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Singer: SEC Enforcement Actions to Enjoin Violations of Section 10(b) and

NOTES & COMMENTS
SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS TO ENJOIN
VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 10(b) AND RULE 10b-5:
THE SCIENTER QUESTION
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,Ithe degree of culpability required to establish a violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-53 in a Securities and Exchange Commission injunctive action was almost uniformly established to be negligence, or the lack of due diligence.4 In
Hochfelder the Court held that a private cause of action for civil
money damages will not lie under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 in
the absence of an allegation of "scienter," 5 which the Court defined as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate,
or defraud." ' Although Hochfelder resolved the degree of culpability in private damage actions so as to require scienter,7 the
1. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
4. See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 809 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC
v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541
(2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 (2d Cir. 1972);
SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339, 1343 (10th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); SEC v.
Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1966); SEC v. M.A. Lundy Assocs., 362 F. Supp. 226,
234 (D.R.I. 1973). But see SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 908 (1975). For a discussion of Coffey, see text accompanying notes 48-58 infra.
5. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
6. Id. (footnote omitted). For further interpretive definitions of the term "scienter,"
see notes 7 & 23 infra.
7. For the pre-Hochfelder confusion concerning the standard of culpability to be
applied for civil liability under § 10(b) and rule lob-5, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). The Court in Hochfelder, however, did not conclusively
define the parameters of the elusive term "scienter," but it clearly stated its unwillingness "to extend the scope of the statute to negligent conduct." Id. at 214 (footnote omitted). While the Court left open the question whether in some circumstances reckless
behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5, it recognized that
"[in certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional
conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act." Id. at 193 n.12.
For a recent case dealing with this issue, see McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057
(D. Del. 1976). In McLean the plaintiff had purchased a small closely-held corporation
partly in reliance upon an opinion audit of the defendant-accountant and had, as a result,
incurred a substantial loss. The district court found that the accountant's conduct constituted "far more than mere negligence, but [fell] short of a preconceived actual intent to
defraud." Id. at 1080. As such, the court held that the defendant's negligent misrepresentations exposed him to liability under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. The McLean court, however,
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Court expressly declined to decide whether scienter is required in
Commission injunctive proceedings for alleged violations of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.1
Three weeks after the decision in Hochfelder, the Office of
the General Counsel of the SEC issued a memorandum to its staff
attorneys' which conceded: "The Hochfelder decision clearly will
have an impact upon pending and future Commission injunctive
actions."' The impact of Hochfelder upon Commission enforcement actions cannot now be doubted," although its ramifications
may not yet be predicted conclusively. 2 This article will explore,
therefore, the likely effects of Hochfelder upon Commission enregarded Hochfelder as not "in any way dispositive of the issue" of whether recklessness
would suffice in a private cause of action for damages under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Id.
Inasmuch as "the Supreme Court. . .explicitly left undefined the parameters of scienter," the court held that "the law of the Circuit Court controls." Id. at 1080-81. Thus, the
court in McLean noted that no controversy existed among the circuits as to whether "some
degree of scienter, short of actual intent to deceive, was sufficient upon which to predicate
liability." Id. at 1081. The court found that those circuits which prior to Hochfelder
required some form of scienter have not "rejected any one degree of scienter as insufficient
in private damage actions." Id. In finding that recklessness is a form of scienter, the court
stated:
There is little reason to distinguish between knowing misbehavior under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In practice, one who recklessly makes a statement inherently possesses some knowledge of its falsity. The common law, precedent in
other fields, and the legislative history of 10(b) all buttress the viewpoint that
10b-5 liability ought to attach upon a showing of recklessness.
Id. at 1084 (footnotes omitted). See also Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,887 at 91,255 (7th Cir. Feb. 23, 1977). For a further discussion of
the issue of scienter, see note 23 infra.
8.Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). The Court noted:
"Since this case concerns an action for damages we . . .need not consider the question
whether scienter is a necessary element in an action for injunctive relief under § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963)."
9. Memorandum from The Office of the General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange Commission to Commission Staff Attorneys Regarding Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder (Apr. 26, 1976), reprinted in SEC. REa. & L. REP. (BNA) F-1 (May 26, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as General Counsel Memo].
10. Id. at F-1 (footnote omitted).
11. See SEC v.American Realty Trust, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,913 at 91,423
(E.D. Va. Feb. 24, 1977); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Harvey Pitt, the SEC's General Counsel, has noted that although Hoch/elder's effects are
not fully known yet, the issue of scienter is now being raised in every case the Commission
brings. SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-11 (Mar. 23, 1977). But see Comments of Irwin
Borowski, Associate Director of the Enforcement Division of the SEC, PLI Conference
(Mar. 1977), quoted in SEC. REG. & L. RP. (BNA) A-7 (Mar. 9, 1977): "No actions have
been brought because of Hochfelder. I can't think of a case we've brought on which
Hochfelder has had significant impact."
12. Compare SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), with
SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976).
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forcement proceedings to enjoin violations of section 10(b) of the

Securities Exchange Act of 1934,11 and rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder.
The Nature of the Remedy

Pursuant to specific statutory enactments by Congress, the
Securities and Exchange Commission is responsible for the enforcement of the various federal securities laws administered by
the Commission." These laws include both the securities statutes
enacted by Congress, and the rules and regulations promulgated
pursuant to such statutes. The particular statutory provisions
which provide for the enforcement of these laws enable the Commission, in its discretion, to seek injunctive relief whenever it
appears that any person "is engaged or is about to engage" in any
act or practice which would constitute a violation of the federal
13. Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the broad antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act, play
a critical role in the protection of investors in the securities markets. The Preamble to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that it is: "An Act to provide for the regulation
of securities exchanges. . . to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges
." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1970) provides: "[Trans.
actions in securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges. . . are affected
with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and
control of such transactions. . . and to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets
in such transactions." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970),
provides that it shall be unlawful:
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Pursuant to this congressional mandate to proscribe fraudulent and deceptive devices, the
Commission promulgated rule 10b-5 which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceipt upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
14. The federal securities laws administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission include: Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970 & Supp. V 1975);
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78hh-1 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. 99 79 to 79z-6 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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securities laws. 5 Section 21(d),1 the enforcement provision of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, provides:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is
engaged or is about to engage in acts or practices constituting a
violation of any provision of this chapter, the rules or regulations
thereunder . . . it may in its discretion bring an action in the
proper district court of the United States . . .to enjoin such

acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or
temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted
17

The statute does not expressly require proof of a past violation of the securities laws for an injunction to issue. However,
past violative conduct is generally sought to be proven in order
to establish the existence of a "reasonable likelihood"' 8 that a
15. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (Supp. V
1975). The other federal securities acts include similar provisions with only minor language variations, without a differing substantive impact. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933
§ 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970); Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 321(a), 15 U.S.C. §
77uuu(a) (1970); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 § 18(f), 15 U.S.C. § 79r(f)
(1970); Investment Company Act of 1940 § 42(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(e) (1970); Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 § 209(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1970).
16. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(Supp. V 1975).
17. Id.
18. In United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953), the Supreme Court
stated that in deciding whether injunctive relief is appropriate, "[tihe necessary determination is that there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation, something
more than the mere possibility which serves to keep the case alive." Courts have traditionally applied the "reasonable likelihood" standard in determining the necessity for injunctive relief. See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d
Cir. 1972) ("The critical question for a district court in deciding whether to issue a
permanent injunction in view of past violations is whether there is a reasonable likelihood
that the wrong will be repeated."); SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 1963);
SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 249 (2d Cir. 1959) ("The critical question for the court
in cases such as this is whether there is a reasonable expectation that the defendants will
thwart the policy of the Act by engaging in activities proscribed thereby."); SEC v. M.A.
Lundy Assoc., 362 F. Supp. 226, 232 (D.R.I. 1973) ("The test to be applied is whether a
defendant's past conduct indicates, under all circumstances, that there is a reasonable
likelihood of further violations in the future unless restrained by the Court."); SEC v.
Bennett & Co., 207 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D.N.J. 1962) ("Once the Court determines that
[the] SEC has presented a sufficient prima facie showing that defendants' past conduct
constitutes a violation of the Act, another test must be applied, and that is, whether or
not such past conduct indicates a reasonable likelihood of further violations in the future.").
Although in SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154, 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Chris Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480
F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973), the district court stated that in order
to obtain injunctive relief, the Commission must prove that the defendants had "a propensity or natural inclination to violate the securities law," the court of appeals in SEC
v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972), expressly repudiated that a
new standard was being applied in Bangor Punta: "[W]e adhere to our well established
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future violation will occur,' and thus that an injunction's prophy-

lactic sanction is warranted. That the defendant, having previously violated the law, is "reasonably likely" to violate the law
in the future, therefore, is an inference which a court may choose
to draw depending on the particular facts and circumstances of
each case.2"
rule and hold that the SEC has demonstrated the necessity for injunctive relief [when]
there is a reasonable likelihood of future violations. . . ... Id. at 1101. See also Chris Craft
Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d at 385, wherein the court noted: "It uniformly
has been held that the correct standard is 'whether there is a reasonable likelihood that
the wrong will be repeated.'" But see 480 F.2d at 394 (Gurfein, J., concurring): "The use
of either test, if indeed they differ except in verbiage, is not the subject of immutable
statutory command."; 480 F.2d at 405 (Mansfield, J., concurring & dissenting): "Although
there is a slight difference between the two clauses ["reasonable likelihood" and "propensity or natural inclination"], both express substantially the fundamental condition
precedent to the issuance of [an] injunction, i.e., that there must be a showing of a
cognizable risk of future violation ....
"
19. Although the Commission need not prove a past violation of the federal securities
laws, past violations may give rise to an expectation of future violations. Thus, when
seeking injunctive relief, the Commission will offer evidence of the defendant's allegedly
illegal prior conduct as a matter of course so that the court may infer therefrom a likelihood of future violations. See, e.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801,
807 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[Tjhe commission of past illegal conduct is highly suggestive of the
likelihood of future violations."); SEC v. First Am. Bank & Trust Co., 481 F.2d 673, 682
(8th Cir. 1973) ("[Tlhe very existence of improper conduct in the past raises an inference
that such conduct will continue in the future."); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.,
458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 1963)
("[F]raudulent past conduct . . . gives rise to the inference that there was a reasonable
likelihood of future violations."); SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 249 (2d Cir. 1959)
("[Plast behavior gives indication that without injunctive measures they might again
engage in such activities."); SEC v. J & B Indus., 388 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Mass. 1974)
("Fraudulent conduct committed in the past may give rise to an inference of recurrent
violations."); SEC v. M.A. Lundy Assocs., 362 F. Supp. 226, 232 (D.R.I. 1973) ("It is
generally recognized that a showing of past violations gives rise to the inference that there
is a reasonable likelihood of future violations.").
In 1975, the committee of conference rejected a Senate bill which amended § 21(e) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (presently § 21(d)) by adding the words "has engaged," to the statutory language "is engaged or is about to engage in . . . a violation."
In rejecting this amendment, the committee of conference stated in its joint explanatory
statement: "The House amendment contained no similar provision. The conference substitute does not make the noted Senate proposed changes in existing law. The Senate
language is dropped without prejudice, the conferees believing that existing law does not
require clarification in [this respect.]" JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITrEE
ON CONFERENCE, SECURITIEs AcTs AMENDMENTS OF 1975, H.R. REP. No. 94-229, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 102 (1975)(emphasis added).
20. Factors which courts commonly consider in determining whether the defendant
is "reasonably likely" to violate the law in the future include: Whether the defendant
ceased or attempted to undo the effects of his unlawful activity prior to the institution of
a Commission investigation or court proceedings, see, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972); the character of the past violation, see, e.g.,
SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 542 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Nor do we suggest that the
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Hochfelder: An Exercise in Statutory Construction
The plaintiffs in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder21 were customers of a brokerage firm who had invested in a securities scheme
which was ultimately revealed as fraudulent, allegedly in violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. The plaintiffs alleged that
the accounting firm of Ernst & Ernst aided and abetted the
broker-dealer in violating section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 by negligently auditing the brokerage firm's books and thus failing to
discover certain unlawful internal practices of the brokerage
firm. 2 The Supreme Court held that a private cause of action for

damages will not lie under section 2310(b) and rule 10b-5 in the
absence of an allegation of scienter.

From an examination of the language of section 10(b), the
Court found that the use of the terms "manipulative," "device,"
and "contrivance" "make unmistakeable a congressional intent
to proscribe a type of conduct quite different from negligence. '24
In addition to noting that these terms have clear and precise
meanings provided by standard dictionary definitions, 25 the
degree of scienter may not be highly relevant to a determination of whether the defendant
has the propensity to commit future violations, a requisite to injunctive relief."); whether
the defendant in good faith relied on the advice of counsel, see, e.g., SEC v. Harwyn Indus.
Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943, 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); whether the defendant had repeatedly
violated the securities laws, see, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d at 542; whether
the defendant persistently maintained that his past conduct was blameless, see, e.g., SEC
v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541 (1st Cir. 1976); and, the trial court's
evaluation of the defendant's sincerity in his assurances that he would not violate the
securities laws again, cf. United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) ("the
bona fides of the expressed intent to comply [with the antitrust laws]"). See also note
70 infra. See generally Jaeger & Yadley, Equitable Uncertainties in SEC Injunctive
Actions, 24 EMORY L.J. 639 (1975).
21. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
22. Id. at 190.
23. Id. at 193. For the Supreme Court's definition of "scienter," see text accompanying note 6 supra. For the Supreme Court's brief discussion of the relevance of recklessness,
see note 7 supra.
Professor Bromberg has suggested that "[p]robably the most important step toward
clarifying the law of scienter would be to ban the word." 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURmTIEs LAW
§ 8.4, at 503 (1971). Professor Loss has noted that scienter "has been variously defined to
mean everything from knowing falsity with an implication of mens rea, through the various gradations of recklessness, down to such nonaction as is virtually equivalent to negligence or even liability without fault . . . ." 3 L. Loss, SECuRmEs REOuLAnON 1432 (2d
ed. 1961). See also Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 562, 567-71 (1972);
Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 48 N.C.L. REy. 482, 48384 (1970); Haimoff, Holmes Looks at Hochfelder & 10b-5, 32 Bus. LAW. 147 (1976); Kee.
ton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A. L. Ray. 583 (1958).
24. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)(footnote omitted).
25. Id. at 199 nn.20 & 21, where the Court noted:
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Court considered the term "manipulative" to be "especially significant" because, as a virtual "term of art when used in connection with securities markets[,] [Ut connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities." 6
Despite its view that the language of section 10(b) unambiguously connotes a standard of "intentional misconduct, 27 the
28
Court nontheless examined the legislative history of the section.
Finding little in the legislative history of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 which bears directly on section 10(b), the Court yet
noted that "[t]here is no indication . . . that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe conduct not involving scienter. ' ' 29 The Court
thus found the relevant portions of the legislative history to "support [its] conclusion that § 10(b) was addressed to practices that
involve some element of scienter and cannot be read to impose

liability for negligent conduct alone.""0
In its amicus curiae brief, the Commission argued that when
Congress intended to require a showing of willful, knowing, or
20. Webster's International Dictionary (2d ed. 1934) defines "device" as
"[that which is devised, or formed by design; a contrivance; an invention;
project; scheme; often, a scheme to deceive; a stratagem; an artifice," and
"contrivance" in pertinent part as "[a] thing contrived or used in contriving;
a scheme, plan, or artifice." In turn, "contrive" in pertinent part is defined as
"[tlo devise; to plan; to plot . . .[t]o fabricate . . . design; invent . . . to
scheme . .. .

21. Webster's International Dictionary, supra, defines "manipulate" as "to
manage or treat artfully or fraudulently; as to manipulate accounts ..
26. Id. at 199 (footnote omitted).
27. Id. at 201.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 202. The Court then quoted what it regarded as the "most relevant exposition of the provision that was to become § 10(b)." Id.
"Subsection (c) [§ 9(c) of H.R. 7852-later § 10(b)] says, 'Thou shalt not devise
any other cunning devices."
Of course subsection (c)is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices. I do not think there is any objection to that kind of clause. The Commission should have the authority to deal with new manipulative devices."
Id. at 202-03 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (statement of Thomas
G. Corcoran)). The Court continued:
This brief explanation of § 10(b) by a spokesman for its drafters is significant.
The section was described rightly as a "catch-all" clause to enable the Commission "to deal with new manipulative [or cunning] devices." It is difficult to
believe that any lawyer, legislative draftsman, or legislator would use these
words if the intent was to create liability for merely negligent acts or omissions.
Id. at 203 (footnote omitted).
30. Id. at 201.
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purposeful conduct as the standard for liability under the securities laws, it explicitly incorporated the terms "willful,"
"knowing," or "purposeful" within the statutory language. 31 The
Court rejected this contention, noting that section 11 of the 1933
Act,32 with its "express recognition of a cause of action premised
on negligent behavior . . . stands in sharp contrast to the lan-

guage of § 10(b), and significantly undercuts the Commission's
argument."33 Moreover, the Court observed that the civil remedies expressly provided for in the 1933 Act, which allow recovery
for negligent conduct, are subject to substantial procedural requirements. 34 The effectiveness of such requirements would be
nullified if actions could instead be brought under section 10(b),
35
which does not impose comparable procedural restrictions.
Relying on the administrative history of the rule, the Court
also rejected the Commission's view that rule 10b-5 proscribes
both intentional and negligent conduct. The Court found that
history to evince the Commission's intent, at the time the rule
was adopted, that it apply only to activities involving scienter 7
Indeed, the Court admonished that the scope of any rule promulgated by the Commission under section 10(b) "cannot exceed the
power granted the Commission by Congress under [that section] ."3
Commission Enforcement ProceedingsPost-Hochfelder:
Determining The Appropriate Standard of Culpability
Although the Court's decision in Hochfelder conclusively established the appropriate standard of liability for private damage
actions, 3 the Court expressly did not decide whether the same
31. Id. at 207.
32. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970)(provides for civil liability for
false registration statements).
33. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208 (1976).
34. Id. at 208-10. These procedural restrictions include the posting of bond for costs,
including attorneys' fees and, in certain circumstances, an assessment of costs and a short
one-year statute of limitations. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e)
(1970); Securities Act of 1933 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970).
35. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 (1976).
36. Id. at 212.
37. Id. at 212 & n.32. The Court noted: "There is no indication in the administrative

history of the Rule that any of the subsections was intended to proscribe conduct not
involving scienter." Id. at 212 n.32.
38. Id. at 214.
39. See note 7 supra. Cf. Vacca v. Intra Management Corp., 415 F. Supp. 248, 250

(E.D. Pa. 1976), (scienter required in an equitable action by buyers for rescission of sale
of securities: "While the Supreme Court left open the question of whether scienter is a
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standard will apply in injunctive actions. 0 The Court ingeminated, however, that the language and history of section 10(b)
necessary element in an action for injunctive relief under those provisions [§ 10(b) and
rule 10b-51, . . . we believe that the Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder holding applies equally
to both equitable actions for rescission and actions at law for money damages.") See note
7 supra.
40. See note 8 supra. While the Court expressly did not decide the appropriate standard of culpability in injunctive actions, in footnote 12 of Hochfelder, it included a "Cf."
signal to the Court's earlier decision in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180 (1963) (Investment Advisers Act of 1940 prohibits a registered investment adviser's failure to disclose to his clients his own financial interest in his recommendations).
The meaning and significance of this citation, however, has been the subject of dispute.
The SEC has noted that the Supreme Court in Capital Gains indicated that in a suit for
equitable or prophylactic relief, all the elements of a suit for money damages need not be
established, and that the securities laws should be interpreted flexibly so as to effectuate
their remedial purpose of avoiding fraud. General Counsel Memo, supra note 9, at F-2.
Since the Court in Hochfelder indicated that § 10(b) was addressed to practices that
involve some element of scienter, the SEC believes that Capital Gainscould be used as a
basis for arguing that recklessness is sufficient in Commission injunctive actions. Id.
Interestingly, however, the courts in both SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp.
1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), and SEC v. American Realty Trust, FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH)
95,913 at 91,423 (E.D. Va. Feb. 24, 1977), see notes 57-74 infra, omitted mention of the
CapitalGains decision and cite thereto by the Hochfelder Court, apparently having discounted its relevance in a Commission action to enjoin violations of § 10(b) and rule 10b5.
The Supreme Court's discussion in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97 S.Ct. 1292
(1977), of the lower court's decision in that case, may shed further light on the relevance
of the Hochfelder citation to Capital Gains. The Court in Santa Fe reversed the Second
Circuit, holding that the Circuit Court's reliance upon cases which dealt with other than
the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, was misplaced,
stating: "The court below construed the term 'fraud' in Rule 10b-5 by adverting to the
use of the term in several of this Court's decisions in contexts other than the 1934 Act
and the related Securities Act of 1933. . . ." Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97 S.Ct. at
1299. The Supreme Court explicitly mentioned the lower court's reliance upon Capital
Gains, and while it recognized that Capital Gainsdid involve a federal securities statute,
the Court explained that its holding there, was "premised on its recognition that Congress
intended the Investment Advisers Act to establish [specific] standards for investment
advisers." 97 S.Ct. at 1299 n.11. The Court therefore indicated:
The Court of Appeals' approach to the interpretation of Rule lob-5 is inconsistent with that taken by the Court last Term in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder ....
Ernst & Ernst makes clear that in deciding whether a complaint states a
cause of action for "fraud" under Rule 10b-5, "we turn first to the language of
§ 10(b), for '[t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a
statute is the language itself.'"
97 S.Ct. at 1299-1300. The Court continued: "The language of § 10(b) gives no indication
that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception."
Id. at 1300. Inasmuch as the Court specifically defined the meaning of the terms "manipulation" and "deception," see note 25 supra and accompanying text, and thus found scienter to be required within the meaning of the statute, application of the Capital Gains
decision to a § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 action would indeed seem to "add a gloss to the
operative language of the statute quite different from its commonly accepted meaning."
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97 S.Ct. at 1300 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976)).
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were dispositive as to the appropriate standard of liability for
private damage actions. Thus, even though the question was
seemingly left open, the Court's construction of the language and
history of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 would appear to compel a
requirement of scienter in Commission enforcement proceedings
as well. Indeed, the dissent noted that the degree of culpability
necessary to establish a violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
should not depend upon the plaintiff's identity,4' and perceived
"no real distinction 4 2 between private damage actions maintained under section 10(b) and Commission injunctive actions.
This argument is in fact the Commission's own, having stated in
its Hochfelder amicus curiae brief that the determination of
whether particular conduct violates section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
should not depend upon the identity of the plaintiff. 3 Thus, the
dissent's reasoning compels the result that if scienter is the appropriate standard of liability in a private damage action under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, scienter must also be required when
the Commission sues for injunctive relief under that statute and
rule.
Although the policy considerations present in Commission
injunctive actions may differ from those present in private actions for damages under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5,4 4 the majority in Hochfelder noted that inasmuch as the language and history of section 10(b) were dispositive as to a requirement of scienter, "there is no occasion to examine the additional considerations of 'policy.' ",4 In Commission injunctive actions subsequent
to Hochfelder, some courts have nevertheless examined the policy
considerations urged by the Commission, and thus found negligence to suffice for a section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 violation.4" Yet,
some post-Hochfelder decisions have held that considerations of
policy will not prevail over the language of the statute so as to
warrant a standard of less than scienter in Commission injunctive
actions.47
41. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 217 (1976)(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as amicus curiae at 8, 16-17, Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
44. See notes 124-126 infra and accompanying text.
45. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976).
46. See, e.g., SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976).
47. SEC v. American Realty Trust, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,913 at 91,440 (E.D.
Va. Feb. 24, 1977); SEC v. Bausch &Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 196).
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Scienter Required
Prior to Hochfelder, only the Sixth Circuit expressly applied
a standard higher than negligence in Commission injunctive actions. 8 SEC v. Coffey49 was an enforcement action to enjoin certain corporate officials from violating sections 17(a) (1)50 and 17(a)
(3)51 of the Securities Act of 1933, section 10(b) of the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934, and rules 10b-5(1) and 10b-5(3) thereunder. The court of appeals reversed the district court's order
enjoining the defendants on the grounds that the Commission
failed to show that the defendants had acted in "wilful or reckless
disregard for the truth. 5 2 The court in Coffey adopted the Second

Circuit's reasoning, enunciated in Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 53 that
the language of section 10(b), particularly the use of the words
"manipulative" and "deceptive," "negate[s] liability for a mere
negligent omission or misrepresentation."5 4 Although Lanza was

a private damage action, the Sixth Circuit in Coffey held that the
reasoning of Lanza must prevail in determining the standard of

liability to be applied in Commission injunctive proceedings.
The precept that the language of section 10(b) is controlling,

regardless of whether a private party or the Commission sues,
appeared in the dissent in Hochfelder,5 has since been followed, 57
and will likely be crucial in the determination of future litiga-

tions."
48. See SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908
(1975). See also note 4 supra and accompanying text.
49. 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) (1970), which provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud ....
51. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3) (1970). This section provides that it shall be unlawful "to
engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
52. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908
(1975).
53. 479 F.2d 1277, 1305-06 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
54. Id. at 1305.
55. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908
(1975).
56. 425 U.S. 185, 217-18 (1976)(Blackmun, J., dissenting). See text accompanying
notes 41-43 supra.
57. SEC v. American Realty Trust, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,913 at 91,440 (E.D.
Va. Feb. 24, 1977); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1240-41 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
58. General Counsel Memo, supranote 9, at F-1.
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Since the decision in Hochfelder, a conflict persists concerning the standard of liability to be applied in Commission enforcement proceedings. In a case of first impression in the Southern
District of New York,5 the district which most often entertains
Commission enforcement proceedings, 0 Judge Ward held that
the Hochfelder decision "must be read to impose a scienter requirement"'" in Commission injunctive actions. This holding
directly conflicts with prior cases in the Second Circuit which
had consistently applied 2a negligence standard in Commission
enforcement proceedings.1

In SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 3 the Commission brought
an injunctive action against Bausch & Lomb, Inc., and its board
chairman, Daniel G. Schuman. Schuman had "leaked" nonpublic corporate information concerning Bausch & Lomb's earnings estimates to a securities analyst. 4 The court denied the injunction and dismissed the action because the Commission had
failed to prove that there was a reasonable likelihood that Mr.
Schuman would violate the securities laws in the future. The
court also found that Mr. Schuman had not acted with scienter
in leaking the information,'- and thus that he had not committed
a past violation of the securities laws: Judge Ward relied upon the
Supreme Court's holding in Hochfelder,66 stating:
Argument drawing upon the words of § 10(b) and the history,
legislative and administrative, of both § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
applies equally to private suits and actions brought by the
Commission.
A careful analysis of Hochfelder has convinced this Court
that the distinction is no longer to be drawn and that the identical standard under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must be applied
whether the plaintiff is the 8EC or a private litigant."
59. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
60. Brodsky, SEC Enforcement Weapon May Be Blunted, 58 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 22,
1976, at 1, col. 2.
61. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
62. See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 809 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC
v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.,
458 F.2d 1082, 1096 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
63. 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
64. Id. at 1237-38.
65. Id. at 1241.
66. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
67. 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1241, 1242 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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The court found that there was substantial evidence of Schuman's lack of scienter, including: the absence of trading by him;
securities analysts' publications expressing the view that Bausch
& Lomb was not an open-mouthed concern; an analyst's testimony that the "slip" of inside information was uncharacteristic
and inadvertent; and, particularly, that shortly after the leak,
Schuman placed a telephone call to the Wall Street Journal to
"go public" with the information, a call which the court viewed
as having been made with a haste belying any intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud."
Inasmuch as Schuman was found to have acted without
scienter, the court held that a past violation of section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 had not been established. However, the court in
Bausch & Lomb recognized that the ultimate issue in such an
injunctive action was not whether Schuman had violated the
securities laws, but whether there was a "reasonable likelihood"
that Schuman would violate the securities laws in the future."
In considering the "totality of circumstances," the court found
Schuman's leak to be an "isolated occurrence." 7 The court,
therefore, concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood
that Schuman would violate the securities laws in the future,
and it denied injunctive relief to the Commission.
Thus, in Commission proceedings to enjoin violations of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, unlike private actions for damages, the
Commission generally attempts to establish both the occurrence
of past illegal conduct, and that such past violations raise an
inference that there is a reasonable likelihood of a future violation. Without this proof of a likely future violation, there is, in
effect, nothing to enjoin.
In a recent decision, SEC v. American Realty Trust,7' the
68. Id. at 1242.
69. Id. at 1244.
70. See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975). Referring
to Commission injunctive actions and the determination of whether the defendant is
"reasonably likely" to violate the law in the future, the court stated: "Whether the inference that the defendant is likely to repeat the wrong is properly drawn. . . depends on
the totality of circumstances, and factors suggesting that the infraction might not have
been an isolated occurrence are always relevant." Id. at 807.
71. FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,913 at 91,423 (E.D. Va. Feb. 24, 1977). The court
also held that scienter is a necessary element in Commission actions to enjoin violations
of § 17(a), the antifraud provision of the Securities Act of 1933. The court based its
interpretation of § 17(a) upon the language of that section, which it found identical to
that of § 10(b). The court also found the purposes of the two sections to be similar,
although the court did acknowledge that § 10(b) was "necessarily broader in scope." Id.
at 91,440.
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District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia also held that
scienter is required in an SEC enforcement action to enjoin violations of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. In American Realty, as in
Bausch & Lomb, the court found that the defendants had not
violated the alleged antifraud provisions, inasmuch as they had
not acted with the requisite scienter. The court in American
Realty, in relying upon the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
language and history of section 10(b) and thus finding scienter to
be required in Commission injunctive actions, stated: "If the language and history of 10(b) is dispositive as to a scienter requirement in private actions, it must also be so for SEC enforcement
actions, since such suits are creatures of statutes .... ,,1As in
Bausch & Lomb, the court in American Realty found that since
no violations had occurred, there was no reasonable likelihood of
future violations. Thus, the Commission's request for injunctive
relief was again denied.
It has been suggested that if scienter is required, the Commission will have to sustain a greater burden of proof in injunctive actions than will the private litigant seeking damages. 3 The
Commission, according to this view, will seek to prove not only
past improper conduct, but a reasonable likelihood of future violations as well; the private litigant need prove only a past violation. Thus, Bausch & Lomb and American Realty arguably represent a new restraint on the Commission's enforcement powers.
Actually, the Commission will have, in most cases, a burden of
proof equal to that of the private litigant, regardless of whether
scienter or negligence is adopted as the standard for establishing
a past violation. If scienter is required to establish a violation in
enforcement proceedings, then the Commission's burden of proof
will be greatest in establishing the past improper conduct. However, even if a showing of negligence is deemed sufficient to establish the past violation, the negligence establishing that past violation may be insufficient to support a finding that future violations are likely. 4 Consequently, in those cases where there is no
In holding that scienter was also required in § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, the court in
American Realty went further than the court in Bausch & Lomb in imposing a scienter
requirement in Commission enforcement proceedings to enjoin alleged fraudulent activities.
72. Id. at 91,440.
73. See Brodsky, SEC Enforcement Weapon May Be Blunted, 58 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 22,
1976, at 1, col. 2.
74. An injunction is designed to deter, not to punish. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S.
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likelihood of future violations, an injunction will be denied.
The Commission has taken the firm stance, nonetheless, that
although Hochfelder's "full impact and meaning . . . is not
clear,"75 the standard of scienter which was required there should
321, 329 (1944). Thus, the Supreme Court has held that a court, in exercising its discretion, may deny an injunction even if a violation is found. Id. at 328-29.
The situation which had occurred in SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), is illustrative. The court there noted that Schuman's "conduct might
justify a finding of negligence," id. at 1242 n.4, although it certainly would not merit a
finding of recklessness or an intent to deceive, defraud, or manipulate. Id. at 1244. If
negligence rather than scienter were deemed sufficient to establish a violation of § 10(b),
however, the result in Bausch & Lomb would have been the same: "[E]ven had a violation been established, the record before the Court does not warrant the grant of this
extraordinary remedy." Id.
The cases are numerous in which a past violation was established, yet a reasonable
likelihood of future violations was not found. Probably, it is the nature of negligence itself,
by definition an inadvertence, which may lead a court to conclude that there is nothing
to enjoin, for there is no reasonable likelihood of future violations. See, e.g., SEC v. Manor
Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
In Manor Nursing Centers the Commission sought injunctions against alleged violators of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. The district court found that all the defendants had violated
the alleged securities provisions. Nonetheless, injunctions were not issued against those
defendants whom the court found to be merely negligent. Rather, injunctions were issued
against the defendants who had not acted in good faith: "With the exception of defendants
Samuel Feinberg, Suzanne Marnane and Gladys Halford [the negligent violators who
were not enjoined], the defendants' violations were willful, blatant, and often completely
outrageous." SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 913, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
afl'd, 458 F.2d 1082, 1097 (2d Cir. 1972). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 312 F. Supp.
77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part on other grounds, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
In Texas Gulf Sulphur the district court on remand found that the framers of a press
release "did not exercise due diligence in its issuance [and thus] violated Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5." 312 F Supp. at 86. Yet, the court denied injunctive relief, stating: "The
issuance of an injunction is inappropriate absent a showing of lack of good faith. . . .On
the record here, there is no 'proper showing' that there is any reasonable likelihood of
future violations by TGS of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5." Id. at 88.
Thus, it has been noted that
some courts, although applying a standard of negligence to determine culpability [and hence the past violation], have seemingly engrafted a standard of
willfulness as a requirement for issuance of the injunction. . . .[N]oxious and
deliberate illegal behavior has a persuasive effect on a court faced with a Commission prayer for injunctive relief, while good faith on the part of the defendant
often tilts the equities in favor of denying the injunction.
Jaeger & Yadley, supra note 20, at 645, 647. The authors note, however:
It is also true . . .that a showing of negligence by itself can be sufficient to
establish both a violation of the law and the equity for injunctive relief. Indeed,
it would be anomalous to require a higher standard to sustain a finding of [a]
likelihood of future violations than that which is required to establish the underlying violation itself.
Id. at 647-48.
75. General Counsel Memo, supra note 9, at F-1.
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not apply in Commission enforcement proceedings. Despite the
Supreme Court's extensive reliance upon the language and history of section 10(b) in requiring scienter in private damage actions, the Commission, "although . . . confident that
[Hochfelder] is not going to be of help to any of us in the foreseeable future,""6 has argued vigorously that the scienter standard
is inappropriate in Commission enforcement proceedings where
"differing policies and purposes" prevail.7
Negligence Will Suffice
In SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 7 the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit enjoined a religious organization and its
leader from violating section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and rule
10b-5. The court held that the defendant's intent is irrelevant in
Commission injunctive actions.7 9 The defendant, World Radio
Mission, which was engaged in evangelical activities, had solicited funds through investment plans. It had, however, failed to
disclose to investors its true financial condition. 0 The district
court held that the Commission "made a prima facie showing of
a violation of the federal security [sic] laws and the likelihood
that future violations will occur," 8' but, in light of certain equitable considerations, the court refused to issue an injunction. 2 The
First Circuit reversed, stating: "From the standpoint of an SEC
injunction against violations which the court finds are likely to
persist, a defendant's state of mind is irrelevant. . . . [G]ood
faith, however much it may be a defense to a private suit for past
actions. . . should make no difference."8 3 The circuit court relied
76. Id.
77. Id. at F-2.
78. 544 F.2d 535 (lst Cir. 1976).
79. Id. at 540.
80. Id. at 539. The Mission solicited investors but did not disclose its substantial and
increasing operating deficit. In effect, it was "borrowing money fast enough to pay off
[its] matured indebtedness." Id. at 540.
81. Id. at 537.
82. Id. A district court has broad discretion to issue an injunction, and, in reaching
its determination, it may take into account relevant equitable considerations. Hecht Co.
v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 328-31 (1944). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recognized the district court's broad discretionary powers in matters of preliminary relief, yet
reversed, noting, "[iln this case its equitable balance was weighted by serious misconception." SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 543 (1st Cir. 1976).
83. SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 540 (1st Cir. 1976) (citation
omitted).
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upon the premise that an injunction is designed to protect the
public against future conduct, not to punish a state of mind."4 In
light of the district court's finding that future violations were

likely to occur, the circuit court issued the injunction.,
The defendants had argued that in light of Hochfelder, the
substantive standards of section 10(b) are unaffected by the
identity of the plaintiff, or the type of relief sought." The defendants maintained that they had not acted with intent to deceive, 7 the standard mandated by the Supreme Court in
Hochfelder. The court's response to this argument was that, even
assuming that the defendants' religious motives and purposes
were beyond reproach, the defendants had evinced an intent to
deceive by stating to prospective investors something "that is
expected to be relied on, that is not believed to be true, or, if
strictly true, is hoped will be understood in an untruthful
sense."88 The court thus indicated that the defendants had acted
with "intent to deceive" as required by Hochfelder. The court,
however, did not "pursue this line of inquiry" inasmuch as it held
that a defendant's state of mind is irrelevant in Commission injunctive proceedings. 9
A defendant's state of mind and good faith, however, will
84. Id. at 541. See note 74 supra.
85. SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 543 (1st Cir. 1976).
86. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 16, SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d
535 (lst Cir. 1976).
87. Id.
88. SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 540 (1st Cir. 1976). In their Loan
Plan Prospectus, the defendants, in answer to skeptical investors, pose the question:
"'How can we possibly pay such interest and still have funds to help the ministry?' "Id.
(quoting World Radio Mission, Inc., Loan Plan Prospectus). The defendants answer:
"World Radio Mission owns a modem, well-equipped publishing company
... . We can produce literature in this plant that generates revenue enough
to pay investors and still have enough left over to be able to provide ton upon
ton of free Gospel literature!"
"For example: Suppose we publish a piece of literature that costs us about
15 cents to produce in massive quantities. That same piece of literature sells
retail for $1.25. You can readily see how we can generate income for our ministry
from our printing plant!"
Id. The court in World Radio Mission indicated that the above, although a hypothetical,
conveyed the message that the defendants were in fact making substantial profits, even
though the printing plant had netted a revenue of less than $5,000 each year. Id. at 540
n.9.
89. Id. at 540. See also SEC v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181, 186 (7th Cir. 1966) wherein
the court held that the defendant's state of mind is irrelevant to the question of whether
injunctive relief is appropriate.
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necessarily be relevant to determining whether future violations
are likely and thus, whether an injunction is warranted." If an
individual has acted in good faith, and his prior misconduct is no
more than inadvertent or negligent, there is no reasonable likelihood of a future violation. If there is no intent to deceive, defraud,
or manipulate, then an administrative warning by the Commission will suffice to alert the individual to the impropriety of his
conduct. Should the disfavored conduct persist, the Commission
may then justifiably initiate an action to enjoin. At that point,
however, proof of the individual's bad faith, or at least, recklessness, will be provided by his failure to heed the Commission's
prior warning. 1 Future violations will thus appear to be "reasonably likely," absent an injunction. In such cases, proof of a past
violation may be established even if the scienter standard applies, because the defendant knew or should have known, in light
of the Commission's initial warning, that his course of conduct
was arguably violative of the federal securities laws. Similarly,
the ongoing infraction raises an inference that future violations
will occur.9 2

Although the court in World Radio Mission expressly discounted as irrelevant the defendant's state of mind, it noted that
the defendants, "while indicating that they would suspend offering their notes, have since apparently engaged in activities that
would be hard to distinguish." 3 Additionally, the defendants in
World Radio Mission had received notice from the Commission
staff that "the legality of WRM's method of raising funds from
the public by sales of securities was questionable." 9' The defen90. See, e.g., SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, 298
(D.D.C. 1973). The court there noted: "The motive, intent and state of mind of the

movants are highly relevant to the Court's determination of the appropriateness of injunctive relief. Well pleaded allegations which support a showing of knowledge and wilfullness
could provide a basis for the issuance of an injunction . .. ."
91. While Hochfelder left unanswered the issues of whether recklessness satisfies a

scienter requirement, and whether scienter is to be applied in Commission enforcement
proceedings, the Commission believes that it "could make a strong argument that a
showing of recklessness would be sufficient in Commission injunctive actions." General
Counsel Memo, supranote 9, at F-2. For a well-reasoned argument, see id. See also note

7 supra.
92. This situation is to be distinguished from that in SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,
420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), in which the court noted that the leak was an isolated
occurrence and where, soon after the leak, procedures to avoid future such occurrences
had been adopted. Id. at 1244-45.
93. SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc,, 544 F.2d 535, 541 n.11 (1st Cir. 1976).

94. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 13-14, SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d
535 (1st Cir. 1976).
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dants nevertheless "continued to offer and sell investment opportunities in WRM even after the Commission advised them that
their activities violated the federal securities laws . . ..., The
repetition of the particular conduct warned against belies mere
negligence and raises the spectre of evil intent, which may at least
have colored the court's opinion." The court purported to apply
the pre-Hochfelder negligence standard of the Second Circuit;"
however, even if the court had applied the scienter standard to
the facts of this case, the defendant would likely have been enjoined.
The Commission's General Counsel Memo to its staff attorneys effectively anticipated a loophole which the court in World
Radio Mission was able to utilize. 8 The memo recommended,
whenever possible, that the staff include allegations of violations of statutory provisions and rules in addition to Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 allegations, and particularly Section 17(a)
of the Securities Act, which may not be subject to the "scienter"
requirements of Section 10(b). Thus, if a court interprets
Hochfelder in a manner hostile to the Commission, allegations
of other statutory violations will still provide the court with an
alternate basis upon which to find a violation and to issue an
injunction."
95. Id. at 20. Even when violations of the federal securities laws have ceased, injunctive relief may nevertheless be appropriate. In United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S.
629, 632-33 (1953), the Court acknowledged that the cessation of illegal activities does not
in itself render an injunctive action moot, for "the court's power to grant injunctive relief
survives discontinuance of the illegal conduct." Id. at 633. Similarly, in SEC v. Culpepper,
270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959), the court stated:
"[O]rdinarily, it is no sufficient answer to a motion for an injunction that
the improper conduct repeated in the past has been discontinued when action
to impose legal restraints is known or thought to be in the offing ... for the
likelihood of a resumption of the acts is a continuing menace." (Emphasis
supplied.)
Id. at 249 (quoting SEC v. Tor, 87 F.2d 446, 449 (2d Cir. 1937)). See also SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers,
Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1101 (2d Cir. 1972).
96. Indeed, the court indicated in dicta that the defendants had acted with "intent
to deceive." See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
97. See Second Circuit cases cited at note 62 supra.
98. General Counsel Memo, supra note 9, at F-3.
99. Id. The court in SEC v. American Realty Trust, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,913
at 91,440 (E.D. Va. Feb. 24, 1977), however, extended the Hochfelder scienter requirement
to enforcement actions to enjoin violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. See
note 71 supra. To the extent that the reasoning of American Realty is followed, the
Commission will have lost the "alternate basis" which § 17(a) might have provided for
avoiding the scienter requirement.
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Using this approach, the court in World Radio Mission avoided
the problematic issue which the decision in Hochfelder presented:
whether scienter is now also to be required in Commission enforcement proceedings. The court noted: "[S]trictly speaking,
since this action is founded on both section 17(a) and Rule 10b5, we need not decide what result would obtain in an SEC injunction action based solely on section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."''1
In light of World Radio Mission and the Second Circuit decision in SEC v. Universal Major Industries Corp.,'" it appears
that the Commission may, to some degree,-be able to avoid the
Hochfelder scienter requirement in proceedings to enjoin fraudulent activities. In Universal Major Industries the Commission
sought injunctions against appellant and seven other defendants.1 2 All defendants, with the exception of the appellant, had
consented to the entry of injunctions against them." 3 The court
of appeals affirmed the district court's order enjoining appellant,
an attorney who was found to have aided and abetted his client
in selling unregistered stock in violation of section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933.1'0
100. SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541 n.10 (1st Cir. 1976). The
court also indicated that it considered it "implausible to suppose that Congress intended
to provide a mechanism for the SEC to protect the public from the injurious schemes of
those of evil intent and yet leave the public prey to the same conduct perpetrated by the
careless or reckless." Id. This effect-oriented approach was urged by the Commission in
Hochfelder. The Court readily disposed of this argument, however, stating:
[T]he commission cites the overall congressional purpose in the 1933 and 1934
Acts to protect investors against false and deceptive practices that might injure
them. . . .The Commission then reasons that since the "effect" upon investors
of given conduct is the same regardless of whether the conduct is negligent or
intentional, Congress must have intended to bar all such practices and not just
those done knowingly or intentionally. The logic of this effect-oriented approach
would impose liability for wholly faultless conduct where such conduct results
in harm to investors, a result the Commission would be unlikely to support. But
apart from where its logic might lead, the Commission would add a gloss to the
operative language of the statute quite different from its commonly accepted
meaning.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 198-99 (1976).
101. 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976).
102. Id. at 1045.
103. Id. Settlements in the form of consent decrees are an important part of the SEC's
current enforcement program due to the Commission's lack of funds to pursue each staff
allegation of wrongdoing. In a consent decree, the defendant consents to the Commission's
findings of illegal conduct without admitting or denying guilt. "Voluntary compliance and
ethical sensitivity are clearly basic in the securities sphere." Address by William J. Casey,
then SEC Chairman, to the Enforcement Conference at the New York Law Journal (Sept.
1972), quoted in J. WIESEN, REGULATING TRANSACTIONS IN SECURITIES 33 (1975).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970) provides:
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Relying on Hochfelder, the appellant in Universal Major
Industries argued that no liability should attach for aiding and
abetting a section 5 violation. Further, he argued that even if
liability may be found in such circumstances, scienter, rather
than mere negligence, must now be proven.' The court held,
however, that Hochfelder does not alter the effect of section 5,
which, by its terms, provides for the imposition of secondary liability."6 The court cited several pre-Hochfelder Second Circuit
cases which support the proposition that injunctive relief is appropriate against aiders and abettors of section 5 violations. 1 7
The court noted that in these section 5 cases, "we also made it
clear that in SEC proceedings seeking equitable relief, a cause of
action may be predicated upon negligence alone, and scienter is
not required.""' While these cases hold that proof of negligence
is sufficient in the context of Commission enforcement proceedings seeking equitable or prophylactic relief, they do not rely
solely upon violations of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 as the basis
for granting injunctive relief. SEC v. Management Dynamics,
Inc.,"' SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd.,"' and SEC v. North American
Research & Development Corp."' also included allegations of
violations of section 5 of the 1933 Act. The rule that a Commission injunctive action may be predicated upon negligence alone
may indeed be unaffected by Hochfelder if violations of sections
other than section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are also proven. This is
precisely the position which the Commission is now urging 2 and
which the First Circuit adopted in World Radio Mission."' In
(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation
or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such
security through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise;
or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any
such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.
105. SEC v. Universal Major Indus., Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1046 (2d Cir. 1976).
106. Id. For the text of § 5, see note 104 supra.
107. Id. at 1047. Cited cases include: SEC v-. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d
801 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. North
Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970).
108. SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1047 (2d Cir. 1976).
109. 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975).
110. 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
111. 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970).
112. See text accompanying notes 98 & 99 supra.
113. 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976). See text accompanying notes 98-100 supra.
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Universal MajorIndustries"' the appellant was not even alleged
to have violated section 10(b) and rule 10b-5; the sole issue was
whether the appellant had violated section 5 of the 1933 Act."'
Moreover, the Second Circuit in Universal Major Industries
hedged the issue of whether scienter was required, stating:
[O]ur decision need not rest on our rejection of appellant's
negligence-scienter argument, because the District Court found
that appellant in some circumstances knew and in other circumstances had reason to know that his client was engaged in illegal
transactions with the aid of appellant's letters and that appellant's acts were performed with knowledge or reckless disregard
to the truth. This, we have held, is sufficient to establish scien6
ter. ,

Thus, in Universal MajorIndustries, as in World Radio Mission,
the court expressly rejected a standard of scienter, yet in dicta,
found scienter or an intent to deceive to be present.
In SEC v. Geotek,"71 the Commission initiated enforcement
proceedings to enjoin the defendants from violating section 17(a)
of the 1933 Act,"' sections 13(a), 1 1 15(d),'2 ° 10(b) of the 1934 Act,
and rule 10b-5. The Northern District of California explicitly
noted the uncertainty concerning the standard of culpability in
Commission enforcement actions under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5.12' The court recognized, however, that section 17(a),
although substantially similar to Section 10(b)i10b-5, does
not contain the specific language of Section 10(b) relied upon in
Hochfelder to require proof of "scienter" in private 10(b)/10b-5
actions and was not specifically discussed by the Supreme Court
in Hochfelder. Nor did the Supreme Court indicate in
114. 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976).

115. See notes 18 & 19 supra and accompanying text.
116. SEC v. Universal Major Indus., Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1047 (2d Cir. 1976). See
also SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225, 1245-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), wherein the
defendants were found to have violated various provisions of the federal securities laws,
including § 10(b) and rule 10b-5, and an injunction was issued. The court there stated:
"While negligence alone suffices as a standard for liability in enforcement proceedings
. . . the misrepresentations and omissions found here were made or withheld either with
actual knowledge or with reckless disregard for the truth." Thus, although a negligence
standard was enunciated in Galaxy Foods, the defendants were, in fact, found not to have
been merely negligent.
117. 426 F. Supp. 715 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). See notes 50 & 51 supra.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)(regulating proxy solicitation).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1970)(periodic filing requirements).
121. SEC v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715, 726 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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Hochfelder whether "scienter" is a required element of proof in

an SEC enforcement action brought for violations of Sections
13(a) and 15(d) of the 1934 Act. 12

Thus, the court found negligence to be sufficient, avoiding once
again a more direct confrontation with the unresolved issue at
hand.' 23 Therefore, courts in future cases in which the Commis-

sion relies solely upon violations of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
will be set to the task of deciding whether the scienter requirement of Hochfelder applies in Commission enforcement proceedings as well.
The Commission has consistently urged that courts distin-

guish between private actions which seek money damages to redress victims for past violations and Commission actions which

seek to prevent future violations to protect the investing public. 24
It is the Commission's position that in view of the different policies and purposes underlying Commission actions, a lesser showing of culpability is required in Commission actions than in pri-

vate actions. To support this proposition, the Commission relies
upon Second Circuit pre-Hochfelder cases which make this distinction, arguing that those cases are "still good law."' s The
122. Id. But see note 71 supra.
123. SEC v. Geofek, 426 F. Supp. 715, 726 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
124. General Counsel Memo, supra note 9, at F-2.
125. Id. at F-2 n.5. The Commission relies upon: SEC v. Management Dynamics,
Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541 (2d Cir. 1973);
and SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
In SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975), the court refuted
the defendants' contention that irreparable injury or the inadequacy of other remedies
must be proven by the Commission before injunctive relief is warranted:
The [defendants'] crucial error on this score is their assumption that SEC
enforcement actions are governed by criteria identical to those which apply in
private injunction suits. Unlike private actions, which are rooted wholly in the
equity jurisdiction of the federal court, SEC suits for injunctions are 'creatures
of statute.'
[Tihe SEC appears in these proceedings not as an ordinary litigant, but as a
statutory guardian charged with safeguarding the public interest in enforcing
the securities laws. Hence, by making the showing required by statute that the
defendant "is engaged or about to engage" in illegal acts, the commission is
seeking to protect the public interest, and "the standards of the public interest
not the requirements of private litigation measure the propriety and need for
injunctive relief."
Id. at 808 (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944)).
The above-quoted passage, however, referred solely to the issue of a showing of irreparable injury, a showing that the court maintained must be made in private injunction
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Hochfelder majority, however, refused to consider policy arguments, finding the words in the statute and rule unambiguous
and dispositive. Moreover, although the Commission seeks to
protect the public interest, it may not exceed its delegated authority under section 10(b). If greater protection is needed for the
investing public, then, as the dissent in Hochfelder indicated, it
"rests with Congress to rephrase and to re-enact."' 2
suits, but whose need is obviated in SEC injunctive actions by the "statutory imprimatur
given SEC enforcement proceedings." Id.
In SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973), the court applied a negligence
standard, noting that the Second Circuit has "repeatedly held negligence to be sufficient
in the context of enforcement proceedings seeking equitable or prophylactic relief." Id. at
541. The court continued: "[1fn a proceeding by the SEC seeking prophylactic relief, we
would be undermining [the protection of investors] by an overly fine appraisal of conduct
which contributes to its circumvention." Id. at n.12.
This analysis, however, is the kind of "effect analysis" which the Supreme Court
rejected in Hochfelder. See note 100 supra. Indeed, the investing public would be afforded
the greatest protection if the strictest standard of culpability were applied in actions under
§ 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court has indicated, it is the language of the statute which mandates a standard of scienter. This is precisely why the
Supreme Court deemed policy considerations irrelevant in Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214
n.33 (1976). See text accompanying note 45 supra.
The court in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), also premised its negligence standard upon policy considerations, stating:
In an enforcement proceeding for equitable or prophylactic relief, the common
law standard of deceptive conduct has been modified in the interests of broader
protection for the investing public. . . for policy reasons which seem perfectly
consistent with the broad Congressionaldesign.
Absent any clear indication of a legislative intention to require a showing
of specific fraudulent intent. . . the securities laws should be interpreted as an
expansion of the common law both to effectuate the broad remedial design of
Congress.

.

.and to insure uniformity of enforcement. .

.

.Moreover.

.

.the

implementation of a standard of conduct that encompasses negligence ...
comports with the administrative and the legislative purposes underlying the
Rule. . . .This requirement, whether it be termed lack of diligence, constructive fraud, or unreasonable or negligent conduct, remains implicit in this standard, a standard that promotes the deterrence objective of the Rule.
Id. at 854-55 (emphasis added) (footnotes & citations omitted).
Much of the foregoing passage appears to have been overridden by the Supreme
Court's decision in Hochfelder. The "effect analysis" which focuses on greater protection
for the investing public was expressly rejected in Hochfelder. See note 100 supra. The
Court in Hochfelder construed both the language and history of § 10(b) to require a
showing of scienter. Likewise the Court indicated that the scope of rule 10b-5 may not be
broadened beyond the authority delegated to the Commission by Congress.
In sum, the policy considerations which these cases advocate may no longer be "good
law" as the Commission urges, in light of Hochfelder.
126. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 218 (1976) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). The General Counsel of the SEC, Harvey Pitt, has recently indicated that
the Commission will await the outcome of several cases concerning the scienter issue as
applied to enforcement suits before seeking remedial legislation to overrule Hochfelder.
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An alternate argument which the Commission has proposed
to avoid the scienter requirement of Hochfelder is that according
to statutory authorization in section 21(d),I a past violation need
not be established to warrant an injunction.rs Thus, if scienter
were required, and the defendant were found to be merely negligent, no violation of section 10(b) would be presented. Nonetheless, the Commission argues, an inference might be drawn that a
future violation is likely. But in such cases, the Commission need
not formally invoke court proceedings to prevent the reoccurrence
of merely negligent behavior.' 29 The Commission may invoke its
administrative proceedings to inform the negligent party of the
impropriety of his conduct. If the party persists in its course of
conduct, the Commission may then justifiably seek an
injunction. At that point, the defendant will no longer be able,
in light of the Commission's notice, to claim that he was merely
negligent.'30
Conclusion
The Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder13l' expressly left undecided whether scienter must be proven in Commission enforcement proceedings to enjoin violations of section
10(b) and rule 10b-5. With regard to private damage actions,
however, the Court found the language and history of section
10(b) to compel proof of scienter. Lower federal court decisions
subsequent to Hochfelder have not uniformly imposed a requirement of scienter in Commission actions to obtain injunctive relief. At least one court, in applying a standard of less than scienter, has found Hochfelder irrelevant to Commission enforcement
proceedings.' 2 In contrast, the Hochfelder holding has been exSEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-11 (Mar. 23, 1977). A House subcommittee, however, has

already recommended such legislation in certain circumstances: "Section 10(b) should be
amended to establish clear liability for negligence by persons effecting transactions in
securities without regard to intent." SuBcoMrrrEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION OF THE
HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH
CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM, 39-40 (Sub-

comm. Print 1976).
127. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (Supp. V 1975).
128. See notes 18 & 19 supra and accompanying text.
129. See text accompanying notes 91 & 92 supra.
130. For a discussion of this situation in SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d
535 (1st Cir. 1976), see text accompanying notes 93-97 supra.
131. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
132. SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976).
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tended by other courts, and a scienter requirement has been imposed.3 3 However this issue is ultimately resolved, a defendant's
state of mind will clearly be relevant in determining the likelihood of future violations of the securities laws and, therefore,
whether injunctive relief is warranted. Because of the crucial nature of the injunctive remedy to the SEC's enforcement powers,
and the obvious need for a uniform construction and administration of the federal securities laws, a resolution by the Supreme
Court of this controversy is desirable and awaited.
Nancy B. McAllister
133. SEC v. American Realty Trust, FED. SEC. L. RP. (CCH) 95,913 at 91,423 (E.D.
Va. Feb. 24, 1977); SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES VERSUS
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT: PREEMPTING
THE MAZE
I.

INTRODUCTION

One's view of an unfriendly cash tender offer, the device by
which one attempts to gain immediate control of a corporation,'
depends upon one's position. To the corporation making the offer,
it is a useful, efficient tool, beneficial not only to the buyer, but
to shareholders tendering shares as well. The arbitrageur2 would
heartily agree, as it is his stock-in-trade. But to the management
of the corporation whose stock is sought, it must seem a ruthless
invasion from which the shareholders will suffer.3
Many managements seeking to resist takeover attempts have
a relatively new weapon at their disposal: the state takeover statute. This article will examine the advisability of eliminating that
weapon. Its purpose is not to examine whether these laws are
desirable for what they seek to accomplish, but rather to demonstrate that they are contrary to the intentions of Congress in
passing the 1933 Securities Act,4 the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act, 5 and the Williams Act.'
I.

BATTLE BY TENDER OFFER

The unfriendly cash tender offer often creates dramatic episodes which engender strife and conflict. Description cannot be
rendered in neutral terms. The corporation making the offer considers itself merely an "offeror"; management of the-target corpo1. Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. RaV. 1250, 1251-54 (1973).
2. In tender offer context, professional arbitrageurs often make substantial
open-market purchases of the target's shares at prices somewhere between the
market price of the target's shares prior to the offer and the tender price, for
the purpose of subsequently tendering such shares at a profit. The price which
arbitrageurs will pay for such shares will be determined by their evaluation of
the risk that tendered shares will not be accepted.
E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 173 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as ARANOW & EINHORN].
3. Management anticipates suffering for itself as well, but this is never stated by
incumbent management resisting a takeover bid.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (1970).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1970).
6. Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m78n (1964)) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-78m(e), §§ 78n(d)-78n(f) (Supp. V 1965-69)),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-78m(e), §§ 78n(d)-78n(f) (1970).
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ration deems it a "raider." 7 The company being sought is dubbed
the "target," and a target often receives shattering blows. Sometimes "target" company inadequately serves, and it may better
be described as the "victim." Incumbent management becomes
entrenched, presumably readying itself for the onslaught. It
frantically seeks time to devise its battle plan so that it may
defend itself."
The terms used to describe unfriendly tender offers may connote violent personal attack or even full-scale warfare. In such a
war, battle lines are clearly defined. On one side stands the offeror, on the other, target's management. The shareholders wander somewhere between in no man's land. Each side wields a
powerful arsenal. The offeror has size and money and thus the
ability to entice shareholders with a premium above the market
value of the stock. Targets have made increasing use of the newest, and perhaps most powerful, addition to their arsenal.
Only a cynic would suggest that the sole purpose of every
state takeover law is to provide a protective environment for incumbent management. The twenty-three' state legislatures that
7. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 597 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 873 (1974).
8. ARANow & EINHORN, supra note 2, at 1.

9. Defensive tactics are discussed in Fleischer, Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 9
Rav. SEC. REG. 853 (1976).

10. See Alaska Takeover Bid Disclosure Act, ch. 129, [1976] 1 BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 6029 (to be codified in ALASKA STAT. § 45.57.010) (effective June 8, 1976); Colorado Investor Protection Act, COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5 (Supp. 1975) (effective July 1,
1975); Connecticut Tender Offer Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-347 (West Supp. 1977)
(effective July 1, 1975); Delaware Tender Offer Act, DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1976)
(effective May 1, 1976); Hawaii Take-Over Bids Law, HAw. REv. STAT. § 417E (Supp.
1975) (effective 1975); Idaho Corporate Take-Over Law, IDAHO CODE § 30-1501 (Supp.
1976) (effective July 1, 1975); Indiana Business Take-Over Law, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-31 (Bums Supp. 1976) (effective June 1, 1976); Kansas Take-Over Bids Law, KAN. STAT.
§ 17-1276 (1974) (effective 1974); Kentucky Take-Over Bid Disclosure Act, Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 292.560 (Supp. 1976) (effective July 1, 1976); Louisiana Business Take-Over Offers Act,
ch. 15, [1976] 1A BLuE SKY L. REP. (CCH) T 21,151 (to be codified in LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 51:1500 (West)) (effective June 28, 1976); Maryland Corporate Take-Over Law, ch. 615,
[19761 1A BLUE SKY L. REp. (CCH) 23,421 (to be codified in MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN.
§ 11-901) (effective July 1, 1976); Massachusetts Regulation of Take-Over Bids in the
Acquisition of Corporations Law, MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 110C, § 1 (West Supp. 1976)
(effective May 22, 1976); Michigan Take-Over Act, P.A. no. 179, [1976] 1A BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) 25,341 (effective July 1, 1976); Minnesota Corporate Take-Over Law, MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 80 B. 01 (Supp. 1977) (effective Aug. 1, 1974); Nevada Takeover Bid Disclosure Law, NEV. REv. STAT. § 78-376 (1973) (effective 1972); New York Security Takeover
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passed these laws generally posit shareholders' interests as the
underlying goal. But unlike blue sky laws, which operate only
when a buyer is physically located within a state," state takeover
laws affect the rights of shareholders and prospective shareholders living far beyond the borders of a particular state. A shareholder living in Arizona, which has no takeover statute, might not
want the protection afforded him by the state of Ohio, whose law
claims a broad jurisdictional basis. 2 Such laws have the inevitable effect of shielding incumbent management. The laws differ
substantially from state to state and conflict where jurisdictions
overlap, as many do. 3 Several provide that the state securities
commission must decide what is a "fair" offer, and may disapprove of those deemed "unfair."" The Williams Act would leave
that determination to the shareholder. These laws conflict with
the Williams Act and to the extent that they do should be
preempted by it. Should the state statutes be found invalid where
they go beyond the federal plan, naught would remain but a body
of laws that mirror the federal scheme. This residue would not
interfere with the purpose of the Act.
It is no accident that the number of state takeover statutes
has increased from eleven' 5 in January, 1976, to the present
twenty-three. These laws have proliferated in reaction to the increase in takeovers: "Tender offers have increased from 34 in
fiscal 1970 to 107 in fiscal 1975, with aggregate cash and securities
offered in fiscal 1975 of over $2.6 billion."'" Takeovers are desiraDisclosure Act, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1600 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77) (effective Nov.
1, 1976); Ohio Take-Over Bids-Requirements, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.04.1 (Page
Supp. 1973) (effective 1969); Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
70, § 71 (Purdon Supp. 1976) (effective Mar. 3, 1976); South Dakota Corporate Take-Over
Offers Law, S.D. COMPaLED LAws ANN. § 47-32-1 (Supp. 1975) (effective 1975); Tennessee
Investor Protection Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2101 (Supp. 1976) (effective Mar. 17,
1976); Utah Take-Over Disclosure Act, S.B. No. 10, [1976] 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
47,331 (effective Feb. 5, 1976); Virginia Take-Over Bid Disclosure Act, VA. CODE § 13.1528 (1973) (effective Mar. 5, 1968); Wisconsin Corporate Take-Over Law, Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 552.01 (1976) (effective 1974). As of November 1, 1976, there were 23 laws in effect.
11. See generally L. Loss & E. CowmTr, BLuE SKY LAw (1958).
12. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.04.1(A)(1) (Supp. 1973).
13. A corporation may thus increase its protection against a takeover attempt by
incorporating in additional states. See discussion of jurisdiction in text accompanying
notes 119-120 infra.
14. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 417E-3(g) (Supp. 1975); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3-2(f)
(Bums Supp. 1976).
15. Vaughan, State Tender Offer Regulation, 9 REv. SEC. REG. 969 (1976).
16. M. Lipton, Corporate Takeovers: Tender Offers & Freezeouts 2 (prepared for a
symposium on takeovers at the Waldorf-Astoria, New York, Oct. 22-23, 1976) [hereinafter
cited as Lipton].
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ble to large corporations, allowing them to buy assets cheaply in
an inflationary economy.'7 Thus, takeovers enable corporations
"[t]o obtain what [they] can't otherwise obtain by negotiation-picking up bear market bargains. In a bear market the low
price ratio and market prices below book value make cash tenders
attractive.""
The problems created by state takeover laws will increase as
the number of tender offers increases. Perhaps tender offers
should be discouraged. The shareholder of a target company may
be pressured into a Hobson's choice in which he must sell his
share or risk retaining less marketable stock."9 States may wish
to provide more protection than the Williams Act affords. The
fact remains, however, that Congress has found tender offers to
be allowable and even desirable,"0 and these state statutes run
contrary to the congressional scheme. Congress never envisioned
the dual lawsuits, proceeding concurrently in state and federal
courts, which these laws encourage.2 1 It is time for Congress or the
courts to put uniformity back into the law governing takeovers by
eliminating these statutes.
The courts may soon have such an opportunity. Recently,
Great Western United Corporation filed suit in district court in
Texas, seeking to enjoin the states of Idaho, Maryland, and New
York from applying their takeover statutes to Great Western
United's cash tender offer for the Sunshine Mining Company, a
22
Washington corporation.
17. See Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HAav. Bus. REv. 135,
136-38 (1967).
18. Lipton, supra note 16, at 7. See ARAow & EINHORN, supra note 2, at 2.
19. For a discussion of listing requirements, see text accompanying notes 101-104
infra. See also S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
20. "[Tlakeover bids should not be discouraged because they serve a useful purpose
in providing a check on entrenched but inefficient management." S. Rep. No. 550, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967), reprintedin [1968] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2813.
21. For a discussion of such a dual suit, see text accompanying notes 128-i31 infra.
22. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, No. CA3-77-0405 (D. Tex., filed Mar. 28,
1977). The plaintiff contends that the takeover statutes of Idaho, Maryland, and New
York are unconstitutional as a burden on interstate commerce, as a violation of the
supremacy clause, and as a violation of equal protection and due process constitutional
guarantees. Plaintiff's Complaint, Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, No. CA3-77-0405
(D. Tex., filed Mar. 28, 1977), at 2. The plaintiff maintains that the Williams Act is a
"uniform national system of regulation of interstate cash tender offers," and preempts
state legislation in that area. Id. at 7. 23. The purpose of the Williams Act is to insure that public shareholders
who are confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will not be required to
respond without adequate information regarding the qualifications and intentions of the offering party. By requiring disclosure of information to the target
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In enacting the Williams Act, Congress has preempted the
state statutes. The courts may enforce this by holding the laws
invalid, preempted by federal law, in any actual controversy.
State and federal laws covering identical subject matter coexist
in many instances. State bank robbery laws, for example,
complement federal law and aid in enforcement. As will be demonstrated, such is not the case in this area of securities regulation.
Hence, preemption is the only solution.

II.

THE WILLIAMS

ACT

The Williams Act was enacted in response to the gradual
increase in the number of tender offers, and was designed to fill
investor information gaps in existing legislation.2 The federal
tender offer statute," like the Securities Acts, is based on the
concept of "disclose or abstain. ' 25 It assures a target company's
shareholders that all information material to determining
whether to tender their stock will be provided. Standards for
disclosure are embodied in the Williams Act.2"
The Act provides only standards for disclosure; Congress
expressly rejected an alternative statute that would substantively
regulate tender offers to protect companies from "raids. '2 This
bill would have required that the bidder give twenty days notice
to the target corporation and the Securities and Exchange Commission of his intent to make a tender offer. The bill was never
reported out of committee.2 Congress noted that the timing of a
tender offer is often determinative of its success, and that prior
notice to a target company could cause wide fluctuations in the
29
market price of the target's stock.
Thus, Congress recognized the necessity for what has become
known as the "balanced scheme, 3 an approach to tender offers
by corporations as well as to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Congress intended to do no more than give incumbent management an opportunity
to express and explain its position.
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1975).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)- 78m(e); §§ 78n(d)-78n(f) (1970).
25. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-78m(e); §§ 78n(d)-78n(f) (1970).
27. See 1967 Report to the Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess., 111 CONG. Rlc. 28256 (1965).
28. Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 687, 688 (1975). See
S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967).
29. Hearings on H.R. 14475 and S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and
Financeof the Comm. on Interstateand Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1968)
(statement of Donald L. Calvin, Vice President of the New York Stock Exchange).
30. State Takeover Statutes and the Williams Act (A Report of the Subcomm. on
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that favors neither the target's management nor the offeror.3 '
Congress did not intend to eliminate takeover bids, and the drafters of the Act took "extreme care to avoid tipping the balance
of regulatory burden in favor of management or in favor of the
person making the takeover bid."3 In requiring only disclosure
and rejecting further regulatory measures, Congress limited the
purpose of the Act to "full and fair disclosure for the benefit of
stockholders while at the same time providing the offeror and
management equal opportunity to fairly present their case." 3
The Act was designed to do no more than lay the ground rules
for a fair fight between management and the offeror."
The Securities Exchange Act requires limited disclosure by
any person" acquiring "beneficial ownership" of five percent of
Proxy Solicitationsand Tender Offers of the Fed. Regulationof Sec. Comm. of the American Bar Ass'n Section of Corp. Banking and Business Law), reprintedin 32 Bus. LAw 187
(1976) [hereinafter cited as State Takeover Statutes].
31. [T~he primary objective of the Williams Act was to provide investor
protection in takeover situations rather than regulate tender offers as an economic phenomenon, that the primary, if not the sole, means by which this
objective is to be achieved is full disclosure to the shareholders of the so-called
"target company", and that the Act was intended to be administered in an
evenhanded way, except to the extent necessary to accomplish the purpose of
investor protection.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 94 (1976) (statement of Philip A. Loomis, Sec. & Exch. Comm'r).
32. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
33. 113 CoNG. Rac. 854-55 (1967) (statement of Senator Williams).
34. We think it clear that the purpose of The Congress, in the enactment
of the legislation in question, is to provide investors who hold equity interests
in public corporations, material information with respect to the potential impact of any effort to acquire control of a company, sufficient time within which
to make an unhurried investment decision as to whether to dispose of or retain
their securities, and to assure fair treatment of the investors. We deem it abundantly clear that there is an obligation on persons attempting to gain control of
a corporation by means of tender offers to make the required filings and disclosures.
Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
35. "Person" is defined to include a "group." 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (1976). Such
acquiror must file a Schedule 13D with the Commission. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976). The
Act requires filing within 10 days of the offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1976). Schedule 13D
provisions include disclosure of the "background and identity" of the purchaser, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d)(1)(A) (1976); the "source and amount of the funds" to be used for the purchase,
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(B) (1976); any plans for liquidation, merger, or "any other major
change in its business or corporate structure," 15 U.S:C. § 78m(d)(1)(C) (1976); "the
number of shares of such security which are beneficially owned, and the number of shares
concerning which there is a right to acquire" by the purchaser, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(D)
(1976); information concerning "any contracts, arrangements or understandings" with
respect to the securities of the issuer, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(E) (1975).
A Schedule 13D also requires a five percent owner to disclose any additional pur-
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any class of registered equity securities. The Williams Act further
requires that any person or group making a tender offer which
would result in ownership of more than five percent of the target
"6
must file a Schedule 13D at the same time the offer is made.
Shareholders, however, are permitted a change of heart; their
tendered shares are not committed indefinitely, but may be withdrawn during the first seven days of the offer or after sixty days
if not yet purchased or returned. 37 Shares tendered during the
first ten days must be purchased on a pro rata basis 38 to prevent
a disorderly first-come-first-served avalanche of tendered shares.
As an extra protection for early tenderers, any subsequent increase in the offered price must be paid to all tendering shareholders. 39
While the Williams Act provides shareholders with information regarding the offeror's proposed purchase, it also allows the
target's management an opportunity to present arguments
against the purchase to prospective tenderersA' Thus, the mystery surrounding the offeror and the otherwise unopposed attractiveness of the premium4 are "the evils which the Williams Act is
designed to eliminate." '
Failure to comply with the disclosure provisions of the Act
constitutes more than a mere "technical violation"; 42 the offender
usually can expect harsh treatment by the courts. In Cattlemen's
Investment Co. v. Fears,4 3 the defendant owned 4.86% of the
plaintiff's corporation and proceeded to purchase additional
chases, and to promptly amend "if any material change occurs" in any item required to
be disclosed, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(2) (1976). See Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 370 F. Supp. 597, 610 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 497 F.2d 394 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 870 (1974).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976).
37. Id. § 78n(d)(5).
38. Id. § 78n(d)(6).
39. Id. § 78n(d)(7).
40. The purpose of the filing and notification provisions is to give investors
and stockholders the opportunity to assess the insurgents' plan before selling or
buying stock in the corporation. It additionally gives them the opportunity to
hear from incumbent management on the merit or lack of merit of the insurgents' proposals.
Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1253 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
41. Id.
42. Twin Fair, Inc. v. Reger, 394 F. Supp. 156, 160 (W.D.N.Y. 1975) (good faith in
failure to file is irrelevant, even though offeror is unaware of filing requirements, where
actual harm occurs). Cf. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57-62 (1975) (if
offeror acts in good faith and files when he becomes aware of an obligation to do so, and
there has been no irreparable harm, issuance of an injunction is not warranted).
43. 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
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stock, thus increasing his holdings in excess of 5%.44 While the
defendant was not engaged in a formal tender offer, the court
decided that his conduct constituted a tender offer within the
meaning of the Act.4 5 The court then enjoined the defendant from
voting all stock purchased after he was required to file. 6 The
Williams Act should not be taken lightly by those acquiring large
blocks of shares in publicly held corporations.
Federal courts generally agree that the shareholder is the
primary intended recipient of the protections offered by the Williams Act.47 That the purpose of the Act is to protect investors is
underscored by many decisions employing the "reasonable investor" standard to determine whether there has been sufficient disclosure. "The applicable test for whether a misrepresentation is
material is whether a reasonable investor might have considered
information to be important in deciding to accept a tender
offer."4 The standard deals not with the magnitude of any misrepresentation; rather it demands that shareholders be given all
44. Id. at 1250.
45. When we consider the plain language of the statute and rules and the
purposes to be served, we have no hesitancy in concluding that the activities of
the defendant in making contact with the plaintiff's shareholders by the use of
the mails, telephone calls, and personal visits, for the purpose of purchasing
their shares, constitute "tender offers for, or a request or invitation for tender
offers of" their stock within the meaning of the statute.
Id. at 1252.
46. Id. at 1253.
47. See, e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th
Cir. 1970); Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
Some courts have stated that the Act covers all shareholders of the target company,
even those who do not plan to tender their stock. "[I]t
must always be remembered that
the protections of the Williams Act extend to all shareholders of the target company-both
those who intend to divest themselves of ownership and those who do not. Both groups
must be assured full, fair and adequate disclosure. . . ." Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v.
Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 394 F. Supp. 267, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Other courts have taken
a broader view of the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act, interpreting the provi.
sions as a protection for investors in general, as a means of providing an environment in
which investments may be made knowledgeably with the confidence that full disclosure
of all pertinent information has been made. Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 500 F.2d
1011, 1015-16 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co.,
489 F.2d 579, 597 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Bath Indus., Inc. v. Canada
Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 420 (S.D. Tex. 1973). Thus, the Williams Act operates as
a vehicle for promoting investor trust in the integrity of securities markets.
48. Missouri-Portland Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388, 393 (8th Cir.
1976). Accord, Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247, 252 (2d Cir.
1973); Electronic Specialty Corp. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948 (2d
Cir. 1969).
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information they might consider material.4 Some courts have
identified the "reasonable prototype investor"5 as the chief object of Williams Act protection. No court has interpreted the Act
to exist mainly for the benefit of incumbent management. Yet
incumbent management, not the shareholder, is the principal
beneficiary of the protections offered by the various state laws.
Some decisions have specifically excluded certain classes
from the protections offered by the Williams Act. In Klaus v. HiShear Corporation,5' the court noted that the Act "was designed
to protect cash tender offerees, not offerors. ' 52 In H. K. Porter Co.
v. Nicholson File Co., 51 the court held that the Act also covered

shareholders of the offeror corporation in situations where misstatements by the target's management resulted in an unsuccess-54
ful offer. In such a situation, the offeror has standing to sue.
Another decision held that the purpose of the Act is to protect the
offeror, the target corporation, and the target's shareholders,
"who must determine whether or not to tender their shares pursuant to the offer." 55
If the Act did, indeed, emerge as a result of Congress's efforts
"to protect investors from unscrupulous corporate raiders,''"
49. Broder v. Dane, 384 F. Supp. 1312, 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (citing Sonesta Int'l
Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973)).
50. Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd,
45 U.S.L.W. 4182 (Feb. 23, 1977) (Nos. 75-353, 354 & 355); General Host Corp. v. Triumph
Am., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Other courts have adopted a more exacting standard of materiality, but still focus
on the shareholder as the principal beneficiary of the Williams Act. This second test deems
any misstatement or omission "material" if a stockholder who tendered his shares would
not have done so absent the alleged violation. Electronic Specialty Corp. v. International
Controls Corp. 409 F.2d 937, 948 (2d Cir. 1969); Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus.,
Inc., 383 F.2d 840, 843 (2d Cir. 1967); Spielman v. General Host Corp., 402 F. Supp. 190,
194 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The decisions typically assert that "materiality" is not merely an
abstract notion, but must take into account "all the circumstances surrounding the transaction." Id.
This test requires that the shareholder would not have sold his shares had he known
more, while the first test examines only whether information that the stockholder should
have known was withheld.
51. 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975).
52. Id. at 232 (citing Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975)).
53. 353 F. Supp. 153 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973).
54. "Congress did not intend to favor either the offeror or the target corporation by
passage of the Williams Act. Defendant would have the Act read to favor the target
corporation." H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 353 F. Supp. 153, 164 (D. R.I.), aff'd,
482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973).
55. Cauble v. White, 360 F. Supp. 1021, 1028 (E.D. La. 1973).
56. "It is clear that the immediate purpose of the Williams Act was to protect investors from unscrupulous corporate raiders who could force shareholders into making a
hasty, uninformed decision to sell by offering to buy a portion of the target corporation's
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management of target corporations have not remainpd immune
from the Act's sanctions for making misleading statements.
Many courts have held that the Act applies also to misrepresen7
tations made by the target's management.
Hence, the balanced scheme embodied in the Williams Act
exists for the protection of shareholders, whether shareholders of
the target company, the offeror, or the investment community in
general. The Act was not conceived to be, and does not operate
as, a protection for incumbent management. In Scott v. MultiAmp Corp.,5" the court held that even though the acquiring group
gained control of the corporation with the knowledge and cooperation of existing management, and though the transaction was
preceded by wide publicity, the acquiror was still required to file
a Schedule 13D. 9 Incumbent management was fully informed
and even participated in the takeover; the defendant was nevertheless required to file for the benefit of the shareholders. To
underscore this point, one court stated: "The history of the Act
• . . clearly reveals that § 13(d) was not enacted to provide protection for management against raiders, as there is substantial
disagreement as to whether tender offers and stock acquisitions
in pursuit of control constitute a desirable and healthy aspect of
stockholder democracy."" °
The Act, as interpreted by numerous federal courts,' was
written and enacted with the shareholder's protection in mind,
and was not meant to obstruct legitimate takeover bids."2 Congress and the federal courts apparently decided to sanction the
use of tender offers as a lawful economic device by which one
corporation can gain control of another. The ultimate decision
securities at a premium price." Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 597 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
57. See, e.g., id. at 598; Missouri-Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 375 F. Supp.
249, 269-70 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 883 (1974).
58. 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974).
59. Id. at 54.
60. Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 354 F. Supp. 686, 694 (W.D. Wis. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 500 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 422 U.S. 49 (1975). Accord, Bath
Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 109 (7th Cir. 1970); GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 324 F. Supp.
1062, 1069-70 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971).
61. See generally cases cited in note 48 supra.

62. Congress did not intend "to impose an unrealistic requirement of laboratory
conditions that might make the new statute a potent tool for incumbent management to

protect its own interests against the desires and welfare of the stockholders." Electronic
Specialty Corp. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948 (2d Cir. 1969). Accord,
Missouri-Portland Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388, 397 (8th Cir. 1976).
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whether to tender their shares is left to the stockholders. The
Williams Act is designed to furnish shareholders information necessary to decide whether an offer is fair and adequate.
The state statutes, under the guise of protecting stockholder
interests, permit the infusion of matters irrelevant to the shareholder into the tender offer process." Many statutes undercut the
sovereignty of the shareholder over his own shares by deciding for
him what constitutes a fair offer." Many tender offers involve
premiums of twenty to fifty percent above current market value, 5
yet a shareholder seeking to tender his shares may be required to
wait for the approval of the state securities commission." Likewise, an offeror who has gone to great expense to make an offer,
willfully incurring any risks involved, must await this same approval. The determination by a state securities commission may
involve a nationally traded security owned by shareholders in all
respects alien to that state. To contend that these statutes avoid
conflict with and merely supplement the Williams Act is to misread the legislative history and the court decisions dealing with
that legislation.
IV.

STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES

While state legislators pontificate about investor protection,
the financial news media have announced that state takeover
laws are designed primarily to obstruct takeovers. 7 Few state
legislators have displayed the candor of those in New York, where
"even the legislation's creators, concede that it would reduce the
number of tender offers and make New York State a more attractive home for companies afraid of a buy-out bid."68 Thus, while
many states create the subterfuge of "investor protection," the
63. See text accompanying notes 133-139 infra.
64. See text accompanying notes 122-124 infra.
65. Most tender offers involve premiums 20% above current market value. See Hayes
& Taussig, supra note 17, at 139-40. Troubh, Purchased Affection: A Primeron Cash
Tender Offers, 54 HARv. Bus. REv. 79, 82-83 (1976).
66. See text accompanying notes 122-124 infra.
67. The New York Times reported: "Governor Carey signed a bill yesterday that
would impose procedural restrictions on the growing number of unfriendly tender offers-the gambit employed by acquisition-minded companies to buy out shareholders of
other corporations." N.Y. Times, July 30, 1976, § D, at 3, col. 3.
Again from the Times: "States are moving with increasing frequency to impose procedural restrictions on unfriendly tender offers, that is, the practice by acquisition-minded
companies of buying out shareholders of other corporations." N.Y. Times, July 6, 1976,
at 41, col. 7. See Vaughan, supra note 15, at 969.
68. N.Y. Times, July 30, 1976, § D, at 3, col. 3.
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real import of these acts is lost on no one except perhaps the
shareholder.
The following sections demonstrate some of the many ways
in which the state statutes conflict with the Williams Act. While
not exhaustive, these sections describe the most formidable challenges to the federal plan posed by the state statutes.
A.

Percentage of Ownership

The Williams Act requires disclosure to be made when an
offeror makes an offer that would result in his ownership of five
percent or more of any class of securities in a corporation." The
state statutes are actuated by varying percentages of ownership.
The Wisconsin statute, for example, comes into play before any
offer that would result in at least five percent ownership;'" Colorado's statute is triggered by an offer that would result in at least
ten percent ownership; 7 ' the Kansas statute requires twenty per72
cent.
B.

Filing in Advance

Unlike the Williams Act, all state statutes require a statement to be filed with the state securities commissions and the
target companies, and require the terms of the offer to be announced publicly 73 before the offer can become effective. These
requirements interfere with the delicate timing and the element
of surprise necessary to make a tender offer successful.7 4 Preregis7
7
tration requirements range from ten days to sixty days. Most
statutes render the offer effective a specified number of days after
filing. This is meaningless, however, as it applies only if the offer
69.
70.
71.
72.

15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1976).
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 552.01(5) (1976).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5-102(13) (Supp. 1975).
KAN. STAT. § 17-1276 (1974).

73. E.g., even the Delaware law, which is viewed as the mildest of all state takeover
statutes, requires notification of the state securities commission and the target 20 days
prior to the offer. DEL. CODE, tit. 8, § 203(a)(1) (Supp. 1976).

74. One of the most damaging effects of prefiling is that it eliminates the essential
element of surprise. Yet this crucial element is permissible under the federal scheme. The
Williams Act does not require prefiling in any form. It is clear that Congress did not
consider prefiling as a protection to be afforded shareholders, but rather viewed it as an
undesirable burden on the offeror that would "tip the balance" in favor of incumbent
management. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967). See H.R. REP. No. 1711,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968).
75. COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5-104(1) (Supp. 1975).
76. HAw. REV. STAT. § 417E-3(f) (Supp. 1975).
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is uncontested.7 7 Since many tender offers are contested, the date
of filing is only the beginning of a long administrative process.
Most states require a filing fee to be paid by the offeror.
While relatively insignificant, this represents only the first of a
long list of expenses exacted by these statutes. Louisiana and

Tennessee charge $1008 for the "services" of their securities commissions; Connecticut charges $250. 71New York reserves the right
to charge up to $2,500 for filing." Many states require an additional sum of equal amount to be paid by the target upon application for a hearing.8"
C.

Length of Offer and Withdrawal Rights

Under the Williams Act, an offer must be open for a minimum of seven days if it seeks all the stock of the target company.

2

Several state laws lengthen this minimum time the offer must
remain open. Alaska demands that the offer be open from twenty-

one to thirty-five days, 3 while Massachusetts law requires that
the offer remain open for sixty days.84
The Williams Act provides for withdrawal rights during the
first seven days of the offer and after sixty days. 5 Idaho, Minnesota, and Wisconsin have retained this scheme.88 Other states

have imposed considerable variations. Colorado permits withdrawal during the first fifteen days and after thirty-five days; 7
77. In Louisiana, the offer is effective 20 days after filing, but may be accelerated "if
the target company agrees . . . ." Louisiana Business Take-Over Offers Act, ch. 15,
[1976] 1A BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 17,231, at 17,232 (to be codified in LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 51:1501(E) (West)) (effective June 28, 1976). If the purpose of the law is to give
shareholders ample time to make a decision, it is questionable why the state allows
management to agree to such an acceleration.
78. Louisiana Business Take-Over Offers Act, [1976] 1A BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
17,231, at 17,234 (to be codified in LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1506 (West)) (effective June

28, 1976);

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 48-2109 (Supp. 1976).

79. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-347j(a) (West Supp. 1977).
80. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1608 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77).
The justification for the charge is of little comfort to the offeror, who is told that the
fee is exacted "to recover the costs of administering this article." Id.
81. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-347j(a) (West Supp. 1977); Louisiana Business TakeOver Offers Act, [1976] 1A BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 17,231, at 17,234 (to be codified
in LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1506 (West)) (effective June 28, 1976).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (d)(1)(5) (1976).
83. Alaska Takeover Bid Disclosure Act, ch. 129, [1976] 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
1937 (to be codified in ALAsKA STAT. 45.57.010) (effective June 8, 1976).
84. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110C, § 7 (West Supp. 1976).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1)(5) (1976).
86. IDAHO CODE § 30-1506(2) (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.06 Subd. 2 (Supp.
1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 552.11(2) (West 1976).
87. COLO. REv. STAT. § 11-51.5-103(c) (Supp. 1975).
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Alaska, Virginia, and Nevada require withdrawal rights to be
given within the first twenty-one days of the offer."5 Massachusetts and Hawaii allow withdrawal any time up to five days prior
to the termination of the offer;89 Kentucky and Indiana allow
withdrawal up to three days prior to termination.
D. Disclosure Provisions
All states' statutes require at least those items included in
the Schedule 13D to be disclosed,' but most require substantially
more. Virginia's statute, typical of many states, requires:
-Description of each class of the offeror's capital stock and
of its long-term debt;
-Financial statements for the current period and for the
three most recent annual accounting periods;
-Description of the location and general character of the
principal physical properties of the offeror and its subsidiaries;
-Description of pending legal proceedings to which the offeror or any of its subsidiaries is subject;
-Description of the business done and projected by the offeror and its subsidiaries, including business done over the past
five years;
-Names of all directors and executive officers with biographical summaries of each for the past five years;
-Any proposed material transactions or any occuring in the
past three years between the offeror or its subsidiaries and its
directors or executive officers. 2
Many states include a variety of additional disclosure requirements. Pennsylvania, for example, requires a history of the
88. Alaska Takeover Bid Disclosure Act, ch. 129, [1976] 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
1937, at 1938 (to be codified in ALASKA STAT. § 45.47.020(2)) (effective June 8, 1976);
VA. CODE § 13.1-530(b) (1973); NEv. REv. STAT. § 78.3772.2 (1973).
89. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110C, § 7 (West Supp. 1976); HAW. REV. STAT. § 417E2(2) (Supp. 1975). Thus, in Massachusetts, where the offer must be left open a minimum of 60 days, the offeror may find he has failed 55 days after the offer, even if the offer
is uncontested. He may pay all expenses necessary to a tender offer, only to find the shares
withdrawn near the termination date.
90. Louisiana Business Take-Over Offers Act, [1976] 1A BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
17,231, at 17,234 (to be codified in LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1504(A) (West)) (effective
June 28, 1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3-5(a) (Bums Supp. 1976).
91. Some states follow the Schedule 13D format very closely. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit.
8, § 203(a)(1) (Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 552.03 (West 1976). Others simply require a Schedule 13D, or allow the 13D as a substitute for their own requirements under
the statute. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 11.51.5-104(2) (Supp. 1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 47-32-6 (Supp. 1975).
92. VA. CODE § 13.1-531(b)(vii) (1973).
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offeror's employer-employee relations during the past five years,
including strikes and unfair labor practices found by the National
Labor Relations Board.9 3 In addition to the multitudinous requirements of the state statutes, New York, like many other
states, reserves the right to request "[s]uch data and further
documents. . . and information as may be required by the attorney general."9 4
One disturbing problem with these extensive state requirements is that this information carries virtually no import for the
tendering shareholder.9 5 The basic premise of all these laws is that
they were enacted for the investors' protection. Yet any benefit
from the additional disclosure required by state statutes accrues
only to the states themselves. While the investor is concerned
with the potential profitability of his shares, many of the statutes
require disclosure of items irrelevant to that interest. Instead they
stress items regarding the effects on local economies that the
proposed takeovers might produce. A state might be interested in
the financial integrity of the offeror or the background of its
directors if that offeror is about to take over a local corporation.
This interest manifests the state's concern with protecting its
citizenry. The state would even be interested in how the offeror
has dealt with labor in the past, a concern demonstrated by the
Pennsylvania law. But many of these laws are misrepresented
behind the facade of shareholder protection. The shareholder's
concerns include the price he is offered for his stock and its potential for profit should he decide to retain it. The financial integrity
of the offeror has already been demonstrated to tendering shareholders by the offer itself. Thus, the state laws conflict with the
Williams Act on the most basic level, concerning the very purpose
for which the laws regulating takeovers were passed. Shareholder
protection is the primary purpose behind the federal law; protection of incumbent management is the primary purpose behind
the state laws.99
93. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 74(8)(Purdon Supp. 1976).
94. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1603(8)(McKinney Supp. 1976-77). See KA. STAT. § 171279(h)(1974); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.04.1(h)(Page Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 48-2104(3)(Supp. 1976).
95. This information would only be of major importance to a shareholder if he were
to receive stock of the offeror in exchange for his shares. In such a case, he would be

interested in many aspects of the corporation whose stock he was to receive. But the type
of disclosure required by the state statutes appears irrelevant to a cash tender offer.
96. Possibly, state legislatures created this not-so-subtle subterfuge because they
hoped to minimize interstate commerce problems in the courts with statutes appearing
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E. Amount of Shares
Ohio, under "emergency rules" since repealed, permitted no
offer for less than all outstanding common shares of the target. 7
Hawaii still prohibits offers for "less than all shares of a class."
For an acquiring corporation to gain "absolute" control of a
target, it must accumulate more than fifty percent of all voting
stock or other securities convertible to voting stock.99 Effective or
working control might be attained by accumulating as little as
twenty percent of the target's securities where the stock is widely
held.10 Nevertheless, provisions such as Hawaii's render takeover impossible where the offeror seeks to acquire less stock than
the statute permits. This problem has not yet surfaced, but the
difficulties posed by these requirements remain.
The states contend that these statutes protect shareholders
with stock remaining where the offeror buys less than all shares
tendered. Such shareholders might have their securities delisted
if the number of shares remaining no longer satisfies listing requirements.10' Thus, a shareholder whose stock was not purchased
by the offeror retains a less marketable security.
A requirement such as Hawaii's may wholly prevent an offer
that might otherwise have been made. A shareholder in Washington, which has no takeover statute, standing to make a financial
gain upon tender of his shares, might be prevented from doing so
if one such statute discourages an offer concerning his stock.
While Hawaii claims to protect his interests, he may want no
such protection.
F. Administrative Hearings
Delaware's law truly aims at assuring investor protection,
requiring only that twenty days' advance notice be given to the
target and that the offer be left open for twenty days. That law
makes no provision for administrative hearings of any kind.,0 2 In
to protect investors' interests. State legislators may believe that courts will view interference with out-of-state shareholders for the sake of the protection of resident shareholders
as less egregious than engaging in such interference to protect local economies.
97. Ohio Exec. Order (Feb. 3, 1976) (approving adoption of rule COs-2-041(A)).
98. HAw. REv. STAT. § 417E-2 (3) (Supp. 1975).

99. The notion of "absolute control" is irrelevant where stock in a corporation is
widely-held.
100. Troubh, supra note 65, at 81.
101. New York Stock Exchange Constitution and Rules 4201 (1973).
102. DEL. CoDE tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1976).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol5/iss4/3

42

Singer: SEC Enforcement Actions to Enjoin Violations of Section 10(b) and

State Takeover Statutes

New York, however, the attorney-general is empowered to call a
hearing at his discretion.10 3 Some states empower the securities
commission to hold a hearing, but only at the request of the target
and then only if the commissioner deems it necessary." 4 The most
popular approach allows the commissioner to call a hearing at his
discretion,
but makes a hearing mandatory at the target's re5
quest.

0

The time limits for hearings vary widely among the states.
Connecticut, Minnesota, and South Dakota require a hearing
within twenty days after filing.0 6 New York and Ohio require a
hearing, if necessary, any time within forty days of filing.0 7 Massachusetts allows up to sixty days.'08
Time limits for adjudications by the commissions vary as
well. The Ohio statute requires a decision within sixty days of
filing,' 9 while Massachusetts may take up to ninety days to decide whether the offer shall become effective."10 Conflicts with the
federal law are obvious here. Provisions for such hearings prior to
"permission" to make an offer are not contemplated by the Williams Act.
G. Jurisdiction
The diversity of methods that states employ to assert jurisdiction over target corporations leads to a situation in which several states may assert jurisdiction over the same transaction. A
few states claim jurisdiction only if the target is incorporated
103. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1604 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77).
104. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.04.1 (1)(B)(1)(a), (b) (Page Supp. 1973).
105. See, e.g., Alaska Takeover Bid Disclosure Act, ch. 129, [1976] 1 BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) 1937, at 1938 (to be codified in ALASKA STAT. § 45.57.020(d)) (effective June
8, 1976); HAW. REv. STAT. § 417E-3(f) (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(4) (Supp. 1976);
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3-2(e) (Bums Supp. 1976).
106. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-347j (West Supp. 1977); MInN. STAT. ANN. § 80 B.
03 Subd. 5 (Supp. 1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 47-32-25 (Supp. 1975).
107. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 17007.04.1 (B)(4) (Page Supp. 1973); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 1604 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77).
105. MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 110C, § 6 (West Supp. 1976).
109. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(4) (Page Supp. 1973).
110. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110C, § 6 (West Supp. 1976). The maximum time
limits would make tender offers impossible as a practical matter when hearings are ordered in Massachusetts. Should the commissioner order a hearing, an adjudication does
not have to be handed down for 90 days. Id. § 6. The offer then becomes effective and
must remain open for 60 days. Id. § 7. But shareholders may withdraw up to five days
before the offer terminates. Id. It may thus take up to 145 days from the date of filing for
the offeror to discover whether his takeover attempt has succeeded.
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within the state."' Some states require the target to be incorporated in and doing business in the state." 2 Others widen their
protection to cover all corporations incorporated in or having
their principal place of business within the state."' Some require
the target to be incorporated in or to have both principal place
of business and "substantial assets" in the state."'
Other states have broadened the jurisdictional reach of their
statutes by creating three distinct categories. These states claim
jurisdiction over any offer involving a target incorporated in the
state, or having its principal place of business there, or having
"substantial assets" located there.15 Louisiana has its own variation, asserting jurisdiction over any corporation "organized under
the laws of this state, or having its principal place of business, or
a substantial portion of the fair value of its total assets or more
than fifty percent of its employees in this state . . . and has
aggregate assets of at least fifty million dollars . ... "I
There are severe interpretational problems with any jurisdiction clause that goes beyond mere incorporation. Particularly
troublesome is the "substantial assets" foothold."' It is unclear
whether this means a small or large plant or whether it refers to
one or several retail outlets. While all state tender offer statutes
contain a "definitions" section, no state legislature has attempted to elucidate the meaning of these provisions. Through
this unexplained and rather arbitrary scheme the states assert
jurisdiction over tender offers potentially affecting shareholders
nationwide. Indeed, these statutes claim jurisdiction over transactions where neither buyer nor seller is located within the
state."' A fairly large target or one with diverse properties thus
111. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(2) (Supp. 1976); NEV. REV. STAT. §
78.3765 (1973).
112. See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 417E-1(5) (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE § 13.1-529 (e)
(1973).
113. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 11-51.5-102(7) (Supp. 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 110C, § 1 (West Supp. 1976).
114. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(6) (Supp. 1976).
115. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3-1(j) (Bums. Supp. 1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 47-32-3 (Supp. 1975).
116. Louisiana Business Take-Over Offers Act, ch. 15, [1976] 1A BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 17,231, at 17,232 (to be codified in LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1500 (12) (West))
(effective June 28, 1976).
117. An example of a state's jurisdictional claim under "substantial assets" was the
attempted takeover of the Otis Elevator Company by the United Technologies Corp. See
Otis Elevator Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 405 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
118. State Takeover Statutes, supra note 30, at 189.
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may fall within the jurisdiction of several states, all of which seek
to apply their statutes and to stifle takeover attempts. 1 9
Where the laws of numerous states apply to the same subject
matter, forum shopping inevitably results. This has already occurred in at least one case. Sabine Royalty was incorporated in
Texas, a state with no takeover law. 2 ' In 1976 it entered into an
unsuccessful takeover arrangement with another corporation.
Sabine, fearing a takeover attempt by a disfavored raider, then
"merged" with a subsidiary it had created in Louisiana. Sabine
thus invoked the protections offered by the Louisiana statute.
While the shareholders overwhelmingly approved the action in a
proxy vote, they might have voted otherwise had they been offered a healthy premium for their stock. For a target to insulate
itself from the threat of a takeover by artificially invoking the
jurisdiction of a foreign state is clearly to abuse these laws. It runs
against the grain of the Williams Act, which was enacted not to
obstruct takeover bids, but merely to provide shareholders with
adequate information.
H.

Standards for Adjudication

Once a hearing is deemed necessary by the appropriate state
official, or in many states if the target simply requests one, the
state securities commission must meet to determine whether the
offeror has complied with the statute. As with other sections of
the state takeover acts, the precise standards which the commission employs to determine compliance vary from state to state.
The statutes least offensive to the Williams Act empower the
commissions only to evaluate the adequacy of disclosure made by
the offeror.12 ' Other states look to the adequacy of disclosure and
2
whether the offer was made to all shareholders on equal terms. '
Some states, however, purportedly seek to offer the shareholder
more "protection" by evaluating the substantive merits of the
offer itself. In these states the commissions rule whether the offer
119. This presents a possible defense for managements seeking to resist takeover bids.
A corporation can increase its protection by taking any action that would qualify it for
jurisdiction under a number of state statutes.
120. Letter and proxy statement from A. Priddy, President, Sabine Royalty Corp.,
to Sabine shareholders (Nov. 29, 1976)(on file at the office of the Hofstra Law Review).
121. See, e.g., Alaska Takeover Bid Disclosure Act, ch. 129, [1976] 1 BLUE SKY L.
1937, at 1938 (to be codified in ALASKA STAT. § 45.57.020(d))(effective June
REP. (CCH)
28, 1976); KANS. STAT. § 17-1277(a) (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1604 (McKinney Supp.
1976-77).
122. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-347f (West Supp. 1977).
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is "unfair, unjust or inequitable" 1 to the shareholder.
Here, additional undefined terms even more problematic
than "substantial assets" arise. The commission's interpretation
of their meanings may be determinative of whether an offer is
successful. For a state securities commission to presume to evaluate the "fairness" of an offer is absurd. The commissions have no
guidelines by which to evaluate the fairness of an offer. Moreover,
unless the commission is comprised of investment experts, it is
ill-equipped to make such a determinatidn for the shareholder.
Even if the commission includes such experts, it will fail to make
a detached investment decision because it will consider matters
irrelevant to sound shareholders' decisions. While claiming to
decide whether the offer is fair from an investment standpoint,
the commission will really measure the impact a takeover might
have on the local economy. The commission is in a better position
to counsel the state than it is to counsel the shareholders, as it
purports to do.
An offeree, whether well-versed in or ignorant of the ways of
business and finance, should be permitted himself to decide
whether to tender. The shareholder knows the price he paid for
his shares. Presumably, he can ascertain the present value of
those shares. The Williams Act leaves the decision to him; the
share is the stockholder's property to retain or to sell as he wishes,
on whatever terms he deems advantageous. The state laws employing the "fairness" standard take that decision away from
him. 24 He can, of course, retain the stock, but he will be able to
tender it only if the offer is certified to be "fair" and becomes
effective. That these statutes supplant the good (or bad) sense of
the shareholder further conflicts with the federal scheme. The
Williams Act attempts to provide vital information to the shareholder to facilitate an independent decision; many of the state
statutes take this decision away from him.
123. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2104(5) (Supp. 1976). See HAw. REv. STAT. § 417E-3(g)
(Supp. 1975); IND. CODs ANN. 23-2-3-2(f) (Bums Supp. 1976); Louisiana Business TakeOver Offers Act, ch. 15, [1976] 1A BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
17,231, at 17,133 (to be
codified in LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1501(F)) (effective June 28, 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 80 B. 03 Subd. 5 (Supp. 1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 47-32-27 (Supp. 1975); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 552.05(5) (West 1976).
124. In contrast, the SEC has resisted the power to evaluate the merits of any bid.
"We [the SEC] do not wish to have responsibility with respect to the terms of the offer
or to affect them in any way." Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of
the Senate Comm. on Banking Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1967).
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I.

Favoring the Target's Management

Serious conflict with the Williams Act can be detected by
examining the advance notice requirements, longer time periods,
25
and administrative clearances mandated by the state statutes.
Further, the delays resulting from these acts favor incumbent
management by giving it additional time within which to mount
an attack on the soundness of the offer. But mere delay is only
one of the advantages conferred upon management. The management of the target company need not meet the same standards
of disclosure as the offeror.2 1 Provisions for review of the management's counter-solicitation materials are rare.2 7 By imposing this
double standard, the statutes upset the "balanced scheme" envisioned by the drafters of the Williams Act.
The existence of state takeover statutes allows and even encourages the initiation of contemporaneous lawsuits in state and
federal courts. This wasteful, costly process exacts a high price
from the offeror, but in management's view, bestows protection
well worth the cost.
Such a dual suit resulted from the takeover bid for the Copperweld Corporation, an Ohio-based manufacturer of specialty
metal products. 12 81 The offeror there was Imetal, a French holding
company controlled by the Rothschild family. Copperweld had
been among thirty-nine corporations under consideration by Imetal in a year-long search for an appropriate American target. Imetal announced its bid on September 4, 1975, and Copperweld's
management lost no time in launching its attack.
In anticipation of Imetal's offer, Copperweld ran a full-page
advertisement in The Wall Street Journal,urging its shareholders
125. See text accompanying notes 69-124 supra. See generally State Takeover Statutes, supra note 30.
126. Moylan, supra note 28, at 701.
127. While subjecting the offeror to heavy restrictions, management is left
essentially free and unrestricted. Few states require administrative review of the
management's soliciting material. None requires management to advise the
offeror of its position before taking one. Despite their avowed purpose of requiring . . . fair, full, and effective disclosure, only a handful of the statutes even
require the target to mail the offeror's soliciting material or to furnish a stockholder list.

Id.
128. Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579, 595 (W.D. Pa. 1975); State v.
Imetal, No. 75CV-09-3868 (C.P. Franklin County, Ohio, Oct. 9, 1975).
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to retain their shares.'29 It sought and attained a temporary restraining order in a Pennsylvania federal district court enjoining
Imetal from proceeding with its offer for ten days.' 30
Thereafter followed a barrage of letters from Copperweld's
management to its shareholders.' 3' Copperweld took several more
full-page1 advertisements urging shareholders to retain their
shares.

3

Copperweld stock had been selling at approximately thirtyfour dollars per share when the offer was first made. Immediately
thereafter the New York Stock Exchange suspended trading in
Copperweld shares. Trading reopened after several days, and the
price shot up to forty-two dollars. Imetal's offer was $42.50.
Seeking a permanent injunction, Copperweld alleged insider
trading resulting in violation of antitrust and federal securities
laws.'3 3 Ultimately, Copperweld lost on the merits. The district
court found none of the alleged violations,'34 and the Third Circuit
35
Court of Appeals denied any further motion for an injunction.
The actions in federal court, however, had successfully stalled the
offer for nearly two months.
Copperweld was by no means finished in its attempt to resist
Imetal's takeover bid. While its action in federal court was still
pending, the Ohio Division of Securities issued a cease and desist
order barring any further solicitation by Imetal until the commission could evaluate whether any violation of the Ohio act had
129. The advertisement thus advised:
*The offer is substantially below the true value of your shares.
*The tender offer is a taxable transaction. Therefore, you may incur a
substantial tax liability.
*Your company has never been stronger financially and its product lines are
healthy and growing.
*Copperweld had record sales and earnings for the first six months of 1975,
despite the recession.
*Your dividends have increased five times in the last four years, and a
further dividend increase will be recommended again in October.
*Dividends have been paid every year for the past 40 years.
*Court action is planned by Copperweld to protect its security holders.
Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 1975, at 17.
130. Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1975, at 13, col. 1.
131. Letters were sent September 3, September 5, October 23, November 7, and
November 21 (letters on file at the office of the Hofstra Law Review).
132. Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1975, at 19. Another advertisement followed the next day.
Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1975, at 32.
133. Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579, 595 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
134. Id. at 608.
135. Wall St. J., Nov. 3, 1975, at 13, col. 4.
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occurred.'36 Several days later, the Ohio Court of Common Pleas
issued its own temporary restraining order on motion by the Division.'37 Indeed, the government of Ohio had already resolved to
"support the efforts of Copperweld's management and the company's work force to continue operations under American ownership. '" 1-s What had been Copperweld's cause of action in the federal courts was now initiated by the State of Ohio in its own
courts. Copperweld had alleged antitrust and securities law violations in federal court. Ohio based its cause of action on Imetal's
failure publicly to announce the terms of the bid twenty days
prior to its effective date, and their failure to file with the Ohio
Division of Securities, both of which were in violation of Ohio's
statute.
Imetal and the State of Ohio finally entered into a consent
decree to settle the matter. The corporation revised its offer to
reflect a recent dividend paid,'39 so shareholders would receive
substantially the same amount as originally offered. Two-thirds
of the common stock was then tendered to and purchased by
Imetal. 40
In state court, Imetal had argued that the Ohio statute was
preempted by the Williams Act and was unconstitutional on
other grounds.' 4 ' Neither that court nor any other ever reached
the merits of that argument. While most of the delay there was
caused by Copperweld's federal court action, a similar delay
could have been procured solely by the state. Such a delay inevitably favors the target. None of the voluminous materials sent by
Copperweld to its shareholders was reviewable in advance by the
securities commission. Had Imetal complied with the statute, all
of its solicitation material would have been subject to
prepublication review and would have been sent to the target as
well. Copperweld would have had the opportunity to formulate
136. The order was issued a little more than a week after the offer was made. Division
order, State of Ohio Div. of Sec., Sept. 12, 1975 (a copy of the order is on file at the office
of the Hofstra Law Review).
137. The order was issued September 17, 1975 (Dow-Jones report on file at the office
of the Hofstra Law Review).
138. Answer of Defendant to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, State v. Imetal,
No. 75CV-09-3868 (C.P. Franklin County, Oct. 9, 1975), at 6.
139. Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1975, at 39, col. 2.
140. Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1975, at 16, col. 1.
141. Supplementary Answer of Defendant to Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint at
1-2, State v. Imetal, No. 75CV-09-3868 (C.P. Franklin County Oct. 9, 1975).
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responses to Imetal's arguments before the public saw any of
Imetal's materials.
It is not surprising that the Ohio law is weighted heavily in
favor of management: It was passed with the encouragement of
an Ohio corporation."' While the statute mimics the Williams
Act disclosure requirements, full compliance with the Ohio statute makes takeovers nearly impossible.'
Ohio's preference for incumbent management over raiders
was also manifest in the attempted takeover of Youngstown Steel
Door Co., an Ohio corporation, by Thrall Car Manufacturing Co.,
a Chicago-based company.'44 After delaying the offer a full two
months beyond the earliest effective date under federal law, the
Ohio Securities Division issued its order, "which approved substantially all of the findings of fact and conclusions of law of its
Hearing Examiner who, in turn, had adopted the same almost
verbatim from the proposals submitted by Steel Door's management."'
It has been argued that state takeover laws are a "boon" to
shareholders. 4 Adherents to this position point out that whenever these laws are involved, the shareholder ultimately receives
a higher price for his shares than he would have received under
the original offer. This occurs when either the offeror raises the
premium or a competitive offeror has been able to bid because of
the delay.'47 This argument is fallacious because the "chilling
effect" of these laws discourages potential offers. While the shareholder might be offered a higher price in some cases, the very
existence of these laws may prevent many offers from ever being
made. Moreover, to contend that these laws benefit shareholders
is to defend the statutes for the wrong reason. The benefit to
142. Sommers, The Ohio Takeover Act: What Is It?, 21 CASE W.L. REv. 681 (1970).
143. Careful analysis of this Act would suggest that it is "special interest"
legislation sailing under different colors, weighted obviously to protect incumbent management from attack. This is accomplished largely under the fiction
of requiring fair disclosure to shareholders. The disclosure method, however, is
of such a nature, and procedures are so designed that they accomplish a substantive result not encompassed in the expressed purpose of the legislation-the
discouragement, nay, the prohibition in effect of tender offers. Disclosure is not
the real aim. The real aim is the protection of incumbent management from
intruders.
Id. at 720.
144. Thrall Car Mfg. Co. v. Rhodes, Civ. No. C-2-76-605 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 22, 1975).
145. Lipton, supra note 16, at 94.
146. See, e.g., The Changing Takeover Rules, DuNN's Rv. 53 (Dec. 1976).
147. Id.
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shareholders in isolated cases is far exceeded by the cost of tender
offers in general. This benefit accrues through the interference
with and obstruction of a legitimate economic transaction sanctioned by Congress. Benign effects of bad laws cannot justify
statutes designed to thwart congressional intent.
There have been increasing indications of shareholder dissatisfaction with management attempts to resist takeover bids.
Shareholders have initiated class action suits against managements that have rejected, out-of-hand, offers fifty percent above
the market price of the shares,' where the offeror attempted a
"friendly" takeover. In some cases the offer had not even been
passed along to shareholders. Perhaps similar dissatisfaction with
the state statutes will emerge as investors become aware that the
state laws do not benefit shareholders; but rather work to their
detriment.
One further problem with these statutes goes beyond the
constitutional difficulties of extraterritoriality and preemption.
These state takeover statutes reflect the dangerous philosophy
that a state can legislatively solve any perceived problem, regardless of the solution's effect on interests outside the state. Utah
recently expanded its takeover statute in response to a perceived
threat. The Utah statute previously covered only targets incorporated or with a principal place of business in that state.' It has
now been amended to protect companies with assets of more than
$12.5 million or more than 500 employees in that state."' According to one legislator in Utah, the action was taken to protect a
company with large holdings in the state from being taken over
by "Arab oil interests."'' The bill, approved unanimously in both
houses of the Utah Legislature within twenty-four hours of its
proposal,'52 was clearly a case of special interest legislation.
As it stands now, nothing prevents any state, with or without
a takeover statute, from changing, amending, or enacting laws
tailored to any unforeseen exigency. While speedy legislative action might be appropriate for purely intrastate problems, the
capacity for instant legislation in an area with such widespread
148. Metz, Shareholder Quams [sic] on Merger Bids, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1977, at
D2, col. 3.
149. Utah Take-Over Disclosure Act, S.B. No. 10, [1976] 3 BLUE SKY L. RP. (CCH)
43,431 (effective Feb. 5, 1976).
150. N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1977, at 29, col. 4.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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ramifications threatens shareholders nationally. Should a rumor
involving a Utah target with only 400 employees circulate, presumably the legislature will have ready an appropriate amendment.
It has been suggested that the effect of the state statutes
might be blunted by curing the defects in the Williams Act that
led to the enactment of these statutes. Proposals include:
-Providing a minimum time, perhaps twenty to thirty days,
that the offer must remain open;
-Giving management more of a chance to resist the offer or
to seek a better deal for the shareholders;
-Amending the Act so purchases cannot be made until the
expiration of a stated minimum period;
-Extending the initial time during which offerees may with153
draw tendered shares.

If Congress deems it necessary to provide investors with additional protection, perhaps these proposals are sound. But it would
be poor policy to incorporate them into the Act merely to conform
to the state laws. Moreover, the states would remain free to
amend their acts to once again circumvent any changes made in
the federal scheme.
Congress made its purpose clear in passing the Williams Act.
State takeover laws are meant not to complement the Act in
achieving that end, but rather to serve a different end which
conflicts with the federal scheme. In short, these laws exist and
operate in spite of the federal law. In an area which sorely needs
uniformity, the federal scheme must prevail. The state laws
should be eliminated.
V.

PREEMPTION

A number of arguments have been advanced in support of
prohibiting state legislation in the takeover area. The state laws
arguably present a burden on interstate commerce.' 54 They may
also violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution. The scope of this discussion shall be limited to
153. State Takeover Statutes, supra note 30, at 194.
154. See generally Note, Commerce Clause Limitations on State Regulation of
Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1133 (1974). The note also provides an early but interesting analysis of the preemption question. At the time the note was written, only five states
had passed takeover statutes, and virtually no judicial background had yet become available. The note relies largely on the Supreme Court test in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350
U.S. 497, 504 (1956), one of several standards the Court uses to determine whether state
laws are preempted by federal statutes.
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demonstrating that the state takeover statutes are preempted by
the Williams Act and for that reason must fall. Article VI, clause
2, of the United States Constitution, commonly referred to as the
Supremacy Clause, provides: "This Constitution, and the laws of
the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof...
shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, anything in the. . . Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding."' 51 5 The state statutes
heretofore described violate the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. They conflict radically with existing federal legislation
and work only to render the Williams Act ineffective. Under the
Supremacy Clause, the state acts must give way.
It may be argued that Congress expressly refused to preempt
state securities regulations15 in section 28(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act, where it is stated: "Nothing in this chapter shall
affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency
or officer performing like functions) of any state over any security
or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of
'15
this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.
It may also be argued, however, that this section does not
apply to provisions added to the Securities Exchange Act by the
Williams Act, "since state takeover acts do not involve the state
securities commissioners' exercise of the sort of jurisdiction contemplated by Section 28 . . . ,,151 Half a century ago, Congress
might not have foreseen the maze of laws created by state takeover statutes. But Congress did not intend to relinquish its right
to preempt inconsistent laws in the securities field where a situation requiring prevalence of the federal law arose. Section 28(a)
does not necessarily exclude preemption by Congress.
Resolution of the issue is further complicated by the manner
in which the state laws are drafted. Each state has been careful
to include all the disclosure provisions of the Williams Act within
its statute. Compliance with the state law requires disclosure at
least adequate to satisfy the Williams Act.159 But an offeror who
155. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. "[Any determination that a state statute is void for
obstructing a federal statute does rest on the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution." Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 534 n.5 (1974) (quoting Swift & Co. v. Wickham,
382 U.S. 111, 125 (1965)).
156. Vaughan, supra note 15, at 974.
157. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976).
158. State Takeover Statutes, supra note 30, at 191.
159. See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hofstetter, 384 U.S. 35, 45 (1966) (citing
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960)) (test for determining
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complies with only the federal act inevitably violates the state
law or several state laws that apply to the bid.
If Congress does not expressly void the state statutes by
amending the Williams Act, resolution will be left to the courts.
There are practical considerations, however, that make this difficult. While the preemption issue has been raised in the complaints and answers of the parties in several unfriendly takeover
battles, settlement always precedes court resolution."' For purposes of judicial resolution, tender offers are ended, one way or
another, in too short a time. "There are, of course, substantial
economic interests at stake, but it is at best doubtful that any
offeror has the interest to spend the time and money necessary
to pursue a test case simply to resolve the issue.""'' At this time,
there are no reported decisions either striking or upholding the
state laws.
The Supreme Court has held that states have the right to
pass regulations in the securities field. 162 But it does not follow
that state takeover statutes are not preempted by federal statutes found to be in direct conflict with them. In many cases in
which Congress has not preempted an entire field, specific state
legislation has been invalidated where it interfered with congressional purpose. "[T]he law of the State, though enacted in the
exercise of powers not controverted, must yield" when incompatible with federal legislation.16 3
Should a case arise in which the validity of a state takeover
statute is questioned, the state will argue that the statute constitutes mere regulation of an internal affair; the laws protect
local companies employing citizens of the state, and such regulation is within the reserved powers of the state. That this exercise
of power over intrastate concerns incurs inevitable interstate
existence of a constitutional conflict: seeking out a conflict between state and federal

regulations where none clearly exists is enjoined).
160. The Changing Takeover Rules, DuNN's REv. 53, 55 (1976).
161. State Takeover Statutes, supra note 30, at 192.
162. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49, 62 (1973) (state and federal
governments may pass laws in areas including securities regulation even if those laws have
the collateral effect of impinging on constitutionally-guaranteed rights); Merrick v. N.W.
Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917); Hall v. Geiger Jones Co. 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Green v.
Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 479 F.2d 462, 466 (7th Cir. 1973).
163. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 384 (1963)(citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1,
211 (1824)). See also Kewanee joil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479-80 (1974),
Bethelem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 773 (1946); New
York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 145 (1837).
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885

consequences is irrefutable. Yet even if the statute regulates
activities that are basically local in nature, preemption cannot be
ruled out. The Supreme Court has stated:
While the general right of the states to regulate their strictly
domestic affairs is fundamental in our constitutional system
and vital to the integrity and permanence of that system, that
right must always be exerted in subordinationto the grantedor
enumeratedpowers of the GeneralGovernment, and not in hos-

tility to the rights secured by the Supreme Law of the Land.' 4
Even statutes governing "local concerns" of major importance to
the state are subject to preemption. Essentiality as a justification
of state laws which conflict with federal law has been deemed
inadequate by the Court, which has not hesitated to "reject it as
a guide in the field.

. .

involved." '65 One prerequisite for preemp-

tion, however, is that the state law must be in clear, direct, and
positive conflict with the congressional legislation.166 The effect of
the state laws in this area does not merely conflict; rather, the
laws serve .to render the Williams Act impotent. They far exceed
its scope and might eventually prohibit the very situations to
which the Act applies. Such emasculation
of federal law has never
7
6
been permitted by the Court.

As indicated, one way to avoid constitutional conflict is to
modify the Williams Act to approximate more closely the type of
regulatory schemes enacted by the states. But any changes made
in the Act should cure its deficiencies, not palliatively mask
them. The Court has expressly rejected the notion that the fed164. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 38 (1910). See Garrity v. New
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (states may not put conditions on exercise of constitutional rights by threatening employment dismissal); Watson v. Employers Liab. Corp.,
348 U.S. 66, 82 (1954) (dicta) (states may not overburden interstate commerce by excessive tax or regulation without justification of state interest).
165. Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101 (1946).
The relative importance to the state of its own law is not material when there
is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of the Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail. Article 6, clause 2. This principle was
made clear by Chief Justice Marshall when he stated for the Court that any
state law, however clearly within a state's acknowledged power, which interferes
with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.
Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962)(citations omitted).
166. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960); Federation
of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 467 (1945).
167. "The law of Congress is paramount; it cannot be nullified by direct act of any
state, nor the scope and effect of its provisions set at naught indirectly." Anderson v.
Carkins, 135 U.S. 483, 490 (1890). See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651-52 (1971).
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eral government must conform to the state view in areas of con-

flict; rather, it is the states that must conform where laws collide. 6 "
Securities regulation is appropriate subject matter for primary federal control where securities are traded nationally. Any
decision by a state securities commission as to whether a bid for
nationally traded securities may become effective affects shareholders across the country: The Court has held that the federal
government may exercise exclusive control over areas of importance to the nation as a whole, even where the power of the state
has not been expressly prohibited. " "The Court's determination
that Congress alone may legislate over matters which are necessarily national in import reflects the basic principle of federalism.' ' 7 0 Such matters include those which affect the states
generally, and not those peculiarly confined within the boundaries of a single state. In those areas federal law must supersede
state law regulating the identical subject matter.'
The Court has demonstrated a reluctance to strike down
state laws where state power has not been expressly prohibited,
unless those laws touch an area of national concern. In Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul,172 California, through its Agricultural Code, rejected Florida avocado shipments which did not
satisfy the state ripeness test, even though they met federal requirements. 7 The avocado growers argued that the California
law violated the Supremacy Clause and therefore denied them
equal protection.' The Court found, however, that the readying
168. "It is of the very essence of supremacy to remove all obstacles to its actions
within its own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in subordinate governments,
as to exempt its own operations from their own influence." Public Utilities Comm. v.
United States, 335 U.S. 534, 544 (1958) (quoting Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 427 (1819)).
169. The States may exercise concurrent or independent power in all cases
but three:
1. Where the power is lodged exclusively in the Federal Constitution.

2. Where it is given to the United States and prohibited to the States.
3.

Where, from the nature and subjects of the power, it must necessarily
be exercised by the National Government exclusively.
Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713, 730 (1865) (citations omitted). See Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 554-55 (1973).
170. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554 (1973).
171. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1946).
172. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 134-35.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol5/iss4/3

56

Singer: SEC Enforcement Actions to Enjoin Violations of Section 10(b) and

State Takeover Statutes

of foodstuffs for market "has always been deemed a matter of
peculiarly local concern."'' The Court continued: "Thus the revealed congressional design was apparently to do no more than
to invite farmers and growers to get together, under the auspices
of the Department of Agriculture, to work out local harvesting,
packing and processing programs and
thereby relieve temporarily
7
depressed marketing conditions.' 1
Only a staunch defender of state takeover statutes would
argue that the Williams Act constitutes merely an "invitation"
for the federal government and each state to "get together" under
the auspices of the SEC to promulgate an irregular, patchwork
amalgam of diverse and confusing standards by which to control
as integral a part of interstate commerce as securities trading.
The Court has not been reluctant to preempt state laws that
severely interfere with matters national in character. In City of
1 77
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,
the local city council
sought to enforce an ordinance prohibiting jet aircraft from taking
off at the Hollywood-Burbank airport during certain hours of the
night.'78 In"view of the action taken by the federal government in
the form of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and the Noise Control Act of 1972, the Court held that enforcement of the ordinance
"is totally inconsistent with the objectives of the federal statutory
and regulatory scheme."'7 While there was no express preemption provision in the federal acts, the Court held the ordinance
to be preempted, given "the pervasive nature of the scheme of
federal regulation of aircraft noise ....
,",0 The Securities Act
175. Id. at 144.
176. Id. at 150. The Court has recently held, however, that a California law requiring
more stringent food weight-labeling standards than those required by the federal Wholesome Meat Act, the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, and the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, was constitutionally invalid. The Court held that the California law was preempted
by the federal regulations. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 97 S. Ct. 1305 (1977).
177. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
178. Id. at 625.
179. Id. at 627-28 (citing Lockheed Air Terminal v. City of Burbank, 318 F. Supp.
914 (C.D. Cal. 1970)).
180. Id. at 633.
And where the federal government, in the exercise of superior authority in this
field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein provided a
standard . . .states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal laws, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941) (context of regulation of aliens). See
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502 (1956); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Williams
Act present a similarly pervasive scheme, leaving no room for
laws that severely interfere with their purpose.
Such areas of national concern demand a uniform law to
replace the multitude of contradictory provisions presented in
state statutes. The need for a uniform system is another basis
for justifying preemption. In Cooley v. Board of Wardens,"'1 the
Court stated: "Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature
national, or admit only of one system, or plan of regulation, may
justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.' ' 8 The problems raised by laws that conflict

not only with the federal regulation, but with each other as well,
underscore the need for preemption. "A multiplicity of tribunals
and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting
adjudications as are different rules of sub83
'
stantive law."'

Should the states forfeit their charade" 4 and admit that the
premise of their takeover laws is protection of local businesses,
the laws will nevertheless interfere with the purpose behind the
Williams Act. This suffices to declare the state statutes invalid.
The Court has emphatically rejected the notions that a state law
may interfere with a federal law if the avowed purposes of the
laws differ, and the state legislature did not intend to frustrate
85
the federal act when it enacted its statute.
"Deciding whether a state statute is in conflict with a federal
statute and hence invalid under the Supremacy Clause is essentially a two-step process of first ascertaining the construction of
the two statutes and then determining the constitutional question
whether they are in conflict."'88 The Court must first determine
the purposes of both laws, but must also look to the practical
181. 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
182. Id. at 319.
183. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
184. See discussion in text accompanying notes 95-96 supra.
185. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 651-52 (1971).
Apart from the fact that it is at odds with the approach taken in nearly all our
Supremacy Clause cases, such a doctrine would enable state legislatures to
nullify nearly all unwanted federal legislation by simply publishing a legislative
committee report articulating some state interest or policy-other than frustration of the federal objective-that would be tangentially furthered by the proposed state law.
Id. at 652.
186. Id. at 644.
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effects of the statutes beyond the stated purposes. The true test
for preemption ultimately depends upon whether the state regulation "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' 87 The Supreme Court has clearly articulated the purpose of the Williams
Act: dissemination of material information. In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., the Court stated that aside from disclosure, the
Act was intended to give management "no more" than a chance
to explain its position to shareholders.'8 8 "The Congress expressly
disclaimed an intention to provide a weapon for management to
discourage takeover bids or prevent large accumulations of stock
which would create the potential for such attempts."' 89
In Rondeau the Court also noted that management cannot
hide behind the rights of shareholders guaranteed by the Act, but
must instead establish its own cause of action: The Act was not
designed for management's protection."' To permit management
to invoke the shareholders' rights as a shield without establishing
its own cause for relief would be inconsistent with the legislative
scheme'9 ' and unnecessary for the protection of investors. The
Court rejected management's claim that the "public interest"
should be taken into account when considering its implied right
of action because, the target argued, management was in the
"best position" to insure compliance with the Williams Act.'92
The Court thus applied the Williams Act in practical
terms,'13 beyond its bare provisions, to effect the "balanced
scheme" Congress sought. Just as the Court looks to the effect of
the federal legislation, it examines the results of the application
of a conflicting state law, whether "the state policy may produce
a result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute."'9 4
State takeover statutes satisfy at least this test, for no matter
187. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963) (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652
(1971).
188. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975) (citations omitted).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 62.
193. In discussing the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, the Court has said: "Because securities transactions are economic in character,
Congress intended application of these statutes to turn on the economic realities underlying the transaction . . . ." United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
194. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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what their avowed purpose, the result they produce runs contrary
to the Williams Act's sole objective of disclosure.
It may be argued that these laws do no more than supplement the federal scheme. The Court has upheld state laws that
were truly supplemental in nature, where there was evidence that
the state and federal regulations could coexist "without impairing
federal superintendence of the field.""- Where an inevitable collision of the effects of state and federal laws occurs, however, the
state law must be stricken. 98 Here the laws clearly collide; although an offeror satisfies the federal disclosure standards, he
must do far more to comply with the state acts. This defeats the
congressional desire to avoid interference with legitimate tender
offers. "When Congress has taken the particular subject matter
in hand coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law
is not to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than
Congress has seen fit to go."' 7 From congressional debate preceding enactment of the Williams Act, "8 it is clear that Congress
intended the Act to be not a mere minimum standard subject to
supplemental action by the states, but rather the sole standard
by which tender offers are to be regulated. In such a case the state
statute is superseded "regardless of whether it purports to supplement the federal law."' 99 It does not matter that the federal law
has less stringent requirements than the state statutes: "The test
• . .is whether the matter on which the State asserts the right
to act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act. If it is, the
federal scheme prevails though it is a more modest, less pervasive
2 ° To
regulatory plan than that of the State.""
conclude that the
Williams Act provides no more than a minimum standard for
disclosure, and that the states may pass laws exceeding that minimum standard, would mean that the Act serves only to protect
shareholders in states that have not yet passed tender offer statutes. Congress had no such inconsequential purpose in mind.
The Supreme Court has instructed that "[i]f Congress is
authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its intentions
clearly. It will not be presumed that a federal statute was in195. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
196. Id. at 143.
197. Charleston & Western Carolina R.R. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597,
604 (1915) (citations omitted).
198. See notes 32 & 124 supra.
199. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956).
200. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947).
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tended to supersede the exercise of the power of the state unless
there is a clear manifestation of intention to do So. ''211 Some justices have interpreted this to mean that the federal law must
contain a specific preemption provision to prevail over the state
statute.22 But the absence of such a provision does not preclude
preemption.2 13 "It long has been the rule that exclusion of state

action may be implied from the nature of the legislation and the
subject matter although express declaration of such result is
wanting. '

24

A strict, doctrinal approach requiring a specific

clause misses the point of the policy behind preemption. A state
law is preempted because of the type of legislation on both state
and federal levels and the subject matter involved. Thus, the
Court looks to the statutes and the effects they seek to achieve.
One basis for deciding whether federal law will preempt is the
uniformity of regulation preemption will provide. The Court asks
not only whether Congress intended to exercise exclusive control,
but also whether preemption would achieve a desirable, beneficial result. The Court has numerous grounds upon which to hold
that the federal statute preempts the twenty-three state laws,
even in the absence of a specific provision in the Williams Act.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Growing corporate conglomerates "swallowing up" the winnowing number of smaller companies legitimately concerns the
states. Perhaps Congress will take action to reverse this trend,
but the need to do so is not a subject within the scope of this
article. For now, it is a question left to social scientists and economists. For the present, Congress has expressly sanctioned the use
of takeovers as a legitimate economic device. The twenty-three
state statutes presently in effect attempt to contravene congressional purposes, and therefore must yield to the federal scheme.
Immediate prospects for preemption by congressional action are
not bright. There is no concentrated movement toward preemption in Congress, and the states discourage any such drive. '
201. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952). See New York State Dep't of
Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973).
202. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956) (Reed, J., dissenting).
203. "There is, to be sure, no express provision of pre-emption in the Act. That,
however, is not decisive." City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 633
(1973).
204. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 772
(1946) (citing Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926)).
205. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1976, at 41, col. 7.
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The long road to the Supreme Court, which ultimately must
decide whether the continued existence of state takeover statutes
is permissible, will be an arduous one. It will take an offeror with
a substantial interest in acquiring a target to endure a lawsuit
that will lead to final resolution of this problem. But such resolution is inevitable. Given the growing number of tender offers
under present economic conditions, the increasing number of
state laws, and the initial signs that states are willing to extend
the jurisdictions of their laws to fit particular situations, a Supreme Court determination may not be far. As the Court has
previously stated: "This Court, in the exercise of its judicial function, must take the comprehensive and valid federal legislation
as enacted and declare invalid state regulation which impinges on
2 '
that legislation.""
Steven M. Cohen
206. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 398 (1951).
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AFTER WASHINGTON v. DAVIS
Employees who wish to challenge the use of a preemployment screening test' on the ground that it discriminates against
them on the basis of race have available various constitutional
and statutory remedies. State employees have a constitutional
claim under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,2 which proscribes state racial discrimination.3 Federal
employees can assert a violation of their rights under the due
process clause of the fifth amendment 4 which has been interpreted to contain an equal protection element.5 To effectuate
these constitutional guarantees, Congress has provided a cause of
action in 42 U.S.C. § 1981.6 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19641 affords additional statutory protection against employment
discrimination.
Initially, public employers at the state, federal, and local
levels could not be sued under Title VII,5 and public employees
attacking the use of employment tests were limited to a
1. This comment will discuss written examinations which purport to measure general
intellectual ability or the specific abilities necessary for successful performance of a particular job.
2. The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "[N]or shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1880).
4. The fifth amendment provides in part: "[N]o person shall. . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). The statute was originally based on the thirteenth amendment and passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. It was reenacted after ratification
of the fourteenth amendment. The statute currently provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions
of every kind, and to no other.
7. Title VII provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer. . . to give and to act upon the
results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its
administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964) (amended 1975).
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constitutional attack or a suit under section 1981.1 Two developments altered this situation. In 1972 amendments to Title VII
extended protection to public employees."0 Four years later, in
Brown v. General Services Administration," the Supreme Court
held that Congress intended Title VII to be the sole cause of
action for federal employees; the Court thus eliminated the possibility of suit under section 1981.12
Although both public and private employees may now sue
under Title VII, it is nonetheless important to consider the proof
necessary to challenge successfully an employment test on equal .
protection grounds. Title VII does not bar plaintiffs from asserting constitutional as well as statutory grounds for relief. Because
Title VII limits monetary relief to two years back pay, 3 plaintiffs
seeking unlimited back pay and punitive or compensatory damages would benefit by including constitutional claims." Moreover, there may be plaintiffs who wish to allege constitutional
claims to avoid the elaborate procedures required to bring a Title
VII suit.' Finally, an equal protection claim provides the only
basis for relief available to employees not subject to Title VII."
The different causes of action available and the distinctions
9. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 n.10 (1976), for a discussion of the
inapplicability of Title VII to government employees at the time plaintiffs' suit was filed.
10. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, § 2(2), 86 Stat. 103
(codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. V 1975)) (state and local government employees);
Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11, 86 Stat. 111 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1975))
(federal employees).
11. 425 U.S. 820 (1976). But see Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S.
454 (1975), where the Supreme Court held that for private employees relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 is available as a fully independent remedy apart from Title VII.
12. Brown v. General Servs. Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 834-35 (1976).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975).
14. For a comparison of damages under Title VII with 42 U.S.C. § 1981, see Note,
Damages for FederalEmployment Discrimination:Section 1981 and Qualified Executive
Immunity, 85 YALE L.J. 518, 519-23 (1976).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). These procedures include filing
a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 90 days
of the alleged violation. If the alleged discrimination took place in a state having its own
fair employment laws, the EEOC must wait 60 days after the filing of a charge under state
law before acting on the complaint. Otherwise the Commission investigates the charges,
determines if there is reasonable cause to support them and attempts to resolve the
dispute among the parties. If the Commission's efforts at mediation fail, the complainant
may file suit in federal district court within 30 days. See generally Note; Federal Employment Discrimination:Scope of Inquiry and the Class Action Under Title VII, 22
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1288 (1975).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. V 1975) defines employer for the purposes of Title
VII as a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more
employees. . ... "Therefore, employees in small businesses are not covered by Title VII.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol5/iss4/3

64

Singer:
SEC Enforcement
Actions to Enjoin
Violations of Section 10(b) and
Challenges
to Preemployment
Tests

between claims by private and public employees have caused
judicial controversy centering around two issues: the proof sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination' 7 and the
proof necessary for an employer to justify the use of a screening
test.' 8 Perhaps the greatest difficulty facing the courts has been
whether, in the area of employment testing, the standards for
deciding statutory and constitutional claims of discrimination
should be the same.
THE PRimA FACiE CASE
In Washington v. Davis,'9 the Supreme Court established
that the evidence required for a prima facie case of a constitutional claim of discrimination resulting from the use of an employment test differs from the proof required for a statutory
claim. In a seven to two decision"0 the Court held that a disproportionate impact on racial groups does not suffice to prove a constitutional claim of racial discrimination; proof of discriminatory

purpose is required.'
Prior to Washington, lower courts2 2 deciding constitutional
challenges to employment tests were greatly influenced by the
Supreme Court's decision in a landmark Title VII case, Griggs
v. Duke Power Co.2s In Griggs the Court considered whether an
employer could make successful performance on aptitude tests
a prerequisite to employment despite the discriminatory effect

of the tests. The court of appeals 4 had held that Title VII per-

17. See Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Boston Chapter
NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910
(1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482
F.2d 1333, 1335-36 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Castro v. Beecher,
459 F.2d 725, 730-31 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 117576 (2d Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 323 (8th Cir.), modified, 452 F.2d
327 (1971), cert denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
18. See Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 735 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of
Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1176-77 (2d Cir. 1972); Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
360 F. Supp. 1265, 1272-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
19. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
20. Justice White wrote the Court's opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger, and
Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976). Justice Stewart joined in Parts I and HI of the opinion. Id. at 252. Justice Stevens
filed a concurring opinion. Id. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at 256.
21. Id. at 239.
22. See note 29 infra.
23. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
24. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).
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mitted such tests absent a discriminatory purpose. The Supreme
Court reversed and enunciated a standard for Title VII cases
which focused on the effect of testing procedures rather than
on the employer's intent.2 The Court found that Congress intended Title VII to remove barriers which have operated to the
advantage of whites. 6 The Court further declared that good intent, or a lack of discriminatory intent, does not redeem employment practices which have a discriminatory effect and which do
not measure job capability. 2
Griggs established that in a Title VII action proof of discriminatory impact, without proof of discriminatory purpose, constitutes a prima facie claim of discrimination. The burden of proof
then shifts to the employer to show a "demonstrable relationship"28 between the test and job performance. Following Griggs,
many courts of appeals held that in equal protection claims, a
marked statistical disparity in the pass/fail rates for blacks
and whites taking a qualifying examination established a prima
2
facie case of racial discrimination. 1
In Castro v. Beecher,3" Spanish-surnamed and black plaintiffs claimed that the city of Boston's use of a written examination in hiring police officers discriminated against them in violation of their rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.11 Evidence showed
that only twenty-five percent of the black applicants and ten
percent of the Spanish-surnamed applicants passed the civil service examination whereas sixty-five percent of all others passed.2
The court held that this constituted a prima facie showing of
racially discriminatory impact which shifted the burden of proof
25. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
26. Id. at 429-30.
27. Id. at 432.
28. Id. at 436.
29. See, e.g., Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Davis v.
Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 958-59 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Boston Chapter NAACP, Inc. v.
Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1019 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); Walston v.
County School Bd., 492 F.2d 919, 924 (4th Cir. 1974); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v.
Members of Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1335 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
991 (1975); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 735 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of
Examiners, 458 F.2d, 1167, 1176 (2d Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 323 (8th
Cir.), modified, 452 F.2d 327 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). But see Tyler v.
Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1096-97 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976).
30. 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
31. Id. at 728.
32. Id. at 735.
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to the defendant civil service commission to justify use of the

test.3
In Chance v. Board of Examiners,34 the Second Circuit held
that a prima facie case of discrimination had been established by
statistics showing that white candidates for supervisory teaching
positions in New York City had one-and-one-half times the pass
rate of their black and Puerto Rican counterparts on a variety of
exams." Considering whether the district court had applied the
proper constitutional standards in reaching this conclusion, the
court of appeals stated:
Concededly, this case does not involve intentionally discriminatory legislation ... or even a neutral legislative scheme applied
Nonetheless,
in an intentionally discriminatory manner ....
racial
minorities
the
protection
afforded
we do not believe that
two possiby
those
by the fourteenth amendment is exhausted
bilities. As already indicated, the district court found that the
Board's examinations have a significant and substantial impact
on black and Puerto Rican applicants. That harsh racial impact, even if unintended, amounts to an invidious de facto classification that cannot be ignored .... 31
Other cases in the courts of appeals have also explicitly rejected the idea that proof of discriminatory intent is a prerequisite to a successful equal protection claim. In Boston Chapter
NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher,37 Spanish-surnamed and black plaintiffs challenged the use of a hiring examination by the Massachusetts fire departments. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
determined:
That Massachusetts did not intentionally discriminate is
immaterial . . . . Equitable relief under the Civil Rights Act
and the Fourteenth Amendment requires no proof of malice or
"fault". . . .The question is whether the test denied applicants
equal protection of the laws by creating "built-in headwinds"
for those who, although qualified to perform the job, cannot pass
the test.
Because Title VII does not require proof of discriminatory
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 737.
458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1171.
Id. at 1175 (citations omitted).
504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
Id. at 1021.
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intent, at least one court specifically stated that it would have
been anomalous to allow a public employer, at that time not
subject to Title VII, to escape the standards the Act imposed on
private employers' use of employment tests. 9 Despite the strong
endorsement in the lower federal courts for the principle that
Title VII and constitutional standards were identical, 0 the Supreme Court explicitly rejected this position in Washington v.
Davis.4'
WASHINGTON v. DAVIS

In Washington v. Davis, unsuccessful black applicants to the
Washington, D.C., police department alleged that the department's use of an employment qualification test discriminated
against them in violation of the fifth amendment, 42 U.S.C. §
1981,42 and a District of Columbia Code provision.4 3 Plaintiffs first
argued that the fifty-seven percent failure rate of black applicants, as compared with the thirteen percent rate of whites, demonstrated a racially disproportionate impact." Defendants then
attempted to prove that the test bore a demonstrable relationship
to successful performance as a policeman by introducing evidence
of a validity study which they claimed showed that test scores
accurately predicted performance in recruit school.45 Considering
only the constitutional claim, the district court concluded that
the test did not discriminate and was related to job performance.
The court thus granted summary judgment for the defendants."
39. Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1176-77 (2d Cir. 1972).
40. See note 29 supra. District court decisions endorsing this principle include: Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ohio 1975); United States v. City of Chicago, 385
F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Extension Serv., 372 F. Supp.
126 (N.D. Miss. 1974); Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 360 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
41. 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 (1976). The Court expressed its disagreement with 16 cases
in the lower courts which held that proof of discriminatory purpose is unnecessary in an
equal protection claim. The list included nine cases in which plaintiffs had challenged
employment screening tests. Id. at 244-45 n.12.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). For the text of the statute, see note 6 supra.
43. D.C. CODE § 1-320 (1973). The provision provides:
In any program of recruitment or hiring of individuals to fill positions in
the government of the District of Columbia, no officer or employee of the government of the District of Columbia shall exclude or give preference to the residents
of the District of Columbia or any State of the United States on the basis of
residence, religion, race, color or natural origin.
44. For a full description of plaintiffs' statistical proof, which is not contained in the
district court opinion, see Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 958-59 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
45. Id. at 961-62.
46. Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1972).
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The court of appeals reversed, 47 holding that Griggs provided the
applicable legal standard. Applying Griggs, the court held that
the employer's lack of discriminatory intent was irrelevant, and
the failure rates alone established a denial of equal protection."
With respect to the defendants' argument, the court held that a
correlation between test scores and training school performance
did not meet the Griggs standard, absent proof of a correlation
between training school performance and job performance. 9
Although the issue on summary judgment was the validity
of the constitutional claim, the court of appeals applied Title VII
standards in reaching its decision. On certiorari to the Supreme
Court, the parties argued the case as if Title VII standards controlled." The Court stated, however: "[W]e have never held that
the constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious
racial discrimination is identical to the standards applicable
under Title VII, and we decline to do so today."' In a review of
its prior decisions in equal protection cases, the Supreme Court
emphasized that those decisions had always required proof of
discriminatory purpose. 2
Among its prior decisions, the Court cited Strauder v. West
Virginia,53 which had held that a West Virginia law totally excluding blacks from juries denied equal protection. In Strauder
the effect of the official practice was so clear-cut that it showed
invidious racial discrimination. The Court also referred to Akins
v. Texas,14 in which petitioner had unsuccessfully argued that the
purposeful limitation of the number of blacks serving on grand
juries violated his constitutional rights. In Akins the Court had
stated:
[T]he mere fact of inequality in the number selected does not
in itself show discrimination. A purpose to discriminate must be
present which may be proven by systematic exclusion of eligible
jurymen of the prescribed race or by unequal application of the
55
law to such an extent as to show intentional discrimination.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Id. at 960.
Id. at 964-65.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 n.8 (1976).
Id. at 239.
Id.
100 U.S. 303 (1879).
325 U.S. 398 (1945).
Id. at 403-04.
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The opinion next examined Wright v. Rockefeller,56 a case
involving an equal protection challenge to a New York congressional apportionment statute. The Court in Wright affirmed a
district court finding that although appellants alleged the intentional creation by statute of one racially exclusive district, they
failed to prove that the statute was adopted with racial considera7
5
tions in mind.

Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 1,58 a school desegregation case
emphasizing the requirement of intent for a finding of de jure
segregation, was cited by the Court to demonstrate that in yet
another context the cases
have ...

adhered to the basic equal protection principle that

the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose. That there are both predominantly black and predominantly white schools in a community is not alone violative of the
Equal Protection Clause.59
The Court conceded in Washington that some cases indicated that effect rather than purposeful discrimination was the
touchstone of an equal protection challenge. Such decisions,
however, were distinguished. First, the Court recognized that language in its decision in Palmer v. Thompson" warned against
deciding equal protection cases on the basis of legislative purpose
or motivation. But, the Washington Court insisted, "[w]hatever
dicta the opinion may contain," 6 ' the Palmercase did not involve
government action with, neutral purpose and disproportionate
racial effect and could not be used to support respondent's argument.12 Second, the majority held that Wright v. Council of the
City of Emporia" did not change the requirement of purposeful
56. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
57. Justices Douglas and Goldberg dissented from the holding that the evidence did
not establish a prima facie case of legislative intent to draw congressional district lines
on the basis of race. Id. at 59, 67.
58. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
59. 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
60. 403 U.S. 217 (1971). In Palmer plaintiffs had argued that the city council of
Jackson, Mississippi, had closed the city pools to avoid desegregation. Both the court of
appeals and the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court finding that there was no denial
of equal protection.
61. 426 U.S. 229, 243 (1976). The Palmer Court had stated: "But no case in this Court
has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it." 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971).
62. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 243 (1976).
63. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
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discrimination. In Wright Emporia officials attempted to establish a separate city school system after desegregation had been
ordered for the county. The Supreme Court enjoined creation of
the separate school system, stating that "[t]he existence of a
permissible purpose cannot sustain an action that has an impermissible effect."" The Washington majority reasoned, however,
that the establishment of the separate school system would have
interfered with an outstanding desegregation order thus making
5
unnecessary proof of an independent constitutional violation.1
After Washington an employee alleging a constitutional
claim of employment discrimination must prove purposeful discrimination on the part of his employer;66 however, the decision
offers little guidance to a plaintiff who seeks to prove discriminatory intent. The opinion suggests only that in extreme situations,
such as the total exclusion of blacks from juries in Strauder v.
West Virginia,7 discriminatory impact will suffice as proof of
discriminatory purpose." Generally, substantial statistical disparities are rejected as proof of a prima facie case.69
Underlying this analysis is a belief that it is possible to draw
a clear distinction between purpose and effect. However, as
Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurring opinion,
the line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory
impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical,
as the reader of the Court's opinion might assume. I agree, of
course, that a constitutional issue does not arise every time some
disproportionate impact is shown. On the other hand, when the
64. Id. at 462. However, the Court also stated: "[O]ur holding today does not rest
upon a conclusion that the disparity in racial balance between the city and county schools
resulting from separate systems would, absent any other considerations, be unacceptable." Id. at 470.
65. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 243 (1976).
66. Id. at 245.
67. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
68. Other decisions in which the Court inferred purposeful discrimination from a
racially exclusive effect are Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972) (of those selected
to serve on grand juries only 5% were black although 21% of the local population was
black); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (all but four or five of Tuskegee's black
voters would have been excluded by the redefinition of Tuskegee's boundaries while no
whites would have been affected); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (out of 384 persons
serving as grand jurors only 5 were black); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (more
than 150 Chinese were arrested under a law prohibiting the operation of a laundry in a
wooden building while about 80 non-Chinese owning wooden laundries were not prosecuted).
69. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-46 (1976).
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disproportion is . . .dramatic . . . it really does not matter
70
whether the standard is phrased in terms of purpose or effect.

The holding in Washington limited the relief available to
plaintiffs bringing a constitutional claim. An employee who must
prove an employer's discriminatory purpose faces tremendous
hurdles.7 1 Without describing the kind of proof which demonstrates purposeful discrimination, the opinion rejected statistical
proof as sufficient to establish a prima facie case.7" The decision
left open the question of what weight, if any, such evidence
should receive. It is possible that in future constitutional attacks
on employment tests the Court will apply the reasoning it formulated in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp.73 In Arlington Heights the Court rejected
petitioners' claim that denial of the rezoning of village property
was purposeful discrimination and thus a violation of their equal
protection rights. The opinion referred to three sources which
might provide evidence of discriminatory purpose: the historical
background of the challenged action, the specific sequence of
events leading to it, and the legislative history of the act.7"
The Washington Court hestitated to extend the Title VII
disproportionate effect rule into the equal protection area. In
part, the Court feared that in the equal protection context the
result "would be far reaching and would raise serious questions
about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare,
public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be
more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to
the more affluent white." The opinion stated that Congress intended Title VII standards to be rigorous in order to make the Act
an effective remedy for discrimination. 7 This implies that in an
equal protection case there will be a heavier burden on the plaintiff to prove discrimination in employment testing. Furthermore,
70. Id. at 254 (citations omitted).

71. See generally Brest, Palmerv. Thompson:An Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. Rv.95, 119-30; Ely, Legislative &Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1212-17 (1970).

72. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-46 (1976).
73. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).

74. Id. at 566.
75. Id. at 564-65.
76. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).

77. Id. at 247-48.
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the Court emphasized that any lessening of that burden by extending the disproportionate impact rule into the equal protection area should come from Congress, not the courts."
THE EMPLOYER'S BURDEN OF PROOF

The federal courts have attempted to determine what standard of proof should govern an employer's rebuttal of a prima
facie case of discrimination. 79 Much confusion has resulted from
the difference between the analysis used in deciding equal protection cases and that used in Title VII cases. Moreover, the review
process in Title VII cases provides for a "more probing judicial
review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of
administrators and executives than is appropriate under the ConThis suggests that in equal protection cases the
stitution. . .. ,,81
burden of proof on the employer is not as heavy as in Title VII
cases.
Griggs provided the standard for Title VII cases.8' In Griggs
the Court announced that if a plaintiff proves that an employment test has a disproportionate racial effect, the employer must
demonstrate that the test has "a manifest relation to the employment in question. 82 The Court in Griggs did not consider
the extent to which a test must be job-related8 3 or the standards
to be used in this determination. Four years later the Supreme
Court inAlbemarle PaperCo. v. Moody84 emphasized the importance of the standards promulgated under Title VII and outlined
in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures.8 5 Although the Guidelines
are not administrative regulations promulgated in compliance
with formal procedures,88 the Court used the Guidelines as the
appropriate standard and found that "[m]easured against the
Guidelines, Albemarle's [the employer's] validation study is
78. Id. at 248.
79. See note 18 supra.
80. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976).
81. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
82. Id. at 432.
83. Job-relatedness refers to the accuracy with which a preemployment test selects
job applicants who have the essential abilities for successful performance of a particular
job. For a discussion of job-relatedness, see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
426-27, 430-31 (1975).
84. Id. at 405.
85. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-14 (1975).
86. See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975).
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materially defective in several respects .
"8...
?
The Guidelines require the employer to validate any test
which has a disproportionate impact on any group protected by
Title Vfl. ss Validation is shown by "empirical data demonstrating
that the test is predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant
to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated."" In
addition, the employer must demonstrate that it has no alternative means of selecting employees.
The Guidelines' standards for validation are based on the
Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests and Manuals
published by the American Psychological Association.' The
Guidelines mention three types of validation.2 Criterion validation is assessed by comparing test scores with scores on an independent measure of job success. Two other types of validation
are content and construct validation. Content validation is established if a test accurately measures the skills necessary for successful job performance. 4 For example, a typing test has high
content validity for selecting secretaries. Construct validation is
established if a test measures the traits or intellectual abilities
thought to be necessary for successful job performance. Because
content and construct validity do not involve the comparison of
test scores with any actual measure of job success, it is questionable whether either accurately predicts job performance. 6 The
Guidelines require an employer using these two types of validation to gather "sufficient information from job analyses to dem97
onstrate the relevance of the content . . . or the construct.
Thus an employer who uses content or construct validation to
87. Id. at 431.
88. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1975) provides in part: "The use of any test which adversely

affects hiring . . . of classes protected by Title VII constitutes discrimination unless: (a)
the test has been validated and evidences a high degree of utility. . ....
89. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1975).
90. Id. § 1607.3 (1975).
91. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR EDUC. & PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS &
MANUALS (1966) [hereinafter cited as AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N STANDARDS].
92. The Guidelines provide a summary description of the types of validation they
recommend. Because the American Psychological Association manual is more detailed, it
is referred to for purposes of this discussion.
93. See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N STANDARDS, supra note 91, at 13.
94. Id. at 12-13.
95. Id. at 13.
96. Id. at 12-24.
97. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(a) (1975).
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prove job-relatedness must provide evidence of a relationship between the trait or skill the test measures and job success.
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 8 the Supreme Court
termed the Guidelines "'entitled to great deference.' -'s To effectuate Title VII's objective and to end discriminatory employment
practices, the lower courts should adhere to the Guidelines' strict
requirements. The use of these Guidelines in equal protection
cases raises many questions, however, and much confusion has
resulted when the courts have grafted the Guidelines onto the
traditional equal protection analysis.'0 '
The equal protection clause requires that legislative classifications further legislative ends.'0 1 The dominant mode of equal
protection analysis, described as a two-tiered system, requires
either a minimal or a strict standard of review.01 2 If the classification has been recognized as (1) suspect' 3 or (2) affecting a fundamental right,'' the courts must apply the stricter standard of
review.' 5 In all other cases, the courts require only that the legislation bear a rational relationship to its stated objective.'0 ' This
standard is usually very deferential to the challenged legislation;
sometimes, however, the courts have applied a less deferential
rational relationship test.'0
Race has been found a suspect classification and cases of
alleged racial discrimination require the stricter standard of review.' 8 In these cases the courts have applied a strict scrutiny test
98. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
99. Id. at 431 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971)).
100. See, e.g., Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Boston Chapter NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1019 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
910 (1975); Walston v. County School Bd., 492 F.2d 919, 924 (4th Cir. 1974); Chance v.
Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1176 (2d Cir. 1972).
101. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
102. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
103. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) (race).
104. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel).
105. Massachusetts Bd.of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976).
106. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483 (1955).
107. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); United States Dep't of Agriculture
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971). See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection,86 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1972).
108. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964).
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requiring the demonstration of a compelling justification for the
official action and a showing that the official purpose is advanced
by the least restrictive means." 9 If the strict scrutiny test were
satisfied, theoretically the racial classification could continue.
Under the strict scrutiny test, however, racial classifications are
nearly always struck down." '0 Therefore, once a public employee
has demonstrated that his employer has purposefully discriminated against him on the basis of race, the court will apply strict
scrutiny and prohibit continued use of the test.
Courts faced with equal protection challenges to employment
tests have grappled with the problem of selecting an appropriate
standard of review for determining whether use of an employment
test is justified.' Although before Washington the courts held
that disproportionate impact sufficed as proof of a prima facie
claim of discrimination," 2 they were unwilling to apply the strict
scrutiny test which is triggered by a showing of purposeful racial
discrimination. Instead, several courts applied a "heavy burden"
test,"' which appeared to be somewhere between the extremely
deferential rational relationship standard and the nearly always
fatal strict scrutiny.
In Castro v. Beecher,"' the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit rejected plaintiffs' argument that strict scrutiny applied.
The court refused to require an employer to demonstrate that
selecting employees by written examination was the only available means of making hiring decisions.15 The court also rejected
the rational relationship test, reasoning that the employer who
uses a test with a racially disproportionate impact must meet a
stricter standard and demonstrate that the test "substantially
relate[s]" to job performance."' The court relied on Griggs as the
source of the appropriate standards to measure a "substantial
relationship" between the employment test and job perform109. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
110. The one case to uphold a racial classification under strict scrutiny is Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
111. See note 100 supra.

112. See note 29 supra.
113. Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482
F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d
725 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972). See
Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 351 F. Supp. 721 (D. Minn. 1972), in which the standard was

articulated as "a high degree of utility." Id. at 725.
114. 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
115. Id. at 733.

116. Id. at 732.
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ance. "7 Because the employer had failed to perform the validation
studies required under those standards, the lower court order to
develop a nondiscriminatory and job predictive test was affirmed."'
In a Second Circuit decision, Chance v. Board of Examiners,"' the court of appeals described the employer's burden of
justification as "heavy" but insisted that the compelling state
interest test had not been applied.' 20 The court held that under
the rational relationship test, the standards for employment test
validation had not been met.' 2' In a later Second Circuit decision,
Bridgeport Guardians,Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Service Commission, 22 the court again adopted the "heavy burden"
test. Citing a prior Supreme Court Title VII case as authority for
using this test, the court stated, "In view of the substantial authority for this test, we see no advantage in an agonizing semantic
discussion as to whether it is within or without the parameters of
the 'rational basis' test employed in distinguishable situa23
tions."'

In an equal protection case under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a Minnesota district court considered whether the showing that an
employment test examined the knowledge, abilities, and skills
demanded of a firefighter sufficed to show job-relatedness.' 24 The
court cited Griggs as affording "an appropriately strong analogy
to the issues raised under the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1983, "125 and mentioned the EEOC Guidelines as embodying
principles which have received wide judicial recognition as appropriate standards in the field of employment testing.' 26 The court
found that the employer had not complied with the Guidelines'
requirements, because he failed to make a proper job analysis
which would show a relationship between the test content and the
desired job capabilities.' 2 Thus, the court decided that the
117. Id. at 732-33.
118. Id. at 736-37.
119. 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
120. Id. at 1177.
121. Id. at 1178.
122. 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975).
123. Id. The Title VII case on which the court relied was McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
124. Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 351 F. Supp. 721, 724 (D. Minn. 1972).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 725.
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employer had not adequately rebutted the prima facie case of
discrimination.
In Washington, the Supreme Court concluded that the respondents had failed to prove a constitutional claim of discrimination.12 Theoretically, the Court should not have reached the
issue of the employer's burden of proof. The Supreme Court
noted that the only issue properly before the Court was the constitutional claim, 2 but nonetheless, it decided that on the statutory
claim under section 1-320 of the District of Columbia Code,,3" the
petitioners showed sufficient job-relatedness to justify continued
use of the test. 3' The majority held that under the governing
standards of proof, similar to those under Title VII, 3 2 a correlation between performance on an employment test and success in
33
a training program validated the test.1
The dissent by Justice Brennan,u joined by Justice Marshall, stated that resolution of the constitutional issue in favor of
the petitioners precluded decision on the statutory claim.'35 On
the latter issue, Justice Brennan would have affirmed the court
of appeals' finding that training school validation failed to meet
the applicable statutory standards. 3 '
Although Title VII standards did not apply in Washington,3 7
the Court characterized the D.C. Code standards as similar to
those under the Act. This suggests that the Court viewed training
school validation as sufficient for Title VII cases. Under the
EEOC Guidelines, however, a validation study comparing test
scores with skills or general traits, rather than with actual job
success, must be accompanied by job analyses.3 8 Such analyses
128. 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
129. Id. at 236. In the district court both parties had filed motions for summary
judgment on the constitutional claim of discrimination in the use of the employment
screening test. The court held that the test was nondiscriminatory and related to the
requirements of the police training program and granted defendants' motion. Davis v.
Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 17-18 (D.D.C. 1972). The court of appeals reversed, holding
that the employment test was invalid because of its racially discriminatory impact in light
of which defendants had failed to establish the test's validity. Davis v. Washington, 512
F.2d 956, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
130. D.C. CoDE § 1-320 (1973). For the text of this section, see note 43 supra.
131. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 250 (1976).
132. Id. at 249.
133. Id. at 250-51.
134. Id. at 256.
135. Id. at 257 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 236.
138. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(a) (1975).
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show the relationship between the trait or skill measured and job
performance.13 9 The employer in Washington had not introduced
evidence of job analyses. Thus, the Court's holding may lessen
the burden of proof on an employer in a Title VII case. In Griggs
and Albemarle Paper the Court emphasized the importance of
the EEOC Guidelines' standards for employment test validation. 4 ' The Guidelines 4 ' and the lower federal courts 42 have favored direct evidence of a relationship between a test and the
skills required for a particular job. It is difficult to understand,
in light of the foregoing, why the Supreme Court determined that
under a statute similar to Title VII training school validation
sufficed. If Washington is used to reduce the employer's burden
of proof, the remedial nature of Title VII could be seriously im43

paired.'

AFTER

WASHINGTON

v.

DAVIS

The decision in Washington mandates that courts differentiate between constitutional and Title VII claims of discrimination.'44 Title VII focuses on the effect of the employer's action;
' Under a constitudiscriminatory purpose need not be proved. 45
tional claim the plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent in
order to obtain judicial review of the use of an employment test.'46
Because of the difficulty in proving intent, few litigants will prevail on constitutional claims of discrimination in the use of employment tests.
Furthermore, the holding in Washington undermines the
emphasis in Griggs and Albemarle on enforcing Title VII standards.'47 The Court stated that the Griggs and Albemarle deci139. See text accompanying notes 93-96 supra.
140. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
141. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(a) (1975). See text accompanying note 97 supra.
142. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543, 555-56 (N.D. Ill.
1974); Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187, 1202-03 (D. Md. 1973); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084, 1090-91 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
143. The Court in Washington discussed the employer's burden of proof in light of
the statutory claims brought by respondents. Thus, the decision did not consider the
appropriate burden of justification for an employer when the employee brings a constitutional claim. However, a finding of purposeful racial discrimination should result in the
application of strict scrutiny. Under this test, preemployment examinations, like almost
all other official actions resulting in racial classifications, would be prohibited.
144. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
145. Id. at 246-47.
146. Id. at 245.
147. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
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sions did not foreclose the possibility that training school validation may suffice to show job-relatedness.' However, Washington
contradicts the principle, espoused in the two Title VII decisions,
that validation studies must show a relationship between the
skills or abilities measured and actual job performance. 49' Justice
Brennan's dissent in Washington points out:
Where employers try to validate written qualification tests by
proving a correlation with written examinations in a training
course, there is a substantial danger that people who have good
verbal skills will achieve high scores on both tests due to verbal
ability, rather than "job-specific ability." As a result, employers
could validate any entrance examination that measures only
verbal ability by giving another written test that measures verbal ability at the end of a training course. Any contention that
the resulting correlation between examination scores would be
evidence
that the initial test is "job related" is plainly erro50

neous.1

Because Washington v. Davis was based on a statute with standards "similar to those obtaining under Title VII, '"' it is unclear whether the Court views training school validation as sufficient proof of job-relatedness under Title VII. The conclusion that
training school validation meets these standards must be rejected
for Title VII cases. Otherwise, it will be far too easy for employers
to show job-relatedness. If this happens, the decision in
Washington v. Davis will have the two-fold effect of blocking
relief for discrimination in the use of employment tests on both
constitutional and statutory grounds.
Julie D. Fay

148. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 250-51 (1976).
149. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).

150. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 270 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 249.
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TITLE VII AND THE SABBATH OBSERVER*
On November 2, 1976, the United States Supreme Court
decided ParkerSeal Co. v. Cummins.' The Court affirmed without opinion the application of Title VII2 requiring an employer,
in the absence of undue hardship, to make reasonable accommodation for the religious requirements of his employees. This decision represents the culmination of many years of litigation involving the employment problems of Sabbath observers.3
The purpose of this comment is to clarify the nature and
extent of the protection provided the Sabbath observer by Title
VII. This will involve an examination of, first, the protection
provided under the statutory scheme of Title VII and the regulatory scheme of the Equal Employment-Opportunity Commission
(EEOC),4 second, the judicial interpretations of Title VII and
EEOC protection, and third, the constitutionality of Title VII
and EEOC regulations.
I. TITLE VII AND EEOC TREATMENT OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
THE SABBATH OBSERVER

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, inter alia,
for relief against religious discrimination in employment. Prior to
its amendment in 1972, the Act stated in part: "It shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's . . . religion . . . 5
* The author wishes to thank Aaron Ben-Merre for his helpful suggestions in the
preparation of this comment.
1. 97 S. Ct. 342 (1976), aff'g mem. by an equally divided Court, Cummins v. Parker
Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975).
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970 &
Supp. II1972).
3. Saturday is regarded as the Sabbath by certain religious groups such as Jews,
Seventh Day Adventists and members of the Worldwide Church of God. According to the
tenets of their faiths, Sabbath is a day of rest upon which no work may be performed.
This belief is based on a Biblical passage which states: "Six days shalt thou labour, and
do all thy work; but the seventh day is a Sabbath unto the Lord thy God, in it thou shalt
not do any manner of work. . . ." Exodus 20:9, 10.
4. The EEOC was created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to further the purposes of
the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970 & Supp. H 1972). The Commission was given the power
to promulgate regulations consistent with the provisions of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e12(a) (1970).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970) (amended 1972).

911
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The language of this prohibition may have been adequate to
protect victims and potential victims of blatant religious discrimination, but it was uncertain whether Title VII would protect a
person who had been discriminated against, less directly, as a
result of individual acts of religious observance. As long as an
employer promulgated a company rule requiring all employees
and prospective employees to be available for work on Saturday,
a job might be denied to an otherwise qualified Sabbath observer
without violating Title VII.
In order to remedy this situation, the EEOC in 1967 promulgated regulation 1605.1.1 This regulation defines the duties imposed upon the employer by Title VII, reducing the statutory
requirement to a two-part test. The employer must (1) make
reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of employees,
unless, (2) such accommodations would cause undue hardship on
the conduct of the employer's business. Thus, an employer could
be held liable for discrimination even if his company rule applied
uniformly to all employees. While a company rule might apply
equally to all employees, it might not have an equal impact on
them. To avoid discriminating, the employer would henceforth be
required to make reasonable accommodations to the religious
needs of his employees.
The EEOC, however, recognized the need of an employer to
carry on his business profitably. Therefore, even if the employer
makes no accommodation whatsoever, he is not culpable if
making such accommodation would cause him undue hardship.
Thus, the EEOC has invoked a balancing test to define religious
discrimination under Title VII. First, the inquiry focuses on
whether an encroachment upon an employee's religious observance has been caused by an employer's rule. If such a restriction
can be demonstrated, the employer must then make "reasonable
accommodations" to the employee's religious needs. If the employer cannot show that he has made reasonable accommodations
6. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b)(1976). The pertinent part of the regulation states:

The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds
, , * includes an obligation on the part of the employer to make reasonable
accommodationsto the religious needs of employees and prospective employees
where such accommodatons can be made without undue hardshipon the con-

duct of the employer's business. Such undue hardship, for example, may exist
where the employee's needed work cannot be performed by another employee

of substantially similar qualifications during the period of absence of the
Sabbath observer. (Emphasis added).
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to the needs of the Sabbath-observing employee, then the employer bears the burden of proving that such accommodation
7
would place an "undue hardship" on his business.
This balancing approach is similar to the approach adopted
by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner.' In Sherbert an
administrative rule required that applicants for unemployment
benefits be available for Saturday work. Although the rule applied equally to everyone in the state, the Supreme Court found
that it discriminated against the appellant, a Seventh Day Adventist.' The Court, therefore, held that the state had to make a
reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of the appellant
by exempting her from Saturday work.10 Like the EEOC's later
ruling, the Court found religious discrimination because of the
rule's unequal impact on the appellant's religious observance."
The court concluded in Sherbert that a compelling state interest was necessary to justify application of the Saturday work
rule without exception: "'Only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.' "
This parallels the EEOC approach, which only exempts the employer from accommodation when it is clear that such accommodation would cause undue hardship on the business of the employer. Mere inconvenience will not suffice.' 3 Thus, the EEOC

had substantial precedent to support its definition of religious
discrimination in regulation 1605.1. Courts generally followed'"
7. The EEOC places the burden of proving undue hardship upon the employer:
"Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or refusing to hire
an employee or applicant on account of his religious beliefs, the employer has
the burden of proving that an undue hardship renders the required accommodations to the religious needs of the employee unreasonable."
29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(c) (1976).
8. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
9. Id. at 404.
10. Id. at 410.
11. Id. at 404. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 300 F. Supp. 709, 713 (W.D. Mich.
1969), where the analogy between Sherbert and 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 was drawn. See also
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), where the Court stated: "If the purpose or effect
of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions. . . that law is constitutionally
invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect." Id. at 607
(emphasis added).
12. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1945)).
13. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1976). See Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 550
(6th Cir. 1975), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 97 S. Ct. 342 (1976).
14. E.g., Hardison v. TWA, Inc., 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), petitionfor cert. filed,
97 S.Ct. 381 (1976); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972); Jordan v. North
Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1972 (W.D.N.C. 1975). A notable exception is Reid v.
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this regulation as a valid expression of the congressional will in
enacting that part of Title VII that deals with religious discrimination.'5
To eliminate any doubt as to the effect that should be given
to EEOC regulation 1605.1, in 1972 the Congress added section
701(j) to Title VII: "The term 'religion' includes all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business.""6 Commenting on regulation 1605.1 and the
Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975), rehearingdenied, 525 F.2d 986 (6th
Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed, 97 S. Ct. 394 (1976). Appellant Reid, a Seventh Day
Adventist, was refused a job as a copywriter on appellee's newspaper. Subsequent to this
refusal, appellant obtained a job elsewhere at a higher salary than he would have made
as copywriter on appellee's paper. Appellant then sued for damages caused by appellee's
refusal to hire him. It is clear that the court of appeals considered appellant's favorable
job position when it held in favor of appellee and refused to apply 29 C.F.R.§ 1605.1. The
court stated:
Apparently no hardship was imposed on Reid because in July, 1970, long before
the first trial, he accepted other employment at a higher salary, and which
employment apparently did not require him to work on Saturday. He is no
longer interested in working for Press Scimitar. All he wants now are damages,
plus attorney's fees.
Id. at 517. For a further discussion of Reid, see Comment, Sabbath Observer
Discrimination,22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 143, 148-51 (1976). The same court applied 29
C.F.R. § 1605.1 in Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir.
1975); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd mem. by an equally
divided Court, 97 S.Ct. 342 (1976); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 468 F.2d 346 (6th
Cir. 1972)(at a time when the court was unaware of plaintiff Reid's new position).
15. This is in accord with the general principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965):
When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows
great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency
charged with its administration. "To sustain the Commission's application of
this statutory term, we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable
one, or even that it is the result we would have reached had the question arisen
in the first instance in judicial proceedings."
Id. at 16'(quoting Unemployment Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S, 143, 153 (1946)).
In a specific reference to an EEOC regulation, the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 stated:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, having enforcement responsibility, has issued guidelines interpreting § 703(h) to permit only the use
of job-related tests. The administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference. . . .Since the Act and its legislative
history support the Commission's construction, this affords good reason to treat
the guidelines as expressing the will of Congress.
Id. at 433.
16. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)(Supp. II 1972). Doubt as
to the applicability of 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 arose as a result of the Supreme Court's affirmance without opinion of Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd
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addition of section 701(j) to Title VII, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated: "We are satisfied that the
guidelines in effect at the time of [appellant's] discharge were
valid, as being a proper interpretation of the statute, and as vali'1 7
dated by the subsequent legislative recognition of that fact.
Therefore, regulation 1605.1 appears to be a valid interpretation by the EEOC of the congressional will in enacting the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Section 701(j) of the 1972 amendment provided an after-the-fact legislative recognition of the validity of
the EEOC approach.
I.

REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP

After the promulgation of regulation 1605.1, courts faced the
tasks of applying the reasonable accommodation standard and of
determining what situations placed undue hardship on an employer's business. The courts have shown much sensitivity to the
particular facts and circumstances of each case. 8
5 is illustrative. That
United States v. City of Albuquerque"
case involved a Seventh Day Adventist fireman whose religion
prohibited work from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday. As
a result of a rotating shift system used by the fire department,
his work shifts occasionally conflicted with his Sabbath observance. However, department regulations could have provided the
employee with a solution had he sought one. The district fire chief
had visited the employee at his home to suggest alternative
means of dealing with the problem, such as shift trading," unby an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971). Largely because of a desire to eradicate
this doubt, Congress included § 701(j) in the 1972 amendment. 118 CONG. Rac. 1861-62
(1972). In Dewey the court of appeals held 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 inapplicable both because

the regulation had not yet been promulgated by the EEOC at the time the circumstances
of the case arose, and because petitioner had exhausted his course of action by electing

arbitration. 429 F.2d at 330-32. Subsequently, the court of appeals denied a petition for
rehearing, holding that § 1605.1 did not reflect the legislative intent of Congress and
therefore constituted an improper interpretation of religious discrimination. Id. at 335.
17. Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1972). The court also minimized the importance of Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd
by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971), stating that it "added nothing to the
jurisprudence" because the cause of action had arisen before the EEOC promulgated 29
C.F.R. § 1605.1. See note 16 supra.
18. This is in accord with the approach of the EEOC. See 29 C.F.R.§ 1605.1(d)(1976).
19. 10 F.E.P. Cases 771 (D.C.N.M. 1975).
20. Shift trading involves an agreement between two individuals of the same rank to
work each other's regularly scheduled shift on specified dates. Id. at 776.
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scheduled vacation," and leave without pay." However, the employee did not pursue any of these possible solutions to the conflict. Instead, he insisted upon a firm commitment from the fire
department that he would not be required to work the Friday
night shift or the Saturday day shift.
In deciding for the defendant, the court considered several
factors." First, the fire department attempted to make reasonable accommodations by allowing shift trading, unscheduled vacation time and leaves without pay. Second, the department had
to protect lives and property. To accommodate the employee
beyond what had already been suggested would have caused
undue hardship to the department. Finally, the employee was
uncooperative. He should not have rejected outright the alternatives suggested by the department.
The court's determination of "reasonable accommodation"
in Albuquerque was strongly influenced by the particular facts of
the case. Perhaps the court would have required greater evidence
of undue hardship on the employer had the employee been more
cooperative.24 The key factors in Albuquerque were the nature of
the employment and the employee's intransigence.
In Hardisonv. TWA, Inc., 2 plaintiff Hardison was employed
as a store clerk at Kansas City International Airport. The store's
department at the airport operated twenty-four hours per day,
seven days per week. After working at the airport for approximately one year, Hardison became interested in the Worldwide
Church of God.2 He discussed with his manager the possibility
of joining this church and the effect it would have on his availability for work on the Sabbath. In an effort to avoid potential
conflict, Hardison transferred to a night shift. Several months
later, when a daytime clerical position became available in another section of the airport, Hardison applied for and obtained
that position. He stated that the daytime shift would be more
desirable due to his recent marriage."
21. Accrued vacation time could have been applied toward those days when the
employee's work schedule conflicted with the Sabbath. Id. at 775-76.
22. Requests for leave without pay were routinely granted to employees except in
emergency situations. Id. at 776.
23. Id. at 771, 773-74.
24. Id. at 774.
25. 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), petitionfor cert. filed, 97 S. Ct. 381 (1976).
26. The tenets of this religion prohibit work from sundown on Friday through sundown on Saturday. Id. at 36.
27. Id.
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Each of the store clerk sections maintained a separate seniority list. Thus, although Hardison held a relatively lengthy tenure
in his former section, he was second lowest in seniority in the new
section. As a result, his freedom to select his work schedule was
diminished considerably. 8
Soon after Hardison obtained his new position, the clerk with
lowest seniority took a vacation. Plaintiff, in conformance with
the union contract and because he was second lowest on the list,
was called upon to substitute for the vacationing employee on a
schedule which included Friday and Saturday work. Following a
meeting with union officials over the seniority rules, plaintiff
agreed to transfer to the "twilight shift,"29 which alleviated the
Saturday work conflict. A few weeks later, however, while still
replacing the vacationing employee, Hardison left work early on
a Friday to observe the Sabbath. He was subsequently discharged. 0
In deciding for the plaintiff, the court noted that the employer had reasonable alternatives to accommodate Hardison,
but that the defendant employer did not pursue them. The employer could have offered any of the following solutions: (1)
Within the framework of the collective bargaining agreement, the
employer could have allowed the plaintiff to work a four-day week
during the period that he substituted for the other employee;" (2)
Within the framework of the collective bargaining agreement,
TWA could have filled plaintiff's Sabbath shift with other available personnel. This could easily have been accomplished by assignment of a worker from a pool of two hundred qualified employees;32 (3) The employer might have attempted or encouraged
28. Id.
29. 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. Id.
30. Id. at 37.
31. Hardison was willing to work a four-day week; however, TWA would not agree.
Although the company conceded that a supervisor could have replaced Hardison for the
fifth workday, or that another worker could have been transferred on a temporary basis,
TWA indicated that such alternatives might have'caused other shop functions to suffer.
Id. at 39-40. The court rejected this argument because the company failed to prove that a
short week for one individual during a temporary period of another's vacation would cause
undue hardship and not merely inconvenience its operations. Id. at 40.
32. TWA contended that this alternative would also have imposed undue hardship.
Id. at 40. The court rejected this argument, noting that TWA is a large firm with many
employees. Any additional compensation for overtime would therefore be negligible because it would involve only the period that the other employee would be on vacation. The
employer might have experienced business inconvenience, but not undue hardship. Id. at
40-41. The court also noted that TWA never considered whether the aforementioned
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a trade-off between plaintiff and another employee, either for an
entirely different shift or for the Sabbath portion of the shift.3
Under these circumstances, where the employer failed to offer
any such methods of reasonable accommodation, the court found
the employer guilty of religious discrimination and thus held for
the plaintiff.34
Interestingly, TWA's defense was similar to that of the defendant in Albuquerque. TWA alleged that it was excused from
making efforts at reasonable accommodation because of plaintiff's own lack of cooperation in transferring from a position with
seniority and protection against Sabbath day assignments to a
position in a new section without such seniority and protection. 5
Rejecting that argument, the court held that limiting the right to
transfer to a more favorable position, as a condition of accommodation, would in itself constitute discrimination on the basis of
religion."
The Hardison court concluded that before an employer may
assert a defense of noncooperation, the employer must first establish that it has tendered an accommodation which the employee
has refused to consider.37 Because TWA had not tendered any
reasonable accommodation, it could not plead the employee's
noncooperation as a defense.3
In situations where the employer offers to accommodate the
Sabbath-observing employee by transferring him to a different
position, the courts have again shown much fact sensitivity.
Johnson v. United States Postal Service" involved a postal service station with few employees, all of whom were required to
work on Saturday. The Sabbath observing employee was a parttime clerk with a flexible schedule. The court found that it would
be a reasonable accommodation to offer him "as many Saturdays
off as possible-or-in the alternative to recommend [him] for
a transfer to [a] larger Post Office." 4
accommodation was reasonable. Accordingly, the burden of proving undue hardship was
strictly imposed upon TWA. Id. at 41.
33. Id. at 40-41.
34. Id. at 39.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 497 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1974).
40. Id. at 130.
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Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co. 41 involved a
skilled electrical employee. The employer offered to transfer the
Sabbath observer to production line work where the employee's
electrical skills would not be used, and the employee was threat-

ened with a reduction in wages. This was not considered a reasonable accommodation. The employer should at least have at-

tempted to adjust shift schedules before considering a transfer
42
from specialized to less skilled work.

Situations where fellow employees have complained about
the accommodations made to the Sabbath observer have also

been considered in a fact sensitive manner. Generally, employee
morale problems must be serious and the complaints of fellow
workers must be chronic to justify nonaccommodation because of

undue hardship. As the court of appeals indicated in Cummins
v. Parker Seal Co.,"3 the harmful effect of fellow worker com-

plaints must yield in the face of the greater harm to the applicant
in denying employment because of religious observance.14 Only

when the employer can make a persuasive showing that employee
discontent'will produce "chaotic personnel problems"

5

will such

a defense to nonaccommodation be permitted.
Ill.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE REASONABLE AcCOMMODATION

RULE

Some courts" have suggested that the reasonable accommodation rule might constitute an establishment of religion in viola41. 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975).
42. Id. at 520.
43. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 97 S. Ct.
342 (1976).
44. Id. at 550. In so observing, the court might have reasoned that an employer may
encourage unwarranted complaints by not discussing with employees the propriety of
allowing equal employment opportunities without infringing upon the right to observe
one's religion. Moreover, the court may have been wary of making accommodation dependent upon the complaints of fellow workers who might harbor bigoted attitudes toward
the observer's religion.
45. Id.
46. See Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975); Dewey v.
Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970); Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 45
U.S.L.W. 2367 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 1977).
The court in Dewey stated:
To construe the Act as authorizing the adoption of Regulations which would
coerce or compel an employer to accede to or accommodate the religious beliefs
of all of his employees would raise grave constitutional questions of violation of
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Id. at 334.
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tion of the first amendment to the Constitution.47 Most courts,
however, have rejected this view."
In Cummins v. ParkerSeal Co.,49 the first amendment issues
regarding the reasonable accommodation rule were extensively
discussed. Appellant Cummins had been employed for over ten
years at the Parker Seal Company. When Cummins became a
member of the Worldwide Church of God, he informed the plant
manager that he could not work on Saturday because of religious
observance. The manager acquiesced to his employee's request."
Several months later Cummins was informed by a new plant
manager that the no-Saturday schedule would remain acceptable
"as long as it don't cause any problems." 5 ' Subsequently, the
manager advised Cummins that a fellow employee had complained about his no-Saturday schedule and that Cummins
therefore would be required to work on Saturday as a condition
of his continued employment. For religious reasons, the appellant
refused to comply with this demand and was subsequently fired.
In deciding for the appellant, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated that mild and infrequent
complaints by fellow employees do not constitute undue hardship
upon the employer's business.5 2 Furthermore, the employer made
no attempt to alleviate fellow employee dissension, although
there had been ample opportunity to do so." The Cummins court
47. The first amendment states in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
" U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
48. See Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975);
Hardison v. TWA, Inc., 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d
544 (6th Cir. 1975), af'd mer. by an equally divided Court, 97 S. Ct. 342 (1976); Reid v.
Memphis Publishing Co., 468 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1972); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d
1113 (5th Cir. 1972); Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172 (W.D.N.C.
1975); Claybaugh v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973).
49. 516 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 97 S. Ct.
342 (1976).
50. Id. at 548. During certain busy periods when the company was open on Saturday,
the stock supervisors substituted for Cummins. In return, Cummins made himself available to replace the stock supervisors "at any other time other than . . .Sabbath or an
annual holy day." Id.
51. Id. Testimony was introduced to show that the efficiency and safety of the employee's department did not suffer when the stock preparation supervisors substituted for
Cummins. The prior plant manager testified: "'[lit's always been kind of a set up down
through the years that if the Banbury Supervisor was not there the Stock Prep. Supervisor
covered both sides of it.'" He further testified that problems with production were
"'nothing related to [appellant's] situation.'" Id.
52. Id. at 550. See notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
53. The court noted that Parker Seal Co. might have asked Cummins to work extra
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therefore found that the employer had not fulfilled its Title VII
duty to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs
of its employees.
The court then discussed Parker Seal's contention that the
reasonable accommodation rule was unconstitutional as an establishment of religion." The court rejected this argument, relying
upon the tripartite "establishment" test set forth in Committee
for Public Education v. Nyquist.55 This test established standards that a statute must meet in order to be nonviolative of the
constitutional ban against establishment of religion: (1) Purpose
Standard-The statute "must reflect a clearly secular legislative
purpose;"56 (2) Effect Standard-The statute "must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion;"'5 7 and (3)
Entanglement Standard-The statute "must avoid excessive
government entanglement with religion." 8
The purpose standard is satisfied with respect to the reasonable accommodation rule because, like Title VII as a whole, the
rule's primary purpose is secular. The rule was intended to prevent discriinination in employment and to assure that employees
are judged by their employers on the basis of merit and not on
the basis of nonemployment-related criteria, for example, religious observance."
hours on weekdays or on Sundays to make up the time lost during the Sabbath period.
Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 1975). Furthermore, the employer
could have reduced appellant's salary commensurate with a shorter work week. Id. As
another possibility, the employer might have taken specific measures to assure that Cummins substituted for his colleagues on an equitably scheduled basis, rather than leaving
the arrangements to individual co-worker demands. Id.
54. According to Parker Seal Co., the reasonable accommodation rule could require
an employer to excuse an employee from Saturday work in order to attend church while
an atheistic employee who wanted to use a Saturday for leisure activities would have no
similar rights under the Civil Rights Act. Thus, the accommodation rule was alleged to
constitute a government-mandated preference for religion impermissible under the first
amendment. Id. at 551. For a discussion of the purposes underlying the establishment
clause, see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
55. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). See also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
56. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 552 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd mem. by a
equally divided Court, 97 S.Ct: 342 (1976).
Senator Randolph of West Virginia, who proposed the amendment that became 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1972), stated his purpose as follows:
MR. RANDOLPH: Mr. President, freedom from religious discrimination has
been considered by most Americans from the days of the Founding Fathers as
one of the fundamental rights of the people of the United States. Yet our courts
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The second, or effect standard, is also satisfied because "the
primary effect of [the reasonable accommodation rule] is to inhibit discrimination, not to advance religion."6 The accommodation rule does not mandate financial support of any kind.' The
rule simply prevents employers from imposing uniform work rules
which appear neutral on their face but which have the effect of
discriminating against Sabbath observing employees. The primary effect of reasonable accommodation is the elimination of
employment discrimination, not the establishment of religion.
Finally, the entanglement standard is satisfied because
"[fror the most part, the EEOC and the courts will have to
determine simply whether the employer has made a reasonable
accommodation and whether an undue hardship will result.
[The] resolution [of these issues] certainly does not necessitate
any government entanglement with religion.

62

Having deter-

mined that the reasonable accommodation rule met all three
standards of the Nyquist test, the majority in Cummins concluded that it was constitutional. The establishment clause was
not violated.
In Jordan v. North CarolinaNational Bank, 3 a federal district court reached the same conclusion as the Court in Cummins,
although it employed a somewhat different analysis. Rather
than rely on the tripartite test, the court cited Sherbert v.
Verner64 and Wisconsin v. Yoder" to conclude that the establishment clause had not been violated.
In Sherbert" the United States Supreme Court required an
accommodation by the state to the religious beliefs of a Seventh
Day Adventist. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan observed:
have on occasion determined that this freedom is nebulous, at least in some
ways. So in presenting this proposal to S. 2515, it is my desire and I hope the
desire of my colleagues, to assure that freedom from religious discrimination in
the employment of workers is for all time guaranteed by law.
118 CONG. REc. 705 (1972).
60. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 553 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd mem. by an
equally divided Court, 97 S. Ct. 342 (1976).
61. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), and Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664 (1970), the Supreme Court characterized government financial aid for religious activities as a violation of the establishment clause.
62. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 553-54 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd mem. by
an equally divided Court, 97 S. Ct. 342 (1976).
63. 399 F. Supp. 172 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
64. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
65. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
66. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See notes 8-12 supra and accompanying text.
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In holding as we do, plainly we are not fostering the
"establishment" of the Seventh-day Adventist religion ...
[T]he extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in
common with Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than
the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious
differences, and does not represent that involvement of religious
with secular institutions .... 11
Yoder involved members of the Amish faith who, for religious
reasons, refused to send their children to an approved school after
the children had graduated eighth grade. This refusal violated
Wisconsin's compulsory education law. The Supreme Court held
that the free exercise clause of the first amendment requires Wisconsin to accommodate the sincere religious belief of the Amish
by exempting them from the compulsory education law. Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice Burger noted that such an exemption did not violate the establishment clause:
The purpose and effect of such an exemption are not to support,
favor, advance, or assist the Amish, but to allow their centuriesold religious society, here long before the advent of any compulsory education, to survive free from the heavy impediment compliance with the Wisconsin compulsory-education law would
impose. 8
The court in Jordan concluded that the ieasonable accommodation rule is similar to the accommodations granted by the
Supreme Court in Sherbert and Yoder. 9 The reasonable accommodation rule, requiring exemptions from work rules which operate as impediments to employees' religious observance, does
nothing more than facilitate the free exercise of employees' reli7
gion. It is therefore constitutionally permissible. 1
67. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
68. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-35 & n.22 (1972).
69. Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172 (W.D.N.C. 1975). The
court stated:
2000e(j) and its predecessor EEOC Regulation 1605.1(b) are, by their very
terms, designed to encourage and protect individual religious freedom. No religion receives monetary benefits; no religion is singled out for special treatment.
The statute requires accommodation to religious freedom in a practical framework.
Id. at 180.
70. Legislative exemptions for religious worshippers support the Jordananalysis and
are consistently upheld. An exemption for the use of sacramental wine was contained in
the National Prohibition Act of 1919, 41 Stat. 305, 308 and was held constitutional in
People v. Marquis, 291 Ill. 121, 125 N.E. 757 (1919). The current federal tax laws exempt
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The fundamental difference between the Cummins and
Jordanapproaches lies in the way each court perceived the consequences of reasonable accommodation. The court in Cummins
perceived exemptions from uniform work rules as a form of benefit to religion." The tripartite test was therefore invoked to determine the constitutionality of such exemptions. The court in
Jordan, however, perceived such exemptions as "aiding" religion
only in the sense that impediments to observance were removed
and the free exercise of religion was facilitated 7. 2 The court apparently considered the tripartite test unnecessary to a determination of the accommodation rule's constitutionality.
IV.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Supreme Court recently examined whether discriminatory intent on the part of an employer must be proved for an
employee to prevail in a Title VII suit.73 In Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.," the employer instituted a policy requiring a high school
education or the passing of a general intelligence test as a condition of employment and/or transfer to certain positions. Neither
standard was shown to be significantly related to successful job
performance. Both requirements operated to disqualify blacks at
a substantially higher rate than whites. The jobs in question were
previously filled solely by white employees as part of a longstanding practice of giving preference to whites. 5
The Supreme Court held that the Duke Power Co. job requirements violated the Title VII prohibition against racial disthe Amish from the payment of social security taxes. 26 U.S.C. § 1402(h) (Supp. 1 1964).

Special statutory provisions exist for those having religious objections to abortions. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6(1970); N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW § 79-i (McKinney Supp. 1975). Each
of these exemptions signifies an attempt by the legislature to facilitate the free exercise
of religion by removing impediments to observance. In the same way, the reasonable
accommodation rule facilitates religious observance by removing the impediment of ad.
verse employment consequences. See Brief for National Jewish Comm'n on Law and
Public Affairs as Amicus Curiae at 14-15, Parker Seal Co. v. Cummins, 97 S. Ct. 342
(1976).
71. The court stated: "It cannot be denied that some religious institutions will derive
incidental benefits from [the reasonable accommodation rule]." Cummins v. Parker Seal
Co., 516 F.2d 544, 553 (6th Cir. 1975), afl'd mer. by an equally divided Court, 97 S. Ct.
342 (1976). The court also stated: "The Supreme Court has made it clear that a law is
not necessarily unconstitutional merely because it confers incidental or indirect benefits
upon religious institutions." Id.

72. Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172, 180 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
73. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
74. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

75. Id. at 426.
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crimination. Although the court of appeals had found that the
"diploma or test" requirement had been adopted without any
"intention to discriminate against Negro employees,""6 the Supreme Court eliminated intent as a factor. "[G]ood intent or
absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job
capability . .

.

.Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the

consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation."77 Further, the Supreme Court determined that "[T]he
touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related
to job performance, the practice is prohibited. 78s Thus, under the
reasoning in Griggs, if an employer has a facially neutral employment policy which operates to exclude Sabbath observers de
facto, the employer is in violation of Title VII. 7 Accommodation

to the religious observances of the employee is required unless the
employer can show that business necessity renders such an accommodation unreasonable."
In Washington v. Davis,s ' where the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of a selection test which had a disproportionate impact on racial minorities, the Court relaxed the test of
76. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970).
77. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
78. Id. at 431.
79. Although Griggs dealt with racial discrimination and the focus of this comment
is on religious discrimination, Title VII treats them similarly. The prohibitions against
both forms of discrimination are usually made in the same legislative breath. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1), (a)(2), (b), (c)(1), (c)(2), (d), (h), (j) (1970 & Supp. I 1972). Further, the
discussion of the business necessity test by the Court in Griggs extended to prohibited
forms of discrimination other than race: "What is required by Congress is the removal of
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification."
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). See Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co.,
468 F.2d 346, 350 (6th Cir. 1972).
80. See Claybaugh v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973), where
the court held that the Griggsbusiness necessity test required reasonable accommodation
to the religious needs of the Sabbath observer: "The balancing of reasonableness and
hardship is what I believe Chief Justice Burger was referring to [in Griggs] as the
"business necessity" which would qualify as a legitimate reason for discharging an employee." Id. at 6 (footnote omitted).
81. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The challenge was brought on constitutional grounds rather
than under Title VII because the respondents were federal employees and at the time their
complaint was filed, federal employees were not yet covered by Title VII. In 1972, Title
VII coverage was extended to government employees. The appellant's original complaint,
however, was never amended. Id. at 238.
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business necessity enunciated in Griggs.2 The opinion indicated
that discriminatory purpose is requisite to an equal protection or
due process violation.83 The Court made clear, however, that the
stricter impact standard, which eliminated the need to prove
intent to discriminate, would continue to apply to Title VII actions in determining whether employment discrimination had
84
occurred under the Act.

Recently, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,5 the Supreme
Court held that an exclusion of pregnancy-related disability benefits from an employer's disability plan was not violative of the
Title VII prohibition against sex discrimination. 6 The effect of
this decision on the impact approach to Title VII is yet unclear."
It seems unlikely, however, that the reasonable accommodation
rule, which was incorporated by amendment into Title VII, will
be affected 8
82. The Court in Griggshad stated: "Congress has placed on the employer the burden
of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question." 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
the Court held that a selection test was validated by showing a positive relationship
between the test and performance on a training course. No relationship between the test
and actual job performance was required. Id. at 250-53.
83. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-46 (1976).
84. Id. at 246-47.
85. 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976).
86. Id. at 409. The Court stated:
[Riespondents have not attempted to meet the burden of demonstrating a
gender-based discriminatory effect. . . . The "package" going to relevant identifiable groups we are presently concerned with-General Electric's male and
female employees-covers exactly the same categories of risk, and is facially
nondiscriminatory in the sense that "[tihere is no risk from which men are
protected and women are not. Likewise there is no risk from which women are
protected and men are not."
Id. (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1973)).
87. The majority reached its holding using impact analysis and stating that the effect
of the employer's disability plan was not discriminatory. See note 86 supra. Despite this,
the opinion used language which implied that the difference between the constitutional
and Title VII standards of proving discrimination was being eroded. Id. at 412-13.
The language generated much confusion. Justice Brennan labeled it "fleeting dictum." Id. at 417 n.6. Justice Blackmun disassociated himself from any inference that the
Title VII impact standard was being eroded as a result of this case. Id. at 413. In contrast,
Justice Stewart did "not understand the opinion to question either Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.. . . or the significance generally of proving a discriminatory effect in a Title VII
case." Id. (citation omitted).
88. In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976), the Court refused to follow
an EEOC guideline, finding that it conflicted with another agency's interpretation and
that it did not reflect congressional intent. Id. at 411-12. The reasonable accommodation
rule, however, reflects the will of Congress through the incorporation of § 701(j) as part of
Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. II 1972). Even the language of the majority opinion
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CONCLUSION

The language of Title VII, as initially enacted in 1964, did
not clearly protect the Sabbath observer from infringement upon
his religious observance by employers and prospective employers.
To close this gap in Title VII, the EEOC promulgated regulation
1605.1. This regulation explicitly defined the Title VII proscription against religious discrimination as a duty to make reasonable
accommodations to the religious needs of the employee in the
absence of undue hardship to the employer. The Supreme Court
decision in Sherbert supported the validity of this interpretation
of religious discrimination. Legislative approval came with the
1972 amendment to the Civil Rights Act, which incorporated into
Title VII the definition of religious discrimination contained in
regulation 1605.1.
In interpreting "reasonable accommodation" and "undue
hardship" under regulation 1605.1 and under Title VII as
amended, courts have paid careful attention to the particular
facts of each case. Determining the constitutionality of the reasonable accommodation rule, the courts have taken two approaches. The first views the rule as a form of benefit to religion.
Thus, the tripartite Nyquist test is invoked to determine the
constitutionality of such a benefit. The second approach views
the reasonable accommodation rule as a mere facilitation of the
right to free exercise of religion. Because the reasonable accommodation rule involves only the facilitation of free exercise rights,
the Nyquist test need not be applied. The conclusion as to legality is based on the premise that, as in Sherbert and Yoder, it is
constitutionally permissible to remove impediments to observance to facilitate the free exercise of religion.
The reasonable accommodation rule signaled the beginning
of a new era for the religious observer in American life. It has
opened up employment doors previously closed and has rendered
"equal employment opportunity" a realizable goal. With the
Supreme Court's affirmance of the accommodation rule in
seems to imply that the Court will follow the reasonable accommodation rule: "When
Congress makes it unlawful for an employer to 'discriminate. . . on the basis of. . . sex
. . .' without further explanation of its meaning, we should not readily infer that it meant
something different than what the concept of discrimination has traditionally meant." Id.
at 413. Congress has unequivocally explained the meaning of religious discrimination by
its incorporation of § 701(j) into Title VII.
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Cummins, it appears that the civil rights of the religious observer

will continue to be protected. 9

Solomon Z. Handler

89. The most recent Supreme Court decision involving the reasonable accommodation rule constitutes a setback for the civil rights of the Sabbath observer. The Court held
that an employer is excused from accommodating the religious needs of his Sabbathobserving employee when this would result in by-passing the company's seniority system.
T.W.A. v. Hardison, 45 U.S.L.W. 4672, 4676-77 (U.S. June 16, 1977) (No. 75-1126). In so
holding, the Supreme Court ignored the question posed by the court of appeals:
If Saturday work inevitably falls to the employee with lowest seniority, one may
well ask whether such seniority provisions would not effectively preclude TWA
from ever hiring those Seventh Day Adventists, Orthodox Jews, and members
of the Worldwide Church of God whose religious convictions preclude work from
sundown on Friday until sundown on Saturday. It is no answer to such person,
or to the statute itself, that if he compromises his religious beliefs for a time he
may develop enough seniority to practice them again.
Hardison v. T.W.A., Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 41-42 n.12 (8th Cir. 1975). For a well-reasoned
critique of the Supreme Court's majority opinion, see Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion. 45 U.S.L.W. 4672, 4678-81 (U.S. June 16, 1977) (No. 75-1126) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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UNION TRESPASS: THE DILEMMA OF FEDERAL

PREEMPTION OF STATE JURISDICTION
Prior to 1937, state law exclusively governed industrial rela-2
tions.' With the passage of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA or the Act), responsibility for the regulation of industrial
relations passed to the federal government. The establishment of
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), with its grant of
primary jurisdiction, has consistently been viewed by the Supreme Court as an expression of congressional intent to assure
national uniformity in labor relations.3
The role left to the states in this comprehensive system of
federal regulation of labor relations has been a constant source of
confusion 4 and litigation. 5 Although it is well-established that
state labor law must yield to federal law governing labor relations,' perhaps no problems in the labor law area have engendered

more litigation7 than those precipitated by state tort laws of general application.' To date, the Supreme Court has not determined
the applicability of state trespass laws to a labor dispute The
thrust of three recent state court opinions'0 indicates that a firm
decision by the Supreme Court is necessary to resolve a conflict
in interpretation among the states and thereby to further the goal
of national uniformity.
1. Cox, Federalismin the Law of LaborRelations, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1297, 1298 (1959).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
3. See, e.g., C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 785 (1971); Come, Federal

Preemption of Labor Management Relations: Current Problems in the Application of
Garmon, 56 VA. L. REv. 1435, 1436 (1970).
4. Note, Federal Preemption-StatePayment of Unemployment Compensation to
Strikers as Prohibitedby Federal Labor Policy, 20 WAYNE L. REv. 1191, 1192 (1974).
5. See, e.g., Musicians Union Local 6 v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. 2d 695, 447 P.2d 313,
73 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1968); Hudgens v. Local 315, Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union,
138 Ga. App. 329, 210 S.E.2d 821 (1974); People v. Goduto, 21 Ill. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385,
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961); Hood v. Stafford, 213 Tenn. 684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1964).
6. Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. RV. 1337, 1351-59 (1972).
7. See cases cited in note 5 supra & note 74 infra.
8. Note, Pre-emption of State Labor Regulations Collaterally in Conflict with the
NationalLabor RelationsAct, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 132, 138 (1968). State laws of general
application are not aimed at affecting the balance of interests among management, union,
employees and the public in union organization and collective bargaining. Cox, supra note
6, at 1355-56.
9. See Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223 (1970); Meat Cutters Local 427 v.
Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957). See also text accompanying notes 48-55 infra.
10. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 17 Cal.
3d 893, 553 P.2d 603, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1172 (1977); May
Dep't Stores Co. v. Teamsters Local 743, 64 111. 2d 153, 355 N.E.2d 7 (1976); People-v.
Bush, 39 N.Y.2d 529, 349 N.E.2d 832, 384 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1976). See also text accompanying notes 56-73 infra.
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The purpose of this comment is threefold: (1) To examine
these state court cases in the context of prior Supreme Court
decisions in the field of labor law preemption; (2) to illustrate the
conflict and confusion that exists in this area; and (3) to suggest
a proposal that will reconcile the conflicting interests and values
involved in federal preemption of state trespass law.
FEDERAL PREEMPTION:

Garmon AND

ITS PROGENY

The doctrine of federal preemption is rooted in both the commerce clause" and the supremacy clause' 2 of the United States
Constitution. While the Act does not explicitly state that the
NLRB shall have exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes, the
Supreme Court, guided by the "presumed intent"'3 of Congress,
has concluded that the goal of a uniform national labor policy
mandates that states be denied jurisdiction over activities within
the jurisdiction of the NLRA." When the NLRA was first enacted, the Supreme Court was reluctant to preempt state jurisdiction over areas not expressly dealt with by Congress.' 5 By
1959, however, the Supreme Court had begun to see the failings
in its ad hoc approach'" and recognized the need for a preemption
policy which would not "sacrifice [the] important federal interof labor relations centrally administered by
ests in a uniform law
'7
an expert agency." '
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon'8 provided the
setting for the Court to cast aside its step-by-step approach in
favor of a broad principle of federal preemption, giving the NLRB
primary jurisdiction over all activities falling within the ambit of
the Act. In Garmon the California Supreme Court had affirmed
11. "The Congress shall have Power . . .To regulate Commerce . . . among the
several states .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 3.
12. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl.2.
13. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403
U.S. 274, 302 (1971).
14. Broomfield, Preemptive FederalJurisdictionOver Concerted Trespassory Union
Activity, 83 HARv.L. REV. 552, 558 (1970).
15. See UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. (Briggs-Stratton),
336 U.S. 245 (1949).
16. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242 (1959).
17. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403
U.S. 274, 291 (1971).
18. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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an injunction issued to prevent peaceful picketing by a union
desiring a union shop.19 Since these activities also violated state
tort law, the court awarded damages. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari" and vacated the injunction. 2 1 On remand the
California court upheld the award of damages, based upon the
state's general tort provisions as well as state laws specifically
dealing with labor relations. 2 2 The Supreme Court again granted
certiorari,2 3 and then reversed the award of damages on the basis
of lack of jurisdiction.2 4 Opting for a principle of federally directed
preemption, the Court found that "to allow the States to control
activities that are potentially subject to federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict with national labor policy."2 5
Mr. Justice Frankfurter enunciated the test for determining
when the preemption principle applies, holding that "[w]hen an
activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act,[2 6] the States
as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive compeof state
tence of the National Labor Relations Board if the 2danger
7
interference with national policy is to be averted. 1
Although this "landmark"' decision never received the support of a unanimous Court, 29 its principle of broad federal
preemption of state jurisdiction has proven to be the cornerstone
19. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 45 Cal. 2d 657, 291 P.2d 1 (1955).
20. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 351 U.S. 923 (1956).
21. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26, 29 (1957). The vacating
of the California injunction was based upon the fact that "the refusal of the National
Labor Relations Board to assert jurisdiction did not leave with the States power over
activities they would be preempted from asserting." San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 238 (1959).
22. See Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473
(1958).
23. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 357 U.S. 925 (1958).
24. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246 (1959).
25. Id. (footnotes omitted).
26. Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), grants employees the right to self-organization,
to join unions, and to bargain collectively. To insure protection of these rights, §§ 8(a)8(b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) & 158(b) (1970), list activities prohibited to employers and
unions respectively.
27. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959) (emphasis
added).
28. Id. at 250 (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. Four Justices concurred in the result in Garmon. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In Lockridge, which reaffirmed Garmon, a six-three vote
was cast. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge,
403 U.S. 274, 291 (1971).
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of the preemption doctrine in labor relations.3 1 In the ensuing
years, the status of the Garmon doctrine appeared to be in question; 31 members of the Court called for a reexamination of
Garmon 32 and several exceptions were created whereby state
courts were permitted to retain jurisdiction.3 3 In 1971, however,
all doubts as to the continuing vitality of Garmon were laid to
rest, at least temporarily, by the Court's decision in Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge.3 Lockridge was an employee who
brought an action against his union for reinstatement to membership and for damages resulting from an allegedly improper discharge. Finding the conduct to be arguably subject to the
NLRA, 35 the Supreme Court declared that since the "full range
of the very substantial interests the preemption doctrine seeks to
protect [were] directly implicated [in this situation],"" there
was no jurisdiction upon which the state court award of damages
could be sustained. 37 Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the majority, addressed the issue of Garmon's survival. After first discussing the rationale behind preemption and the history leading to
Garmon, he concluded:
While we do not assert that the Garmon doctrine is without
imperfection, we do think that it is founded on reasoned principle and that until it is altered by congressional action or by
judicial insights that are born of further experience with it, a
heavy burden rests upon those who would, at this late date, ask
the Court to abandon Garmon and set out again in quest of a
system more nearly perfect. A fair regard for considerations of
30. Come, supra note 3, at 1435.
31. Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72
COLUM. L. REv. 469, 470 (1972).
32. See Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223, 227-29 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring).

33. See notes 39-47 infra and accompanying text.
34. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).

35. Section 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970), makes it an unfair labor
practice for a union to restrain or coerce "employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [section 7]. . . ." Section 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970), makes it an
unfair labor practice for a union to "discriminate against an employee with respect to
whom membership in such organization has been denied [for some reason other than
failure to pay dues]." Section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970), makes it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to discriminate "in regard to hire or tenure of employment
• ..to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . ..."
36. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry.& Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403
U.S. 274, 293 (1971).
37. Id.
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stare decisis and the coordinate role of the Congress in defining
the extent to which federal legislation pre-empts state law
strongly support our conclusion that the basic tenets of Garmon
should not be disturbed. 8
EXCEPTIONS TO

Garmon

Garmon, it must be noted, did not totally deprive the states
of all jurisdiction over activities arguably subject to the NLRA.
While perceiving the necessary supremacy of federal law and
administration over state law, the Court in Garmon noted that
there are two situations in which the states will retain jurisdiction:
[D]ue regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal
system, including the principle of diffusion of power not as a
matter of doctrinaire localism but as a promoter of democracy,
has required us not to find withdrawal from the States of power
to regulate where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral
concern of the Labor Management Relations Act. Or where the
regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local
feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling
congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had
deprived the States of the power to act. 39
The first, or "peripheral concern" exception, will apply primarily
to violations of state law for which the NLRA has not provided a
remedy. In these situations state jurisdiction poses only a minimal threat to national labor policy,4 ° and thus the ousting of state
jurisdiction is not warranted.
The principal case falling within this exception is Linn v.
United Plant Guard Workers Local 114,41 where the Supreme
Court decided that a state court may retain jurisdiction over an
38. Id. at 302. In a more recent decision, Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976), the Supreme Court held
a state labor board preempted from enjoining a union which was putting economic pressure on an employer by refusing to work overtime. State jurisdiction was preempted
because the union's conduct, although neither protected nor prohibited by the NLRA, was
nevertheless an activity intended to be left unrestricted by any governmental regulatory
power. Id. at 144-45. In so holding, the Court overruled a prior decision to the contrary,
UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. (Briggs-Stratton), 336 U.S. 245
(1949), and again demonstrated its commitment to a broad preemption policy which alone
can effectuate a uniform system of labor relations.
39. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959) (citations
omitted).
40. Broomfield, supra note 14, at 558.
41. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
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action for libel where the libel occurred during a union's organizational campaign. While Linn is an example of the Court's willingness to permit state laws of general application to be used in a
labor dispute, the case should be limited to its facts and not
extended to make state trespass laws applicable.42
The second exception to Garmon, for activities "deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility," refers to the Court's
refusal to allow federal regulation to preempt state jurisdiction
over violent activities.4 3 The curtailment of violent acts has traditionally been a function of the state police power. State courts
and law enforcement officials are certainly closer to the locus of
the violent activity: Where ability to act quickly is essential, this
power is logically deemed an exception and should not be
preempted. Since the characterization of conduct as "violent"
can involve "both subtle issues of judgment and the risk that the
state may lay hands on conduct which the [NLRB] might find
protected,"44 this exception has been limited to instances of actual violence or instances where such violent activity is imminent. 5 As the Supreme Court has determined that the congressional goal in enacting the NLRA was to establish a uniform
national policy of labor relations,48 any suggestion that mere potential violence is sufficient to allow states to retain jurisdiction
should be dismissed as contrary to congressional intent. 7
42. The tort of defamation has a significantly different role in the field of labor
relations than the tort of trespass. The law of defamation will at most have a tangential
effect on labor-management relations; thus it logically falls within the "peripheral concern" exception to Garmon. Union trespass, on the other hand, often occurs in situations
involving strikes and picketing, the crucial areas in labor preemption. See Cox, supra note
6, at 1367-68. Trespass cases, therefore, do not fit within the "peripheral concern" exception to preemption.
43. See Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry.& Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge,
403 U.S. 274, 297 n.7 (1971); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
248 n.6 (1959). See also Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction
Over Labor RelationsI, 59 COLUM. L. Ray. 6, 33 (1959); Michelman, State Power to Govern
ConcertedEmployee Activities, 74 HAav. L. Rv. 641, 664-66 (1961).
44. Meltzer, supranote 43, at 26.
45. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 729-33 (1966).
46. See note 75 infra and accompanying text.
47. Broomfield, supra note 14, at 565. It should be noted that in addition to the
above-mentioned exceptions, other situations have arisen where the Court has held that
state courts may retain jurisdiction in matters involving labor relations. State courts
retain jurisdiction over suits brought for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1970), see Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); over damage actions by
parties injured by illegal secondary boycotts under § 303(b) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. §
187(b) (1970), see Local 20, Teamsters v. Lester Morton Trucking Co., 377 U.S. 252 (1964);
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JURISDICTION OVER UNION TRESPASS: AN ISSUE UNRESOLVED

The issue whether, under the Garmon principle of preemption, state courts may retain jurisdiction over union trespass activity has never been decided by the Supreme Court. This question was expressly left open by the Court in Amalgamated Meat
Cutters Local 427 v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc.," where a union, attempting to gain recognition from a reluctant employer, was enjoined from picketing the employer, from trespassing on his premises, and from exerting secondary pressures on his suppliers. In
vacating (for want of jurisdiction) the broad injunction issued by
the Ohio court,4" the Supreme Court pointed out:
Whether a State may frame and enforce an injunction aimed
narrowly at a trespass . . . is a question that is not here. Here
the unitary judgment of the Ohio Court was based on the erroneous premise that it had power to reach the union's conduct
in its entirety. Whether its conclusion as to the mere act of
trespass would have been the same outside
the context of peti5
tioner's other conduct we cannot know. 0
Although this same trespass issue was again presented to the
Court in Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc.,51 it was never decided;
certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted.2 Chief Justice
Burger, in a concurring opinion, declared: "In my view any contention that the States are pre-empted [from enjoining union
trespass] is without merit."53 The Chief Justice based his opinion
on the ground that "[flew concepts are more 'deeply rooted'
than the power of a State [through its trespass laws] to protect
and over actions against a union for breach of its duty of fair representation, see Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). These suits typically involve situations where Congress has

affirmatively indicated that state jurisdiction should exist, or where the Court has been
willing to presume that state court jurisdiction will not disserve the interests promoted
by the NLRA. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 297-98 (1971). Furthermore, it is federal law rather than state law that
is applied by the states in these situations. These exceptions may have led Mr. Justice

White to conclude that the "'rule' of uniformity [invoked by Garmon] is at best a tattered one." Id. at 318 (White, J., dissenting). However, since these exceptions involve
solely the application of federal law, they are inapposite to a discussion of the application
of state trespass laws in situations calling for federal preemption.
48. 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
49. Id. at 25.
50. Id. at 24-25.
51. 283 Ala. 171, 214 So. 2d 913 (1968), cert. granted, 396 U.S. 813 (1969).
52. 397 U.S. 223 (1970).
53. Id. at 227 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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the rights of its citizens."54 In a separate memorandum, Mr. Justice Harlan was in direct disagreement with the Burger opinion,
finding that since the trespass activity was arguably protected by
the NLRA, the states should be preempted under Garmon.A1
RECENT STATE COURT DECISIONS

With the issue left open by the Supreme Court, and only the
differing views of two Justices as guidance, it is not surprising
that the state courts have been inconsistent in deciding issues of
union trespass. 6 Three recent decisions will best illustrate the
confusing and conflicting state court determinations of their own
jurisdiction to enjoin union trespass.
In People v. Bush, 57 a union was engaged in the picketing of
retailers carrying goods manufactured by the wholesaler with
whom they were in dispute. The New York Court of Appeals
upheld a conviction for criminal trespass against the union members, notwithstanding that the peaceful union conduct was both
arguably protected by the NLRA as consumer picketing"5 and
arguably prohibited as a secondary boycott. 9 Noting the Supreme Court's refusal to decide the issue of the applicability of
state trespass laws to a labor dispute in Fairlawn Meats," the
New York court found that "[t]he clear import of this passage
[concerning preemption of the state's broad injunction in
Fairlawn Meats] is that had the [Ohio] State court ruled only
on the trespassing conduct before it, the ruling would not have
been pre-empted."'
The court apparently decided that trespass falls into one of
the exceptions to Garmon, although it discussed neither the
"deeply rooted" nor the "periphiral concern" exceptions. Further, the court held that "[w]here private property is involved,
union rights under section 7 are limited and must be made clear
on its initiative in advance." 2
54. Id. at 228. For a contrary statement on the applicability of the "deeply rooted"
exception to peaceful trespass, see notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text.
55. Id. at 229 (Harlan, J., separate memorandum).
56. See note 74 infra.
57. 39 N.Y.2d 529, 349 N.E.2d 832, 384 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1976).
58. Id. at 532 n.2, 349 N.E.2d at 835 n.2, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 734 n.2.
59. See note 126 infra.
60. Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 427 v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20
(1957). See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
61. People v. Bush, 39 N.Y.2d 529, 536, 349 N.E.2d 832, 836, 384 N.Y.S.2d 733, 737
(1976).
62. Id. at 538, 349 N.E.2d at 838, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 738. This in effect shifted to the
union the burden of proving that the state's jurisdiction should be preempted. A reasona-
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In the California case of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego
County District Council of Carpenters,3 a union had engaged in
peaceful picketing following an employer's refusal to contract his
work or hire directly through a union hiring hall. An order was
granted enjoining the union from picketing on company property 4 and the union appealed. Finding that the union activity was
both arguably protected (as a form of mutual aid) and arguably
prohibited (as recognition picketing), the California Supreme
Court vacated the injunction for want of jurisdiction. Disagreeing
with Bush and construing Fairlawn Meats as leaving open the
question of state jurisdiction over union trespass,65 the court held
that the "picketing activities of the Union were not disqualified
for arguable protection.

. .

merely because they were engaged in

upon Sears' private property and, being without Sears' permission or approval, were consequently of a trespassory nature."6
Recognizing Garmon as firm precedent, the court disposed of
the trespass issue in terms of a national labor policy:
Notwithstanding the views of individual members of the high
court, the fact remains that the [C]ourt itself, speaking
through a majority of its members, has not to this date created
a judicial exception to its Garmonruling so as to except from it
and thus withdraw from the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board
those peaceful activities-like the activities now engaging our
attention-which, although arguably subject to section 7 or section 8 of the Act are nevertheless trespassory in nature. Furthermore, we continue to believe that "[u]nlike the power to prevent violence and public disorder, the power to prohibit peaceful
picketing that trespasses on the premises of employers involved
in labor disputes would 'leave the States free to regulate conduct
so plainly within the central aim of federal regulation .... "'I'
ble reading of the Garmon principle, which holds that when activity is even "arguably
subject" to the NLRA state jurisdiction is preempted, would indicate that this presumption is totally unwarranted.
63. 17 Cal. 3d 893, 553 P.2d 603, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct.
1172 (1977).
64. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, Superior Ct., San
Diego County, Joseph A. Kilgarif, J., No. 347511 (Nov. 21, 1973).
65. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 17 Cal.
3d 893, 902 n.5, 553 P.2d 603, 610 n.5, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443, 450 n.5 (1976), cert. granted, 97
S. Ct. 1172 (1977).
66. Id. at 899, 553 P.2d at 608, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
67. Id. at 905, 553 P.2d at 612, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 452 (citation omitted).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1977

107

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 4 [1977], Art. 3

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 5, 1977]

In May Department Stores Co. v. Teamsters Union Local
743,8 the most recent state court decision dealing with union
trespass, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the intermediate
appellate decision 9 and affirmed the state's jurisdiction to enjoin
union trespass. The activity at issue was a union's organizational
campaign which took the form of solicitation of employees and
distribution of union literature on a company-owned parking lot.
In accord with the Bush decision, the Illinois Supreme Court held
that, based upon Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in Taggart
v. Weinacker's, Inc.,70 the application of a state's law of trespass
falls within both the "peripheral concern" and "deeply rooted"
exceptions to preemption.7 1 Recognizing that "an imminent
threat of violence exists whenever an employer is required to resort to self-help in order to vindicate his property rights," 72 the
court held that states retained jurisdiction to enjoin union activity even though an unfair labor practice charge against the em73
ployer had been filed with the NLRB.
With state courts split on the issue of their jurisdiction over
union trespass activity,74 the congressional goal of a uniform labor
policy is being frustrated by the Supreme Court's failure to decide
the applicability of state trespass laws to labor disputes.
68. 64 Ill. 2d 153, 355 N.E.2d 7 (1976).
69. 32 Ill. App. 3d 916, 337 N.E.2d 299 (1975).
70. 397 U.S. 223, 227 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring). See notes 53-54 supra and
accompanying text.
71. May Dep't Stores Co. v. Teamsters Local 743, 64 Ill. 2d 153, 161, 355 N.E.2d 7,
9-10 (1976).
72. Id. at 162, 355 N.E.2d at 10.
73. Id. at 165, 355 N.E.2d at 12. The court indicated that this decision did not harm
the union, since the injunction merely had the effect of maintaining the status quo during
the pendency of the NLRB proceeding.
74. The following cases have held that state courts retain jurisdiction over union
trespass: Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 283 Ala. 171, 214 So. 2d 913 (1968); Jack Loeks
Enterprises v. Local 291, 87 L.R.R.M. 3105 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1974); Hood v. Stafford, 213
Tenn. 684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1964).
Other state courts have considered their jurisdiction over union trespass preempted
by federal law. See Hudgens v. Local 315, Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union, 138 Ga.
App. 329, 210 S.E.2d 821 (1974); Inland Indus., Inc. v. Teamsters Local 541, 68 Lab. Cas.
24,185 (Kan. 1972); Weis Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Store Employees' Local 692, 56 Lab. Cas.
65,908 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1967); Hennepin Broadcasting Assocs. v. AFTRA, 84 L.R.R.M. 2217
(Minn. Dist. Ct. 1973); IBEW Local 903 v. Chain Lighting & Appliance Co., 76 Lab. Cas.
18,504 (Miss. 1975); Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union Local 1207, 58 Wash. 2d 426, 363 P.2d
803 (1961); United Maintenance Co. v. Steelworkers, 86 L.R.R.M. 2364 (W. Va. 1974);
Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Employees Local 444, 16 Wis. 2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876
(1962).
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939

PREEMPTION: THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY

An examination of both the values served by a broad principle of preemption and the problems that may ensue from its
implementation is essential to an evaluation of the competing
interests present when a union engages in trespass upon an employer's private property.
The Supreme Court has inferred that the intent of Congress
in the field of labor relations is to implement a uniform labor
policy. 5 In determining whether state jurisdiction should be
preempted in a given situation, the threshold question will be
"whether the conduct

. . .

the State has sought to [regulate] is,

or may fairly be regarded as, federally protected activity."76 If the
answer is in the affirmative, state jurisdiction must be preempted, for the greatest threat that Garmon guards against is a
state's prohibition of activity that Congress has indicated must
remain unhampered.7
This fear of unwarranted state intrusion into labor disputes
was expressed by the Court early in the history of labor legislation: "For a state to impinge on the area of labor combat designed
to be free [from regulation] is quite as much an obstruction of
federal policy as if the state were to declare picketing free for
purposes or by methods which the federal Act prohibits."7 8
One aspect of preemption, therefore, is concerned with preventing state regulation in an area that Congress intended to be
left unrestricted by any governmental power;" this is the
"arguably protected" element of the doctrine. A second strand of
preemption emerges from the conviction that "a multiplicity of
tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce
incompatible or conflicting adjudication as are different rules of
substantive law."8 The Supreme Court, in upholding the grant
75. See Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry.& Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge,
403 U.S. 274, 288-90 (1971). See also Broomfield, supra note 14, at 556.
76. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 250 (1959) (Harlan,
J., concurring).
77. Note, Labor Law: Implementation of Congressionally Declared NationalLabor
Policy PrecludesInvocation of Doctrine of Pre-emption, 1966 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1139. See
also Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427
U.S. 132 (1976), where the Supreme Court held that this category of preemption "reflects
the concern that one forum would enjoin what the other forum would find legal." Id. at
138.
78. Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 500 (1953).
79. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
427 U.S. 132 (1976).
80. Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
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of primary jurisdiction to the NLRB over conduct even "arguably prohibited" by the Act, 81 has determined that Congress

sought "to restructure fundamentally the processes for effectuating [the uniform labor] policy." 2 Based on the assumption
that "[c]onflict in technique can be fully as disruptive . . .as

conflict in overt policy,"83 preemption principles demand that
where conduct is arguably subject to the NLRA, state courts
must "defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor
Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national
policy is to be averted."84
GUARANTEED UNION ACCESS

The NLRB's "exclusive competence" is most needed in situations where union organizers enter onto company property to
solicit and where a factual determination as to the sufficiency
of the union's access is required. While state trespass laws are
designed to insure the ability of property owners to choose who
may enter their land, an employer has no absolute right to exclude nonemployee union organizers from his property.85 The
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co."8 set out the
parameters for situations where union organizers must be allowed
onto an employer's property:
It is our judgment, however, that an employer may validly
post his property against nonemployee distribution of union literature if reasonable efforts by the union through other available channels of communication will enable it to reach the employees with its message and if the employer's notice or order
does not discriminate against the union by allowing other distribution. In these circumstances the employer may not be compelled to allow distribution ....
. ..But when the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them through the usual channels, the right to exclude
from property has been required to yield to the extent needed
81. See id. at 490.
82. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403
U.S. 274, 288 (1971).
83. Id. at 287.
84. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
85. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
86. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
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to permit communication of information on the right to
organize.87

Since "organizational rights [guaranteed by section 7 of the

NLRA8 ] are not viable in a vacuum,"89 the Board is empowered

to charge the employer with an unfair labor practice 0 for refusing

to allow union organizers onto his property when the union has
no other adequate access to the employees.9 Again it must be
emphasized that state courts have no role in ordering the employer to open his property to union organizers; the "determination of the proper adjustments [between property and organization rights] rests [exclusively] with the Board.""
UNION TRESPASS: THE No-MAN's LAND

The essential dilemma created by d broad preemption principle arises when a union engages in trespassory activity where such
conduct is not even "arguably prohibited" by the NLRA.93 Union
trespass, when not occurring in conjunction with some other proscribed activities, is not an unfair labor practice. If the activity
is not "arguably prohibited," the employer is unable to petition
the Board for a determination of the propriety of the union's
conduct. Since union trespass may be protected under Babcock
& Wilcox,94 the only way an employer can obtain a Board ruling
on whether the union trespass is in fact protected is to resort to
"self-help" to expel the trespassers.95 At this point the union is
87. Id. at 112 (emphasis added).
88. Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), provides, in part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities ....
89. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 543 (1972). For an employee to
exercise his § 7 rights fully, he must have the opportunity to be contacted by both union
organizers and management representatives. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S.
793 (1945). The employer's ability to contact his employees is never really at issue; thus
it is the ability of the union to reach employees that is the primary concern of the NLRB.
90. Section 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1970), provides: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [section 7]."
91. E.g., NLRB v. S & H Grossingers, Inc., 372 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967).
92. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
93. E.g., union organizers going onto an employer's property without permission.
94. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
95. Under general tort law principles, a property owner is entitled to use the force
reasonably necessary to overcome any resistance and expel a trespasser. See W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK ON LAW OF ToRTs ch. 4, § 21, at 114-15 (4th ed. 1971).
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entitled to file an unfair labor practice charge against the employer for refusing access to his property. 6 The ouster of state
jurisdiction in this situation, certainly justifiable for furthering a
uniform national labor policy, has been criticized as resulting in
"complete denial of a legal or equitable remedy to some employers who by hypothesis are entitled to relief.""
The fear of "artifically creatfing] a no-law area" 8 led Chief
Justice Burger in his concurring opinion in Taggart to conclude
that state trespass laws should be an exception to the Court's
broad preemption principle. Mr. Justice Harlan, in disagreement, asserted that since the creation of the National Labor Relations Board by Congress was "to assure uniformity of application
by an experienced agency," 9 Garmon foreclosed state action
where activity is arguably protected, even if "wrongs may occasionally go partially or wholly unredressed."'' The major issue in
allowing states to act upon union trespass, therefore, is "whether
we are prepared to undertake the risk of admitting improper state
jurisdiction for the sake of preserving desirable state action."''
The present law is an intolerable collection of conflicting
state court interpretations of the National Labor Relations Act.,0 2
A resolution is necessary to "spell out from conflicting indications
of congressional will the area in which state action is still permissible."103
PROPOSED SOLUTIONs-A CRITICAL EVALUATION

One solution that has been proposed to lift the employer out
of this no-law area is for the NLRB to issue advisory opinions on
whether a union's trespassory conduct is protected.' 4 Section 6 of
the NLRA provides that "[t]he Board shall have authority from
time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the
96. Come, supra note 3, at 1437-38.
97. Cox, supra note 6, at 1362.
98. Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223, 228 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
99. Id. at 230 (Harlan, J., separate memorandum).
100. Id.
101. Michelman, supra note 43, at 683.
102. See note 74 supra.
103. Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
104. See Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 328 n.6 (1971) (White, J., dissenting); Come, supra note 3, at 144546.
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NLRA] .105 It appears that this section is sufficient authority to
enable the Board to issue advisory opinions concerning whether
the activity in question is protected by section 7 or prohibited by
section 8.100 The determination would be made by the Regional
Director with appeal available within ten days to the General
Counsel of the Board, whose decision would be final.' 7
The problem with this proposal, however, is the prevalence
of factual disputes in cases involving a union's right of access to
an employer's property. To the extent that such factual matters
require a hearing, a substantial time lag will remain - despite
the availability of advisory opinions - before the rights of the
parties will be determined. ' Thus, it seems unlikely that advisory opinions would expedite Board determinations such that
state jurisdiction may be invoked in sufficient time to prevent the
harm that would have initially justified action by the state. 0 9
Furthermore, although the proposal of NLRB advisory opinions
was suggested as early as 1960,110 the use of the opinions in unfair
labor practice proceedings is virtually nonexistent;"' the same
appears to be true for determinations of whether activities arguably subject to the NLRA are protected."'
A second proposed solution aimed at eliminating this no-law
area is to allow preemption of state laws directed toward the
supervision of labor relations, but to permit the states to retain
the power necessary to enforce their laws of general application.
Professor Archibald Cox, the major proponent of this approach,

argues:
[State] laws apply to the general public or substantial segments thereof without regard to whether the individual is an
employer, union, or employee concerned with unionization or a
labor dispute. Neither the laws themselves nor any particular
application involves weighing the special interests [unique to
labor relations]. The likelihood that the collateral impact of
105. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1970).

106. Note, State Regulation of UnprotectedUnion Activity: Bypassing the "Arguably
Subject" Test with NLRB Advisory Opinions, 70 YALE L.J. 441, 449 (1960).
107. Id. at 450.
108. Broomfield, supra note 14, at 570. See also Michelman, supra note 43, at 64546.
109. Cox, supra note 6, at 1363.
110. See Note, 70 YALE L.J., supra note 106.
111. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge,
403 U.S. 274, 328 n.6 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
112. Id.
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such laws upon management or labor will upset the national
balance is small enough to permit their operation unless interference with a specific federal right can be affirmatively demonstrated. It is only where the state law or rule of decision is based
upon an accommodation of the special interests of employers,
unions, employees, or the public in employee self-organization,
collective bargaining, or labor disputes that the likelihood that
its application to persons under NLRB jurisdiction will upset
the balance struck by Congress is so great as to require 3exclusion
of state law unless Congress has provided otherwise.1
While admitting the risk is "not insubstantial" ' that a
wrong decision by the state courts could result in the denial of a
right which the NLRB and the federal courts would have recognized, Professor Cox counters that the cost to an employer of
denying him access to any forum whatsoever "seems an extraordinarily heavy price to pay""' 5 in order to prevent states from intruding onto a federally protected area.
This approach of not preempting state laws of general application has gained acceptance from at least two members of the
Supreme Court,"' and has provided the basis for the Illinois Supreme Court's refusal to find that its jurisdiction over union trespass was preempted."7
The starting point for evaluation of this proposal must be
Garmon itself, where Justice Frankfurther explicitly rejected this
distinction:
Nor has it mattered whether the States have acted through laws
of broad general application rather than laws specifically directed towards the governance of industrial relations. Regardless of the mode adopted, to allow the States to control conduct
which is the subject of national regulation would create potential frustration of national purposes."'
113. Cox, supra note 6, at 1355-56.
114. Id. at 1361-62.
115. Id. at 1362.
116. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1976) (Powell, J., & Burger, C.J., concurring).
117. See May Dep't Stores v. Teamsters Local 743, 64 111. 2d 153, 355 N.E.2d 7 (1976).
118. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959) (citations
omitted). See also Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971), where the Court held: "It is the conduct being regulated,
not the formal description of governing legal standards, that is the proper focus of concern.
Indeed, the notion that a relevant distinction exists . . . between particularized and
generalized labor law was explicitly rejected in Garmon itself." Id. at 292.
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The proposed formula would "avoid the regulatory gaps and
the drastic impairment of state powers which would result if all
state law of general application were foreclosed whenever it impinged on labor-management relations." ' One must question,
however, what price should be paid to avoid these gaps in regulation. State laws of general application may not have been formulated with any intent of disturbing the "delicate balance" 120 of
conflicting interests that Congress has empowered the NLRB to
maintain. Nevertheless, the application of these "neutral" laws
will have the same effect on a labor dispute as will the states'
labor laws. There is no difference in effect between a state law
which regulates a union's right to picket on an employer's property (preempted under the Cox formula) and a general state tort
law against trespass which is applied to union activity upon an
employer's property (not preempted under the Cox formula). The
effect of allowing states to apply their general tort laws could
result in state regulation of activity that is federally protected.
One must then wonder whether it is alarmist to predict that
states will issue injunctions against protected activity in the
name of state trespass law.
THE CONTEXTS OF UNION TRESPASS

The problem of state encroachment onto federally protected
or regulated activity is great; the problem of an employer left
without a remedy is equally great. Yet a solution is possible which
can not only reconcile these competing interests, but can also be
practical enough to guide the courts in its application without
requiring a case-by-case approach.
This problem of a no-law area exists solely in those situations
where the employer is confronted with trespass activity by a
union not representing his employees.121 In these situations the
119. Meltzer, supra note 43, at 47.
120. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957)..
121. The problem of a no-law area does not exist in situations involving primary
strikes, for "[w]hen the basic dispute is between a union and an employer, any hiatus
that might exist in the jurisdictional balance that has been struck can be filled by resort
to economic power." Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 700
(1963) (Douglas, J. dissenting). In addition, if the primary strike is for an objective proscribed by the Act, the employer may bring a suit for damages under § 301 of the LMRA,
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). Since a hiatus of legal remedies was envisioned by Congress, and
the employer is free to retaliate with economic force, state courts are preempted of all
jurisdiction to enjoin peaceful primary strikes. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
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employer is unable to retaliate with economic force, and the problem of a hiatus of legal remedies supposedly manifests itself.
However, where the trespass occurs as part of an "arguably prohibited" activity, the employer is able to petition directly to the
NLRB for a determination of the propriety of the union's conduct. In so doing, he is able to take himself out of this judicially
created no-man's land and thus eliminate any need for the states
to retain jurisdiction over the dispute.
Trespass, it must be noted, should not be viewed as a monolithic activity. There are a variety of purposes for which a nonrecognized union12 might engage in trespassory activity: to put
pressure on an employer doing business with a company with
which the union is in dispute; rs to gain recognition from a recalcitrant employer; 2 4 or to distribute literature and solicit employees
to join a union.rs When the union's conduct is regulated by the
National Labor Relations Act, the essential principles of preemption would be violated if state laws-even those of general application-were applied to this conduct.
Trespass as part of a secondary boycott
Where the union's trespassory conduct may arguably constitute a secondary boycott, the application of section 8(b) (4) of the
NLRA is appropriate.'26 A state may not enjoin activity which has
122. A nonrecognized union is one which has not been recognized by the employer as
the collective bargaining agent of his employees.
123. See, e.g., People v. Bush, 39 N.Y.2d 529, 349 N.E.2d 832, 384 N.Y.S.2d 733
(1976).
124. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist.. Council of Carpenters, 17 Cal. 3d 893, 553 P.2d 603, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1172
(1977).
125. See, e.g., May Dep't Stores Co. v. Teamsters Local 743, 64 Ill. 2d 153, 355 N.E.2d
7 (1976).
126. Section 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970), provides, in pertinent part:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage
in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise, handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or
restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce,
where in either case an object thereof is(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or
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been made an unfair labor practice under the federal statute;'7
exclusive jurisdiction to pass on the propriety of the union's activity has been delegated to the NLRB.128 The employer in this situation is not faced with a lack of remedies. He is entitled to petition
the Board for an expedited proceeding to determine the legality
of the trespass, 129 and he may also bring an action for damages
caused by an illegal secondary boycott under section 303 of the
Labor Management Relations Act.13
The New York Court of Appeals, therefore, was incorrect in
finding that it had jurisdiction to decide People v. Bush."' The
union's conduct in Bush was both arguably protected as consumer picketing and arguably prohibited as a secondary boycott.
If the activity was in fact consumer picketing, the danger of state
regulation of conduct protected by the NLRA was realized. If, on
the other hand, the union's picketing of the retailer, who sold
goods manufactured by a company with which the union was on
requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization
as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been
certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section
159 of this title [section 9]: Provided, That nothing contained in this clause
(B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any
primary strike or primary picketing;
. . .Provided further, That . . . nothing contained in [this] paragraph
shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose
of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor
organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer with
whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by
another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing
any individual employed by any person other than the primary employer in the
course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods,
or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in
such distribution ....
127. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 475, 481 (1955).
128. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
129. Section 10 (1), 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1970), provides, in pertinent part:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice
within the meaning of paragraph (4)(A), (B), or (C) [of § 8(b); or § 8(e) or §
8(b)(7)] the preliminary investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith
and given priorityover all other cases except cases of like character in the office
where it is filed or to which it is referred. [Emphasis added].
130. 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1970), provides, in pertinent part: "Whoever shall be injured
in his business or property by reason or [sic] any violation [of section 8(b)(4)] may sue
therefor in any district court of the United States . . . or in any other court having
jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost
of the suit."
131. 39 N.Y.2d 529, 349 N.E.2d 832, 384 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1976). See text accompanying
notes 57-62 supra.
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strike, was, in fact, a secondary boycott, then the regulation of
this conduct was within the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB.
Jurisdiction lies exclusively in the Board, for, as the Supreme
Court has determined, a "[c]onflict in technique can be as fully
disruptive to the system Congress erected as a conflict in overt
2
policy."

3

In situations where the union trespass occurs as part of an
alleged unfair labor practice, the employer may petition directly
133
to the National Labor Relations Board to halt such activity.
The preemption of state trespass laws will not result in any hiatus
of remedies, as the Board, not the state courts, has jurisdiction
over conduct involving violations of the National Labor Relations
Act. Thus, the New York Court of Appeals' ruling in Bush that
it had jurisdiction over union trespass in the instance of an arguable secondary boycott was irrational and unnecessary, particularly where the employer had the right and the opportunity to
petition the Board to restrain the union's conduct.
Trespass and RecognitionalPicketing
Union trespass may also occur when the union engages in
picketing on the employer's property, either in an attempt to
induce employees to join the union or for the purpose of obtaining
recognition from the employer as the bargaining representative of
his employees. The 1959 amendments to the NLRA placed great
restrictions'34 on this once "time honored trade union organizing
132. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge,
403 U.S. 274, 287 (1971).
133. Section 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970), lists the union activities proscribed by
the Act. Section 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970), grants the Board the power to prevent unfair
labor practices.
134. Pub. L. No. 86-110, 73 Stat. 542 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970)). Section
8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970), provides, in pertinent part:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
-(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be
picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of
his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept
or select such labor organization as their collective bargaining representative,
unless such labor organization is currently certified as the representative of such
employees: (A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with
this subchapter any other labor organization and a question concerning representation may not appropriately be raised under [section 9(c)], (B) where
within the preceding twelve months a valid election under [section 9(c)] has
been conducted, or (C) where such picketing has been conducted without a
petition under [section 9(c)] being filed within a reasonable period of time not
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practice."' 35 Where the employer has not lawfully recognized another union, and where there has not been a valid election for
representation within the preceding twelve months, a union,
without filing for an election, may picket for recognition for a
reasonable time (not to exceed thirty days).' After this period of
time such activity is considered violative of the Act. When a
union engages in picketing for recognition, state courts clearly
have "no jurisdiction to issue an injunction or adjudicate [the]
controversy, which [lies] within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
37
NLRB."
In these situations, as in trespass cases arguably involving a
secondary boycott, the no-man's land really does not exist and
the state courts thus have no justification for retaining jurisdiction. If the employer feels victimized by the union's picketing for
recognition on his property, he may charge the union with an
unfair labor practice, resulting in an expedited proceeding on the
issue.13
Confronting this situation, the California Supreme Court in
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
3 9 was correct in refusing
Carpenters'
to enjoin as trespass arguably protected union conduct which also arguably consisted of
recognitional picketing. Any legal hiatus which 'Might exist by the
preemption of state trespass law would have existed thirty days
at most.4 0 The danger of allowing state courts to retain jurisdiction and thus possibly enjoin protected activity is so great that,
in any situation arguably involving recognitional picketing, state
trespass law should be preempted. The employer is always free
to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing:. . . Provided
further, That nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit
any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public
(including consumers) that an employer does not employ members of, or have
a contract with, a labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to
induce any individual employed by any other person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any

services.
135. Goldberg and Meiklejohn, Title VII: Taft-HartleyAmendments, with Emphasis
on Legislative History, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 747, 760 (1960).
136. See note 134 supra.In addition, the Act specifically provides that union activity
aimed at recognition which takes the form of publicity picketing shall not be proscribed.
137. Local 438, Constr. & Gen. Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 546-47 (1963).
138. See note 129 supra.
139. 17 Cal. 3d 893, 553 P.2d 603, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct.
1172 (1977).
140. See id. at 905, 553 P.2d at 613, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 453.
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to file with the Board, which retains exclusive jurisdiction over
the dispute, if he wishes to halt the union activities.
Trespass by union organizers:The true no-man's land
Where the union trespass occurs as part of an activity arguably prohibited by the NLRA, such as secondary boycotts or
recognitional picketing, the problem of a hiatus of legal remedies
is nonexistent. Only when union organizers enter company
property without an NLRB determination that they are entitled
to do so is the employer left without a remedy. The activity is
protected by section 7 only if it can be shown that the organizers
had no other sufficient access to the employees."' On the other
hand, union trespass alone is not an unfair labor practice, and
thus does not fit under the "arguably prohibited" aspect of
Garmon.
The employer may have a qualified right to refuse union
organizers entry onto his property, but he is left in a no-law area
where there is no forum available to enforce this right.' He is
unable to appeal to the NLRB as there has been no violation of
federal law and, as the conduct is arguably protected by federal
law, state law is preempted. It is in this situation that the employer truly finds himself in a no-man's land, forced to resort to
self-help to remove the trespassers from his land and thereby
subject himself to charges of violating the NLRA.4 3 Allowing
state laws of general application to apply to this situation does
not seem to be the answer, for to do so would emasculate the
Garmon rule altogether."' As the goal of preemption is to keep
labor disputes out of the hands of state authorities and within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, one solution may be to amend
the National Labor Relations Act making it an unfair labor practice for a union organizer to trespass onto company property when
other reasonable means of communication are available.'45
This alternative, however, is not very promising when one
considers that the NLRA has been amended only twice in its
forty-two years of existence. It thus appears to be "unrealistic to
141. See notes 85-92 supra and accompanying text.
142. See notes 93-96 supra and accompanying text.
143. A refusal to allow union organizers onto company property when the organizers
do not have sufficient access to otherwise make contact with the employer's workers is an
unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
144. See notes 119-120 supra and accompanying text.
145. Broomfield, supra note 14, at 571.
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look to Congress for particular changes in this branch of labor
46
law."'2
BALANCING THE INTERESTS-A PRACTICAL SOLUTION

Present case law makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to prevent union organizers from entering onto his property when the union has insufficient access to the employees. If
the union does have sufficient access, as determined by the
Board, union organizers may lawfully be excluded from the employer's property. The real problem arises when union organizers
come onto property where the employer believes they have no
right to enter. An analysis of the values to be protected in this
situation may clarify the problem and aid in formulating a feasible solution. A summary of the various interests involved follows:
The employer has an interest in maintaining the sanctity of
his property rights, and in having a forum to adjudicate these
rights when he feels a union has unlawfully entered onto his property.
The employees have an interest in being contacted by union
organizers and in fully exercising their rights to organize as guaranteed by section 7. A failure of contact by union organizers may
impair the employees' abilities to make a "free and unrestrained
choice"' 47 as contemplated by the Act.
The union has an interest in seeing that its organizational
campaign is not unjustly stifled by a state court injunction. The
notoriety of the labor injunction and its use against union activity
is well-documented."' The union also has an interest in having
its organizers solicit employees without risking state prosecutions
for criminal trespass.'
The federal government has an interest in seeing that congressional purpose is fulfilled. To accomplish this, it is necessary
to implement a uniform national labor policy, with the NLRB
having exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes and the states
not regulating disputes intended to be covered by the Act.
Balancing these interests, the most equitable solution would
be achieved by the promulgation of a rule by the NLRB15 0
Cox, supra note 6, at 1377.
A. Cox & D. BOK, CASES & MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw 144 (7th ed. 1969).
See F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
Gold, Union OrganizationalRights and the Concept of "Quasi-Public"Property,
49 MINN. L. REv. 505, 513 (1965). See also Broomfield, supra note 14, at 577.
150. For one example of the many situations where the Board has acted pursuant to
146.
147.
148.
149.
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whereby union organizers would be allowed onto the nonworking
areas of company property, during nonworking hours, for a period
fixed by the Board (one month, for example)., 51 At the end of this

period, a presumption' 2 should arise that the union has had sufficient access to enable the employees to fully exercise their section 7 rights. If the organizers remain on the company property
after this specified period, or if the organizers come onto working
its rulemaking powers, see Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 61 L.R.R.M. 1217 (1966). For another proposal in this area involving the rulemaking power of the National Labor Relations
Board, see Broomfield, supra note 14, at 571-77.
151. In Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 392, 546 P.2d
687, 128 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1976), the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA) (CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1140-1166 (West
1975)). Dealing with farmworkers who are not covered by the NLRA, the California Labor
Relations Board, pursuant to its rulemaking power, granted to farm labor organizers a
qualified right of access to the grower's property. CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 8, pt. II, ch. 9,
§§ 20900-20901 (1975). The relevant parts of this regulation are as follows:
5. Accordingly, the Board will consider the rights of employees under Labor
Code Sec. 1152 to include the right of access by union organizers to the premises
of an agricultural employer for the purpose of organizing, subject to the following limitations:
a. Organizers may enter the property of an employer for a total period of
60 minutes before the start of work and 60 minutes after the completion of work
to meet and talk with employees in areas in which employees congregate before
and after working.
b. In addition, organizers may enter the employer's property for a total
period of one hour during the working day for the purpose of meeting and talking
with employees during their lunch period, at such location or locations as the
employees eat their lunch. If there is an established lunch break, the one-hour
period shall include such lunch break. If there is no established lunch break, the
one-hour period may be at any time during the working day.
c. Access shall be limited to two organizers for each work crew on the
property, provided that if there are more than 30 workers in a crew, there may
be one additional organizer for every 15 additional workers.
d. Upon request, organizers shall identify themselves by name and labor
organization to the employer or his agent. Organizers shall also wear a badge or
other designation of affiliation.
e. The right of access shall not include conduct disruptive of the employer's property or agricultural operations, including injury to crops or machi.
nery. Speech by itself shall not be considered disruptive conduct. Disruptive
conduct by particular organizers shall not be grounds for expelling organizers
not engaged in such conduct, nor for preventing future access.
f. Pending further regulation by the [Agricultural Labor Relations
Board, this regulation shall not apply after the results of an election held pur.
suant to this act have been certified.
Acting pursuant to its rulemaking power, the NLRB can grant to union organizers subject
to the Act similar qualified rights of access.
152. See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). For a discussion of the use of presumptions in cases involving the right of access, see C. MoanIs, THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 82-86 (1971). For a collection of cases where the Board and the
courts have applied these presumptions to cases involving union access, see Gould, The
Question of Union Activity on Company Property, 18 VAND. L. REV. 73, 75-76 (1964).
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areas during working time, the Board will be empowered to
charge the union with an unfair labor practice. Section 8(b) (1) (A)
of the Act may be read to make it an unfair labor practice for
union organizers to come onto company property when the union
has sufficient access to reach the employees in another manner. 53
An expedited proceeding would be made available 54 whereby an
employer charging the union organizers with this unfair labor
practice would be able to petition the Board and obtain a temporary restraining order to keep the organizers off his property until
the NLRB could hold a hearing on the issue. 5'
In the typical situation, a union organizer will come onto an
employer's property to solicit and distribute literature, be asked
to leave, and refuse. 5 ' The employer may then file a notice with
the NLRB stating that a union organizer has entered onto his
153. Section 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970) provides in pertinent part: "It shall be
an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(1) to restrain or coerce (A)
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [section 7]." While it may be novel
to have the Board interpret this provision to include trespass by union organizers who
already have sufficient access, it is not unprecedented. In 1957 the NLRB interpreted §
8(b)(1)(A) to include union recognitional picketing as an unfair labor practice. Curtis
Bros., Inc., 41 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1957). In that case it was noted that "[tihe words 'restrain
and coerce' appear in both 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(1)(A). As Senator Taft stated, the Board has
interpreted 8(a)(1) for years and '[a]ll that is attempted is to apply the same provisions
with exact equality to labor unions.' "Id. at 1034 (Jenkins, member, concurring) (footnote
omitted). This expansive reading of § 8(b)(1)(A) was reversed by the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Drivers Local 689, 362 U.S. 274 (1960). That decision, however, does not militate
against the proposal of an expansive reading of § 8(b)(1)(A) in the context of union
organizer's trespassory activity for two reasons: (1) The Supreme Court's decision in
Drivers Local 689 was based upon the fact that the Board's expansive reading of §
8(b)(1)(A) constituted a restriction upon the union's right to strike, specifically protected
by § 13 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1970). See NLRB v. Drivers Local 689, 362 U.S. 274,
282 (1960). Expanding § 8(b)(1)(A) in this situation would not limit the union's right to
strike, nor would it limit any other rights guaranteed by the Act. (2) By the time the
Supreme Court had decided DriversLocal 689, the 1959 Amendments to the NLRA had
already been passed, thus resolving the problem of a no-law area by extensively regulating
recognitional picketing. The dilemma caused by union trespass on company property
shows no sign of being resolved, and it is the Board's duty to reconcile the conflict between
property and organizational rights. An expanded reading of § 8(b)(1)(A) in this context
would merely be an instance of rulemaking power by the Board acting as an expert agency
charged with administering the Act.
154. See note 129 supra.
155. Section 10(j), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1970) provides, in pertinent part:
The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint. . . charging that
any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition
any United States district court, within any district wherein the unfair labor
practice in question is alleged to have occurred or wherein such person resides
or transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order.
156. See, e.g., May Dep't Stores Co. v. Teamsters Local 743, 64111. 2d 153, 355 N.E.2d
7 (1976).
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property without permission. Pursuant to the proposed rule, the
organizer will be allowed to solicit in nonworking areas during
nonworking hours for the specified period. If after that period the
organizer remains on company property, or, if the organizer solicits in working areas, the employer may charge the union with the
expanded section 8(b)(1)(A) unfair labor practice, and obtain a
Board order restraining such activity. A hearing will then follow
to determine whether the union does, in fact, have sufficient access to the employees.
The effect of this proposal will be to preempt all state jurisdiction over union trespass. It is the Board's exclusive duty to
balance the conflict between property and organizational
rights.' 7 This rule, allowing union organizers onto company property for a specified period, should be a helpful tool for achieving
such a balance. Furthermore, the rule would take the employer
out of the no-man's land that was thought to justify state intrusion into an area of federal regulation. The proposal thus accommodates both sides of the labor-management dispute while preserving the basic tenets of Garmon. It should bring about greater
stability in the field of labor -relations while, at the same time,
preserving the delicate balance of property and organizational
rights that stands as the foundation of governmental labor policy.
CONCLUSION.

The federal goal of uniformity in labor relations has been
placed in jeopardy recently by the conflict among the states respecting their right to adjudicate cases of union trespass. This
conflict has resulted in a hiatus of legal remedies for the aggrieved
employer who finds himself in a "no-man's land" where neither
the state courts nor the National Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction to determine the propriety of the union's activity.
A nonrecognized union may engage in trespass for a variety
of purposes: It may picket to exert pressure on a neutral secondary employer; it may picket to obtain recognition; or it may solicit
employees on company property as part of an organizational campaign. When union trespass is "arguably prohibited" by the
NLRA, the employer may petition directly to the National Labor
Relations Board for relief, thus taking himself out of the judicial
"no-man's land." The necessity of state jurisdiction manifests
itself only when union trespass occurs during an organizational
157. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
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campaign. The solution to the employer's dilemma caused by
federal labor law preemption of state trespass law can thus be
resolved by initially focusing on the nature of the trespass. Congress has provided in the National Labor Relations Act that the
NLRB have exclusive jurisdiction over activities covered by the
Act. Picketing for recognition and picketing to exert pressure on
a secondary employer are activities carefully regulated by the
Act. As primary jurisdiction has been vested in the Board, the
problem of a hiatus of legal remedies does not exist in these
situations. If the employer files a complaint with respect to the
union's picketing, the Board will conduct an expedited proceeding to determine the propriety of the conduct. State jurisdiction
over union trespass in these situations should be preempted.
With respect to trespass during a union's organizational
campaign-where the true "no-man's" land exists-this comment suggests that proper exercise of the Board's rulemaking
power can provide for a qualified right of access for union organizers and, at the same time, preserve the employer's right of control
over his property. Reciprocal unfair labor practice charges against
the employer and the union can be used to enforce this qualified
right of access and to guard against abuse of this privilege. This
proposal will solve the problem of denying an employer a forum
to adjudicate his rights, while furthering the goal of national uniformity in labor relations by preempting all state jurisdiction in
cases involving union trespass.
Ezra D. Singer
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